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This Volume is dedicated to
Late Prof. Sanghasen Singh
for his long services in the field of
Buddhist Studies and in the promotion of the
Teachings of the Buddha

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The Maha Bodhi is the bi-annual journal of the Maha Bodhi Society of India, Headquarters, Kolkata. The Journal seeks to publish quality, peer-reviewed articles (English) on any aspect of Pali and Buddhism. Contributions should be submitted to the Editor. Books for Review should also be sent to the Editor Prof. Bimalendra Kumar (Email: bimal_bhu_60@yahoo.co.in / bimalendrakumar9@gmail.com / mbsihq@gmail.com).

Editor-in-Chief's Note

I am happy to bring forth before the scholars, researchers, readers and lovers of Buddhism, this 133rd Volume No. 1 of the *Mahabodhi Journal*. I would like to thank our learned contributors for their continuing effort and support for this Journal. There are altogether nine articles, one Book Review, one obituary and Notes and News in the end. This volume has been dedicated in honour of Prof. Sanghasen Singh, who had been an active Life Member of the Maha Bodhi Society of India and one of the members of Advisory Committee of *The Maha Bodhi Journal* for long time. He has dedicated his whole life in the field of Pali and Buddhist Studies and in the promotion of the teachings of the Buddha. He also devoted his life to the cause of the weaker and the marginalized people in the society.

I hope that the present volume of the Journal will be appreciated by the scholars and lovers of the Buddhism across the world.

Bhavatu Sabba Maṅgalaṃ

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Editor's Note

We are glad to place in the hands of the scholars, students, researchers, and lovers of Buddhism the 133rd Volume No. 1 of *The Mahabodhi Journal*. The articles of this volume are containing the aspects of Buddhist studies. There are altogether nine articles, one Book Review and one obituary. The volume begins with a research paper By Prof. Mahesh Deokar on '*Buddhism and Democracy*'. In this article, an attempt is made to identify the principles of Democracy. The author concludes that the Buddha through his conduct and teachings impressed upon his followers the democratic principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. He applied these principles to create a model of ideal society, religion, and polity. The Buddhist Saṅgha followed this model even after the passing away of its master. It showed the world that democracy can be successful, if it is practiced in its letter and spirit. As long as the Saṅgha practiced democracy with utmost sincerity, it remained a powerful force of social and religious reform.

The second paper has been presented on the topic '*A Note on Buddhist Education*' by Prof. Pradeep Gokhale. He says that education system should not bifurcate between moral education and professional education. It should be implied by the concept of right livelihood (*samyak ājīva*), one of the limbs in the noble eight-fold path. This also suggests that today the Buddhist education should be more laity-oriented than it was before. Buddhist educational system, like any traditional religious educational system has to come to terms with science.

Prof. Dilip Kumar Mohanta in his research paper on 'Buddhist Logic and its Development has tried to show the historical development of epistemic logic as developed by the Buddhist philosophers and their relevance for our time. This development of logic differs because of difference in ontological presuppositions. Accordingly, there is difference among philosophers of the same school in broad sense.

Venerable Dr. Brenda Huong X. Ly (Bhikkhuni Thong Niem) presents a picture of the knowledge related to the Nikāyas in her paper on '*Progressive Development of Knowledge (Paññā) in The Concept of Emptiness (Suññatā) in Nikāya.*' Concepts of *suññatā* in Pāli literature are presented in simple and concise language at the level of learning and contemplation. However, it would very difficult to attain knowledge from practice as one needs to practice insightful meditation (*vipassanā*) in order to gain the true knowledge from experience and penetration.

Md. Ashikuzzaman Khan Kiron attempts to search a concept *Lālan* Philosophy on the World Philosophy and says that the philosophy propagated by *Lālan* is undoubtedly comparable to world philosophy. He tried to establish his philosophy through his songs. His songs are not only songs, but also his thoughts, which are found in harmony with the thoughts of the great philosophers of the world.

Venerable Thailafru Mog investigates to study the influence of *Saddhā* in his article and concludes that *Saddhā* plays a crucial role in both personal and social development, contributing to the promotion of peace in society. It serves as a guide for cultivating wholesomeness, acting as a fundamental influence in the birth of virtuous actions. Any mental action devoid of *saddhā* lacks the potential for wholesomeness. Consequently, *saddhā* significantly impacts the wholesome mental factors of individuals.

'*An Analysis of Dharmakīrti's Refutation to the Mind-Body Relations with A Special Reference to the Commentaries of Tibetan Scholars*' by Ms. Tenzin Minkyi attempts to throw light on commentarial differences among scholars and she has presented an analytical study on Dharmakīrti's refutation to the opponent's view of the mind-body relation. The main concept of refuting these relations is to prove the possibility of attaining a compassionate mind if one accustoms its homogenous causes for many lives.

Dr. Anil Kumar Tiwari in his interesting research paper on *Identifying Persons: A Dialectic in the Ātmavādapratiṣedha* suggests that the Buddhist understanding of a person as a 'convenient designator' provides significant insight into the contemporary debate on the continued existence of a person.

The next paper '*Majjhima-magga* and *Nibbānic Consciousness*: *A Historical Sketch of the Buddha's Wandering for Enlightenment*' presents information regarding the stages of Nibbāna. Dr. Anand Singh summarises that an *Arahanta* is a person who has eliminated all the unwholesome roots and after that, he will not take any rebirth in any world. It is a stage of final consciousness or *Nibbāna* and after attainment of it, the five aggregates will continue to function with the help of physical vitality. But once the *Arahanta* dies and with the disintegration of his physical body, the five aggregates will cease to function and it will end all traces of existence in the phenomenal world and thus total release from the misery of *saṁsāra*. Hence, removal of all sensual desires is essential for a seeker to progress on the path to *nibbāna*.

Last article is the 'Book Review' done by Prof. Sanghasen Singh, a well-known scholar of Buddhist Studies. Prof. Singh has reviewed the book '*Dictionary of Early Buddhist Monastic Terms*' by Prof. C S Upasak. There is Obituary in honour of Prof. Sanghasen Singh who had been active life member and well-wisher of Maha Bodhi Society of India. He had been also member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the *Mahabodhi Journal* for so many years. In the end, there is Notes and News of the activities of Maha Bodhi Society of India.

I would to put record my sincere gratitude and thanks to Venerable P Seewali Thero, General Secretary, Maha Bodhi Society of India for his inspiration and encouragement as well as reposing his trust on me in bringing out and continuing this *Mahabodhi Journal*. I sincerely appreciate the efforts of the scholars for their contributions to this Volume. Without their active support and cooperation, this volume would not have been published. I also put on record my gratitude to esteemed Board of Editors as well as members of the Editorial Advisory Board for their cooperation. Thanks, are also due to Shri Hari Talukadar and Shri Avijit Karmakar of Rohini Nandan, Kolkata for printing this volume neatly and beautifully.

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Contents

Buddhism and Democracy

Mahesh A. Deokar*

A question may be asked whether democracy is a modern phenomenon, which India has adopted from the west, particularly from the French revolution. Was there a concept of democracy in ancient India? If yes, then what was the form of that democracy? Were there democratic institutions and practices prevalent in this part of the world? Let us explore the Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist literature to find out answers to these questions in the following pages.

The proposed article will try to bring forth the golden chapter of Indian democracy. It will demonstrate how the modern democratic values were embedded in Buddha's teachings, and how they were given a sacred status. It will also throw light on the Buddhist Saṅgha as an ideal socialist democratic institution and its democratic praxis. The article will be divided into the following sections: 1. Introduction, 2. Political scenario in the sixth century India, 3. The Buddha as a champion of democratic way of life, 4. Democratic values embedded in Buddhism, 5. Saṅgha as a democratic institute, and 6. Democratic praxis in the Saṅgha.

Introduction

The core of democracy is the democratic principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, which guide democratic institutions and praxis. As far as political democracy is concerned, legislature, executive council and judiciary are its institutions whereas election, collective decision-making and governance are its praxis.[1] Democracy however, is not simply a mode of governance based on majority rule. It is "primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoined communicated experience"[2] (Ambedkar 2010: 57). Ambedkar argued that the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity are essential for an ideal society, an ideal democracy, and an ideal religion (Gokhale 2022: 19).

Among the modern scholars, Acharya Dharmanand Kosambi and Dr. B. R. Ambedkar are the two prominent figures, who tried to trace the roots of modern democracy in Buddhism. Both of them believed that Buddhism carries in it the spirit of social and political democracy. It is reflected in the life and teachings of the Buddha, and has percolated in the functioning of the Buddhist order (Saṅgha). In 1910, in his letter to the Marathi newspaper *Kesari*, Kosambi traces the roots of democracy in the North-Indian republics at the time of

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[1]For an overview of the history of the concept of democracy, cf. an article 'Buddhism and Democracy' by Lewis R. Lancaster, published in the *Hsi Lai Journal of Humanistic Buddhism,* vol. V, 2004, pp. 14–19.

[2]Cf. Annihilation of Caste, an article originally prepared as a presidential address for the 1936 annual conference of the Jat-Pat-Todak Mandal of Lahore.

the Buddha and those of socialist principle of collective ownership in the Buddhist Saṅgha (Kosambi, Meera 2010: 312–315). Ambedkar in his 1954 speech on the All India Radio said "[p]ositively my social philosophy may be said to be enshrined in three words - liberty, equality and fraternity. Let no one, however say that I have borrowed my philosophy from the French Revolution. I have not. My philosophy has roots in religion and not in political science. I have derived them from the teachings of my master, the Buddha" (Ambedkar 2003: 503).

In order to get a proper perspective on this issue, let us look at the background on which Buddhism flourished.

Political scenario in the sixth century India

As per the Pali literary records Buddhism appeared on the Indian scene in the sixth century BCE. It was the period of transition in the Indian society in terms of politics, economics and religious thoughts. On the political front smaller republics of northern India were getting absorbed in to newly emerging empires. In the economic field the hunting, gathering and pastoral economy was changing in to an agrarian and commercial economy. With the growth in trade and commerce there emerged new cities giving rise to urbanization. If we look at the religious scenario, the Vedic religion of bloody sacrifices and social order based on the hierarchical *varṇa* system was being challenged by the Upaniṣadic and Śramaṇic teachers.

The Pali and the Sanskrit Buddhist literature provides us ample information about Indian polity at the time of the Buddha. It tells us about the existence of sixteen sovereign regions (*mahājanapada*) of Aṅga, Magadha, Kāsi, Kosala, Vajji, Malla, Cedi, Vaṃsa, Kuru, Pañcāla, Maccha, Surasena, Assaka, Avanti, Gandhāra, and Kamboja (Cf. A IV p. 252, and LV pp. 20–23). Since these are always mentioned in plural, in all probability they were oligarchies governed by a group of elites. These elites were called king (*rājā*), whereas, their president was called the great king (*mahārājā*) (Kosambi 1989: 30). It seems that by the time of the Buddha except the small republic states of Vajjis of Vaiśālī, Mallas of Pāvā and Mallas of Kusinārā, all other republics gradually got absorbed in to the newly emerging monarchies of Magadha and Kosala. The Buddha himself was born in the Sakyan republic of Kapilavastu. However, it is not included in the list of the sixteen *janapada*s mentioned above. This shows that by that time Kapilavastu was already under the dominion of the Kosala kingdom.

Kosambi in his book 'Bhagavān Buddha', (1989: 47 ff.) observes that the luxurious lifestyle of the oligarchs (*gaṇarājā*) and increasing dominance of Brahmins in politics seem to be primarily responsible for the downfall of the republics. The rule of these oligarchs was tyrannizing for the common people. They did not have any control over such rulers. It is not at all surprising that people harassed by oligarchs preferred autocracy over oligarchy.

Since Brahmins could enjoy important positions in the monarchies, they became its strong supporters. The fact that there is no reference to the small republics in Brahmanical texts suggests that Brahmins were not in favour of such republics. Besides this, the monarchs were great patrons of sacrifices. They bestowed gifts and lands upon Brahmins who performed sacrifices. Thus, with mutual support monarchy and priesthood attained supremacy in the society.

From the Buddhist texts it becomes quite clear that at the time of the Buddha śramaṇic culture had started gaining popularity in the society. Śramaṇas had deep respect for the republics, which did not favour the culture of sacrifices. However, they were so busy with their own spiritual progress that they had no time and will to improve the deteriorating condition of the republics (Kosambi 1989: 48). In Pali discourses like *Mahāsudassanasutta* and *Cakkavattisutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* (nos. 17 and 26) we rather find the glorification of the Wheel turning monarch (*Cakkavattin*). Such a monarch is however, distinguished from the Brahmanic model of kingship. The Brahmanic king performs many sacrifices and takes care only of the Brahmins. The *cakravartin* king of the Buddhists is however, diligent in making everyone happy by ruling over them righteously. He establishes peace in the kingdom and advices the subjects to observe the five moral precepts. The Buddha praised such a *cakravartin* king and was himself called *Dharmacakravartin* by his followers. Similarly, in two later texts ascribed to a famous Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna, namely, *Suhṛllekha* (Letter to a Friend) and *Ratnāvalī* (A Garland of Jewels), an advice has been given to kings about ruling the state following the Buddhist moral values without asking them to accept the democratic polity. Here, the emphasis is rather on the overall welfare of the subjects and the righteous mode of governance, but not on the type of government.[3] The same attitude can be observed throughout Buddhist literature, especially in the Pali chronicles which are full of praise for righteous kings and censure for the unrighteous ones. Despite these facts, it is quite clear that the Buddha certainly had great respect for the republics. He however, could not do much to save the republics from losing their sovereignty. One can get a fair idea of his love for the republics and the democratic way of life from his discourses and the constitution of his monastic order.

The Buddha as a champion of democratic way of life

When one looks at Buddha's personality, one can clearly see that he was an embodiment of the democratic values of liberty, equality, and fraternity. As pointed out by Ambedkar in

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[3]In this connection Garfield (2016: 271), rightly observes: Buddhism has nothing to say about the appropriate form of government. Nāgārjuna's letters are addressed to king. But in these letters we find neither a conservative royalist defense of monarchy nor a revolutionary tract calling for a democratic order. Nāgārjuna is silent about these matters, focusing instead on the goods the state must deliver: hospitals, roadside resthouses, good water supply, care for animals, schools, and so on. Buddhism emerges in these texts as a theory about the good, silent about procedures, except for the general implicit proviso that only procedures capable of facilitating the pursuit of that good are legitimate."

his *magnum opus The Buddha and His Dhamma*, (1957: 215–217), unlike in the other theist religions "[t]he Buddha claimed no place for Himself in His Own Dhamma." Nor did he avail any special privileges as the head of the religion. In this way he did not raise himself above other members of the Saṅgha. He thereby ensured equality of status and feeling of brotherhood among them.

Another important fact pointed out by Ambedkar about him is that "[t]he Buddha did not claim any Divinity for Himself or for His Dhamma. It was discovered by man for man. It was not a Revelation" (Ambedkar 1957: 221–222). Hence, the Buddha did not demand absolute surrender to him from his disciples. Nor did he consider his teachings to be infallible or beyond logical scrutiny. In this way the Buddha did not encourage authoritarianism of any sort.

According to an incidence reported in the *Vinayapiṭaka*, *Mahāvagga* of the Pali canon, (Vin. I pp. 20–21 and Horner 2007: 28) when the number of the enlightened monks (*arahat*s) in the Saṅgha reached sixty, the Buddha told them that they were equal to him with respect to their mental purity, and hence should go to different places to teach the doctrine just like him. Later, he also allowed them to ordain new monks in to the Saṅgha (Vin I 21–22 and Horner 2007: 28–29). When the time passed on, he delegated all his powers to the Saṅgha making it a self-reliant body. Through this the Buddha could inculcate in his Saṅgha the ideas of federalism and fraternity.

The Buddha admonished his disciples not to give importance to him as an individual, i.e., his material body (*rūpakāya*). He rather advised them to give prominence to his teachings, i.e., the *dhamma*-body (*dhammakāya*). In the *Vakkalisutta* of the *Saṃyuttanikāya* the Buddha said to the monk Vakkali "Enough, Vakkali! Why do you want to see this foul body? One who sees the Dhamma sees me; one who sees me sees the Dhamma. For in seeing the Dhamma, Vakkali, one sees me; and in seeing me, one sees the Dhamma"[4] (Bodhi 2000: 939). Such an advice is quite significant from the point of democracy, in which democratic values are of paramount importance, and not the individual. Ambedkar in his speech given in the Constitution Assembly cautioned the members against the danger of hero worship, which is the greatest enemy of democracy. In his opinion "[t]his caution is far more necessary in the case of India than in the case of any other country, for in India, Bhakti or what may be called the path of devotion or hero-worship, plays a part in its politics unequalled in magnitude by the part it plays in the politics of any other country in the world. Bhakti in religion may be a road to the salvation of the soul. But in politics, bhakti or hero-worship is a sure road to degradation and to eventual dictatorship" (Ambedkar 1994: 1215–1216).

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[4] *"alaṁ Vakkali kiṁ te iminā pūtikāyena diṭṭhena. yo kho Vakkali dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati. yo maṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati. dhammaṃ hi Vakkali passanto maṃ passati maṃ passanto dhammaṃ passati."* (S III p. 120)

In part III (*The Appointment of a Successor*) of book VII *The Wanderer's Last Journey* of *The Buddha and His Dhamma*, Ambedkar has brought forth Buddha's wisdom in not appointing a successor. In the traditional account found in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* (no. 16), the Buddha tells Ānanda that his disciples should not think that after the passing away of the Buddha, the teaching is without the teacher. He assures Ānanda that after the death of the Tathāgata, his teaching and discipline would be their teacher[5] (Walshe 2012: 269–270). In this assurance Ambedkar saw Buddha's love for democracy and opposition to dictatorship. According to him, the Buddha believed that "[m]ajority agreements is the way to settle the disputes and not the appointment of a successor" (1957: 548).

Kosambi (1989: 131) feels that because the Buddha did not appoint any successor to him and laid the authority in the Saṅgha ruled by the moral code of discipline in the form of the Vinaya rules, his Saṅgha could remain united and could function smoothly. In the same context, in the twelfth chapter of his book *Bhagavān Buddha*, Kosambi (1989: 214) clearly points out that the Buddha had no wish to become a leader of his Saṅgha. He rather wanted his disciples to be self-reliant and reliant on his teachings. Thus, the Buddha not only championed the democratic values, but also lived them to the fullest.

Democratic values embedded in Buddhism

Ambedkar cherished democratic values as values of the modern world. He locates the trinity of liberty, equality, and fraternity in the Buddha's advice to Vajjis found in the *Mahāparinibbānasutta* of the *Dīghanikāya*. The Buddha asked Vajjis to assemble frequently for discussing their problems, to be united, to take collective decisions, to abide by the rules and regulations of the land, to respect women and elders, to revere holy men and holy places of all faiths, and not to disturb religious practices of holy men (D II pp. 73–75 and Walshe 2012: 231–232). Ambedkar summarizes the said discourse saying "so long as the Vajjins believe in democracy and practise democracy there is no danger to their State" (1957: 408).[6]

Let us now examine Buddha's teachings in order to locate the trinity of liberty, equality, and fraternity and to understand their nature according to the Buddha.[7]

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[5]*"siyā kho pan' Ānanda tumhākam evam assa: "atītasatthukaṃ pāvacanaṃ, n' atthi no satthā" ti. na kho pan' etam Ānanda evaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. yo vo Ānanda mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto, so vo mam' accayena satthā."* (D II p. 154)

[6]For understanding the relevance of the Buddha's advice to Vajjis in the context of the modern democracy, cf. the article 'The Buddha's Discourse on Defending Democracy: Seven Questions from The Canon for testing The Health of a Nation' by Jamyang Norbu, published in Tricycle Magazine, Winter 2020,

[7]For a detailed discussion on this topic from the point of view of Dr. Ambedkar cf. the article entitled 'Trinity in Buddhism: Dr. B. R. Ambedkar's Perspective' by Pradeep P. Gokhale, published in *The Journal of Foundational Research of the Department of Philosophy,* Rajasthan University, Vol. xxx no. 1, January 2022, pp. 19–28.

Liberty

Although the Buddha did not define liberty and did not spell out individual's rights, he did advocate freedom of different sorts. According to Gokhale (2022: 23), as far as Buddhism is concerned, the concept of liberty can be understood in terms of freedom of thinking, freedom of speech, freedom to choose one's profession, freedom to acquire property, and so on.

A. Freedom of thought

Although the Buddha taught morality, "the morality he prescribed was not based on scriptural authority or divine commandment. It was based on free and rational thinking. Hence in the Buddha's thought human freedom and morality went together" (Gokhale 2022: 23). In the *Kesamuttisutta*, which is popularly known as the *Kālāmasutta* (no. 3.65) of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* the Buddha asked Kālāmas to judge whether an action is good or bad based on the intention with which it is performed, its appraisal by the wise, and its impact on oneself and the society (A I pp. 189–192 and Woodward 1979: 172–175).

In the discourses like the *Tevijjasutta* (no. 13) of the *Dīghanikāya*, the Buddha questioned the infallibility of so-called religious texts and their teachers (D I pp. 238–239 and Walshe 2012: 188–189). In the *Vīmaṃsakasutta* (no. 47) of the *Majjhimanikāya* and the *Kālāmasutta* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* he rather encouraged the spirit of free enquiry and questioning the authority of any sort. In the *Vīmaṃsakasutta* the Buddha advised his disciples "Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu who is an inquirer, not knowing how to gauge another's mind, should make an investigation of the Tathāgata in order to find out whether or not he is fully enlightened"[8] (Bodhi 2001: 415). Similarly, in the *Kālāmasutta* the Buddha said to Kālāmas "Ye, Kālāmas, you may well doubt, you may well waver. In a doubtful matter wavering does arise"[9] (Woodward 1979: 171). In another famous stanza the Buddha asked his disciples not to accept his teaching out of their respect for him, but only after its thorough scrutiny, just like a goldsmith, who accepts gold after examining it by hitting, cutting and rubbing on the touchstone.[10] In other words, the Buddha gave his disciples liberty of thought and expression, which are vital for a healthy democracy.

B. Freedom of speech

The greatest statement of the Buddha on freedom of speech can be found in the *Ambaṭṭhasutta* (no. 3) of the *Dīghanikāya*. While responding to the young Brahmin Ambaṭṭha's complain against the Śākyas of Kapilavastu about their talking freely in the assembly, the Buddha said "But Ambaṭṭha, even the quail, that little bird, can talk as she likes

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[8] *"vīmaṃsakena bhikkhave bhikkhunā parassa cetopariyāyaṃ ājānantena Tathāgate samannesanā kātabbā sammāsambuddho vā no vā iti viññāṇāyā ti."* (M I p. 317)

[9] *alaṁ hi vo Kālāmā kaṅkhituṃ alaṃ vicikicchituṃ. kaṅkhānīye va pana vo ṭhāne vicikicchā uppannā.* (A I p. 189)

[10] *tāpāc cchedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ | parīkṣya madvaco grāhyaṃ bhikṣavo na tu gauravāt*

in her own nest. Kapilavatthu is the Sakyans' home, Ambaṭṭha. They do not deserve censure for such a trifle"[11] (Walshe 2012: 114). This is in all probability the first known declaration of the fundamental right to speech. It implies that according to the Buddha, every human being, whether high or low, has equal right to expression. As mentioned above, in *sutta*s like the *Vīmaṃsakasutta* and the *Kālāmasutta* the Buddha has unequivocally accepted person's freedom to speech by rejecting authoritarianism, which is its greatest enemy.

C. Freedom of occupation and property

In the *Esukārīsutta* (no. 96) of the *Majjhimanikāya*, the Buddha opposed caste-based restriction on one's right to choose occupation. He challenged the authority of the Brahmins to determine and fix the privileges, duties, and occupations of the four *varṇa*s. He refuted them saying:

(i)   The people of all *varṇa*s have not given to Brahmins the right of fixing their privileges, duties, and occupations.

(ii) Moreover, imposing them unilaterally on people without their consent is improper and unethical.

The Buddha further adds that it is proper to serve a person serving whom one acquires welfare and moral virtue. To follow the noble dhamma is the duty of all (M II pp. 178–179 and Bodhi 2009: 786–787). Ambedkar interprets this as the Buddha's injunction to refuse those services, which make one bad and not good (Ambedkar 1957: 304).

Gokhale (2022: 25) suggests that the principle of right livelihood (*samyak-ājīva*) prescribed by the Buddha is relevant to the right to choose one's occupation. It implies that one may choose one's profession by applying moral criteria. According to the Buddha, there is nothing wrong in becoming rich or in accumulating property provided that one accumulates it by moral means. Although the monastics were not allowed to have the private property, such a prohibition was not applicable to the house-holders.

In fact, one can find a number of discourses in the Pali canon such as the *Dīghajāṇusutta* (no. 8.54) of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* advising the house-holders how to earn the wealth and how to use it rightfully. In this *sutta* (A IV 281–283), the Buddha identifies four ways that lead to happiness and well-being in the present life. The first two, he says, are the wealth of industry (*uṭṭhānasampadā*) and the wealth of protection (**ārakkhasampadā**). According to the Buddha, a lay person should be skilled at their craft in order to ensure success in their occupation. Having utilised their skills to generate wealth, the layperson must then protect this wealth from all conditions which may lead to loss. The next two principles are having good friends (*kalyāṇamittatā*) and living within one's resources (*samājīvitā*). Good friends

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[11] *"laṭukikā pi kho, Ambaṭṭha, sakuṇikā sake kulāvake kāmalāpinī hoti. sakaṃ kho pan' etaṃ Ambaṭṭha, Sakyānaṃ yad idaṃ Kapilavatthuṃ, na arahati yasmā Ambaṭṭho imāya appamattāya abhisajjitun ti."* (D I p.91)

with their qualities of conviction, virtue, generosity, and discernment would inspire one to emulate them. Whereas, the principle of balanced living implies that a lay person should generate wealth and then without leading a frugal life should spend it mindfully by being neither too stingy nor too extravagant. The Buddha further advises against activities that may lead to depletion of wealth (Rai forthcoming).

D. Freedom to education and acquiring knowledge

In the *Lohiccasutta* (no. 12) of the *Dīghanikāya* and later in the Tantric tradition in works like the *Vimalaprabhā* commentary on the *Kālacakratantra* (vol. I, pp. 40–41), it has been pointed out that the caste system has forcibly kept the low caste people ignorant by depriving them of the right to education (Bahulkar and Deokar 2012: 49–50). In the *Lohiccasutta* (D I pp. 227–230), the Buddha rejects the narrow outlook of the Brahmin Lohicca that only the higher classes should have access to knowledge. He advocates that knowledge should be freely distributed to people of all the classes (male as well as female); for, those who deny the right to knowledge to the lower classes (*śūdra*s and women) are danger-makers, unsympathetic, and hostile towards those who depend on them. They are the followers of the wrong doctrine (Ambedkar 1957: 287–290 and Walshe 2012: 182–183). In order to give knowledge to all, the Buddha admitted people of every *varṇa* and women to his Saṅgha and taught his dhamma to all without any discrimination.

Equality

As is well known, the Buddha was a great upholder of equality. Although he primarily argued against the caste inequality, it is quite clear from the Buddhist literature that he was also a strong supporter of the gender equality. He constantly argued in favour of the moral equality among all human beings, which in fact is at the root of equality of any form.

A. Caste equality

Ambedkar points out that the institution of caste is opposed to the cardinal principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity as it neither allows a person a choice of his own occupation nor gives him an equal status in the society as a human being nor does it promote the sense of fraternity or democracy, which is an associated form of living, among persons of different castes (Ambedkar 2010: 57). He further underlines the need for a religion to teach equality by saying that the religion preaches equality in order to "help the best to survive even though the best may not be the fittest" (Ambedkar 1957: 308).

The Buddha refuted the unjust and anti-social institution of caste in discourses such as the *Ambaṭṭhasutta* and the *Lohiccasutta* of the *Dīghanikāya* (no. 3 and 12), the *Assalāyanasutta* and the *Esukārīsutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya* (nos. 93 and 96), the *Vāseṭṭhasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya* (no. 98) and the *Suttanipāta* (no. 3.9), and the *Vasalasutta* of the *Suttanipāta* (no. 1.7). In these discourses he rejected the views supporting caste by proving

caste distinction to be irrational and unnatural, declaring it to be neither universal, eternal nor unalterable in all circumstances, highlighting biological equality, equality of potential, and equality with respect to the law of karma among all the classes and by showing the importance of moral virtues and knowledge as ultimate parameters of higher social status (Deokar 2021: 92–93).

The Buddha gave importance to action, morality, and knowledge. He emphasised that only by possessing high moral qualities and actions, not by birth, can one achieve high status in the society. According to the *Vāseṭṭhasutta*, since caste is not natural—to use Ambedkar's words—the worth of a person and not his birth alone should decide his status in society. The same is echoed in the *Vasalasutta* of the *Suttanipāta* (Deokar 2021: 91).

Gender equality

After his initial reluctance to establish a Saṅgha of women out of concern for their security and the monastic rule of celibacy, the Buddha wholeheartedly threw open the doors of his Saṅgha to women without discrimination. He acknowledged in unambiguous terms women's equal capacity to attain enlightenment just like men.[12] He treated them with equality and utmost dignity. This allowed women of different backgrounds to actualize their full potential as human beings and liberated them from the worldly bonds. A number of them became *arhat*s (the worthy ones) realizing the ultimate goal of the Buddhist path. In the *Etadaggavagga* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* nuns named Khemā and Dhammadinnā were praised by the Buddha for their wisdom and proficiency in explaining the doctrine at par with him.[13] In the *Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā Therī-apadāna* it is said "For it is well known that man alone is not wise on every occasion. A woman, who is watchful on each and every occasion, is also wise. For it is well known that man alone is not wise on every occasion. A woman, who instantly thinks what is appropriate, is also wise."[14] In the *Bhikkhuṇīsaṃyutta* of the *Saṃyuttanikāya* a nun called Somā strongly rejects the idea of treating the life of a woman as an handicap of any sort. While answering the Māra she says "What does womanhood matter at all when the mind is concentrated well, when knowledge flows on steadily as one sees correctly into Dhamma"[15] (Bodhi 2000: 222–223). The above discussion clearly shows how the spirit of gender equality was vibrant in early Buddhism.

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[12] *"bhabbo Ānanda mātugamo Tathāgatappavedite dhammavinaye agārasmā anagāriyaṁ pabbajitvā sotāpattiphalaṁ pi sakadāgāmiphalaṁ pi anāgāmiphalaṁ pi arahattaṁ pi sacchikātuṁ ti."* (Vin II p. 254)

[13] *"etadaggaṁ bhikkhave mama sāvikānaṁ bhikkhunīnaṁ ... mahāpaññānaṁ yadidaṁ Khemā. ... dhammakathikānaṁ yadidaṁ Dhammadinnā."* (A I p. 25)

[14] *"na hi sabbesu ṭhānesu puriso hoti paṇḍito | itthī pi paṇḍitā hoti tattha tattha vicakkhaṇā || na hi sabbesu ṭhānesu puriso hoti paṇḍito | itthī pi paṇḍitā hoti lahum atthavicintikā ||"* (Ap II. III. 31–32)

[15] *"itthibhāvo kiṁ kayirā cittamhi susamāhite | ñāṇamhi vattamānamhi sammā dhammaṁ vipassato ||"* (S I p. 129 and Thī 61)

B. Moral equality

It is only through moral equality that equality among humans can be justified. It is noteworthy that in his article *Philosophy of Hinduism,* Ambedkar (2008: 25) defines equality among human beings as their common essence which entitles them to the same fundamental rights and equal liberty. As pointed out by the fourteenth Dalai Lama the Buddha did acknowledge that every human being has equal right to life, liberty, and happiness.

In the *Assalāyanasutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya*, the Buddha proves moral equality among human beings with the following arguments:

(a) Persons of all classes are equal before the moral law of karma and equally bear the fruits of their evil or good deeds.

(b) Persons of all classes have equal capacity to self-culture. (M II pp. 150–151 and Bodhi 2009: 765–766)

Besides this, the Mahāyāna Buddhism acknowledges the potential of all sentient beings to become the Buddha. The doctrines that every sentient being can produce the *bodhicitta* (the mind aimed at awakening) and has the *Tathāgatagarbha* (the potentiality to become the Buddha) provide a strong basis for such a moral equality. According to these doctrines, the potential of Buddhahood or awakening is the common moral essence of all sentient beings.

Fraternity

The next important characteristic of Dhamma is fraternity. Ambedkar (1957: 325) believed that the only remedy to the evils of group set-up "lies in making fraternity universally effective." According to Gokhale (2021: 141) "[f]raternity implies treating human beings as objects of reverence and love, paying regard to others, seeking good of others and so on". The Buddhist principles of friendliness (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), altruistic joy (*muditā*) and considering others similar to oneself (*ātmopamyatā*) represent fraternity in true sense. The Buddha's teaching of the four bases of sympathy (*saṅgahavatthu*), namely, generosity (*dāna*), amiable speech (*peyyavācā*), profitable action (*atthacariyā*) and impartiality (*samānattatā*) (D III p. 152) is also aimed at developing the sense of fellowship among people.

The Buddha's teaching of five-fold precept (*pañcasīla*), eight-fold noble path (*aṭṭhaṅgikamagga*), and six or ten perfections (*pāramitā*) form the foundation of social good. As pointed out by Garfield (2016: 273) "[t]he Buddhist doctrine of the pañcaśīla, or five ethical precepts for laypersons, adds to the Buddhist conception of social institutions and conceptions of the good: these precepts enjoin refraining from killing, stealing, lying, sexual misconduct, and intoxication. Put together and viewed in a social context, they together constitute advice against violent arid actions likely to sow discord, and favour openness and integrity." Similarly, Ambedkar (1957: 123–131) looks at the doctrine of the

noble eight-fold path as the path of righteousness and the doctrine of ten perfections as the path of virtues. The path of righteousness ensures removal of all injustice and inhumanity that man does to man. Whereas, the path of virtue promises general good of all as well as "affection for every one and hatred for none". Since Buddhism is founded on morality and generates the sense of fraternity among fellow-beings, it could sustain liberty and equality in a true sense.

Sacredness of the democratic values

It seems that the Buddha was aware of the fact that the democratic values of liberty, equality, and fraternity are the only solution to human conflicts, and these cannot be imposed on the people by the law or by a brutal force. Only through religion it is possible to give these values a sacred status. Both, Kosambi (1989: 115) and Ambedkar (1957: 323–325), acknowledge the significance of religion in establishing this 'Sacred Morality'. Ambedkar (1957: 309) describes the Buddha's religion as "perfect justice springing from a man's own meritorious disposition." He declares morality to be the essence of Dhamma. Without it there is no Dhamma (1957: 323). In view of Ambedkar (1957: 323), "[m]ere morality is not enough. It must be sacred and universal." It cannot be either profane or individualistic. According to him, "[t]he only way to put a stop to conflict is to have common rules of morality which are sacred to all"[16] (1957: 325). If a value is profane and individualistic, it can be easily violated. However, when it is given a sacred status, it cannot be touched or transgressed. The Buddha raised the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity to a sacred level by giving morality the central position in his religion. He made these values integral to one's spiritual life. They are thus expected to spring from one's heart and need not be imposed from outside.

It is on this solid doctrinal foundation that the Buddha could dream of building an ideal society based on the democratic principles.

Saṅgha as a democratic institute

Although at the time of the Buddha the small republics were getting absorbed in to larger empires, the Buddha was greatly influenced by their democratic way of life. He upheld the democratic values not only in his teachings, but also in his practice. When he established the Saṅgha of monks (*bhikkhu*s) and nuns (*bhikkhunī*s), he preferred the democratic model of governance for the Saṅgha over the autocratic one for maintaining its efficiency, unity, and missionary character.

The Saṅgha kept its admission open to all irrespective of one's caste, gender, and status. In the *Cullavagga* of the *Vinayapiṭaka* (Vin II p. 239) and the *Aṭṭhakanipāta* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (A IV p. 202), the Buddha declares that *varṇa* and *jāti* have no place

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[16]The sixth section (Mere Morality is not Enough. It must be Sacred and Universal) of the first part (Religion and Dhamma) of the fourth book (Religion and Dhamma)

in his Saṅgha. Just as all rivers lose their individual names when they enter an ocean and are simply called an ocean, similarly all those who join his Saṅgha lose their earlier designations of family and caste and are simply known by the name of Buddhist monks (Horner 2001: 334). This helped the Saṅgha to remove the caste consciousness from the minds of its members by discarding the designations associated with it.

The Saṅgha gave every member equal right of opinion, irrespective of their former caste affiliation or social status. It acknowledged no special privileges to monks based on their birth or any other past background. Seniority in the Saṅgha was the only criterion on which monks were expected to show reverence to their colleagues. It is because of the casteless nature of the Buddhist Saṅgha that it could attract followers from the high and the low castes and could also spread beyond the boundaries of India.

The Buddhist Saṅgha played an important role in making education accessible to all. It functioned like a mobile school open for people of all castes, creeds, and genders. Simplicity and non-possessive nature were its two major missionary characteristics. It adopted the ideal of common ownership, giving members an equal share in requisites such as clothing, food, beds, seats, and medicine. The practice of *sapadānacariyā*, i.e., begging for alms from successive houses without preference and *saṃvibhāga*, i.e., distributing the gathered alms/food equally among members of the community encouraged members of the Saṅgha to overcome their caste-consciousness by inter-dining (Deokar 2021: 94). It also created among them the sense of brotherhood and associated living. Thus, the Saṅgha fostered the values of liberty and equality and developed among its members the feeling of fraternity.

Democratic praxis in the Saṅgha

The Buddhist Saṅgha adopted a federal model of governance. Saṅghas belonging to different regions functioned as autonomous bodies. Their day-to-day activities were regulated by a fixed code of conduct laid down in the Buddhist law book called *Vinayapiṭaka*, which can be regarded as the constitution of the Saṅgha. Although the *Vinayapiṭaka* is primarily, to use Garfield's words, "a code formulated explicitly and solely for the government of a voluntary, celibate, ideologically homogenous monastic community",[17] and hence, cannot be fully compared with liberal democracy, it certainly gives us some idea about the democratic nature of that law.

In the *Bhikkhu-* and *Bhikkhunipāṭimokkha*, various moral offences are categorised according to their severity and nature of punishment, such as those resulting in immediate expulsion of a member from the Saṅgha (*pārājika*), those requiring sanction of the entire Saṅgha (*saṅghādisesa*), those that are undetermined as to the category of the offence (*aniyata*), those requiring expiation by forsaking extra possessions (*nesajjiyapācittiya*), those requiring mere expiation (*pācittiya*), those seeking pardon from the offended

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[17]Cf. Garfield (2016: 271)

(*pāṭidesaniya*), and those expecting disciplinary training (*sekhiya*). Apart from this, in the *Kammakhandhaka* section of the *Cullavagga* of the *Vinayapiṭaka* one can find other types of offences, which attract other legal actions, such as censure (*tajjanīyakamma*), guidance (*niyassakamma*), banishment (*pabbājanīyakamma*), reconciliation (*paṭisāraṇīyakamma*), and suspension (*ukkhepanīyakamma*). In the *Pārivāsikakhandhaka* of the *Cullavagga* we come across other disciplinary acts, such as assigning probation (*parivāsa*), disciplinary penance (*mānatta*), and rehabilitation of a monk back in to the sangha (*abbhāna*). The *Mahāvagga* and the *Cullavagga* of the *Vinayapiṭaka* are full of rules and regulations concerning many topics related to a monastic's life, like the observance of instruction of the *pātimokkha* (*pātimokkha-uddesa*), the day of abstinences (*uposatha*), rainy retreat (*vassāvāsa*), and termination of the rainy retreat (*pavāraṇā*), as well as the use of robes, slippers, beds and chairs, medicine, monasteries, etc. It also contains guiding rules of behaviour for teachers, preceptors, disciples, monks leaving the monastery or arriving as a guest, etc. Here, one can also find guidelines for the righteous conduct of a legal procedure, role and responsibilities of an accuser, an accused, and a witness. Despite these stringent rules, the Buddha gave freedom to the Saṅgha to alter or abolish minor disciplinary rules without disturbing the core principles of his doctrine.

The Saṅgha was required to meet regularly to hold discussions and to take decisions by common consensus. These decisions included things such as deciding the boundary of a particular chapter of the Saṅgha (*sīmā*), giving admission to the Saṅgha (*pabbajjā*), bestowing higher ordination (*upasampadā*), carrying out legal procedures in the presence of the Saṅgha (*saṅghakamma*), and appointing a member to a particular office *(sammannanā)*.

In order to take such decisions, the Saṅgha used to follow a formal procedure and formulaic expressions called *kammavācā* which are similar to our modern democratic praxis. This included:

1. Calling a meeting of the Saṅgha with proper quorum,

2. Placing any new proposal before the Saṅgha for its consent in the form of a resolution called *ñatti*, inviting objections, if any, from the members by announcing the resolution twice or thrice before the Saṅgha,

3. accepting the resolution if no objection is raised by the members,

4. holding an open referendum called *salākāgāha*[18] in case of disagreement among the members,

5. settling a dispute by appointing a council to break the deadlock (*ubbāhanā*/*yebhuyyasikā*).

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[18]Such a referendum was held by distributing among members sticks of different colours (salākā) representing consent or dissent and then, by asking them to submit the stick representing their opinion to a person in charge of collecting them *(salākāgāhaka)*. The decision was then taken on the basis of majority vote by counting the collected sticks.

Such a council is constituted by choosing equal number of representatives from disputing parties for considering the matter.[19]

Besides this, the *Vinayapiṭaka* contains discussion on four types of conflicts, namely, conflict arising out of dispute (*vivādādhikaraṇa*), conflict arising out of censure (*anuvādādhikaraṇa*), conflict arising out of offence (*āpattādhikaraṇa*), and conflict arising out of obligation (*kiccādhikaraṇa*) (Vin II p. 88). It has also laid down procedures for resolving conflicts arising in the Saṅgha called *adhikaraṇasamatha*. They include: Disciplinary proceeding in presence of the Saṅgha and the accused (*sammukhāvinaya*), disciplinary proceeding under appeal to the accused *arhat*'s own conscience (*sativinaya*), acquittal on the ground of restored sanity (*amūḷhavinaya*), settling the dispute by accused monk's acknowledgement of his offence before the Saṅgha (*paṭiññā*), settling the dispute by a majority vote of the Saṅgha (*yebhuyyasikā*), a proceeding of censure against an accused monk, who denies his serious offence (*tassapāpiyyasikā*), and settling a minor dispute by covering it with grass, i.e., by mutual consent of the parties involved (*tiṇavatthāraka*) (Vin IV p. 207).

The Buddhist principles of non-self, and interdependent co-arising formed the foundation of democracy in the Saṅgha. With its well-defined law and democratic procedures the Saṅgha could function smoothly and could remain united even without a master. It ensured human dignity and justice to all without discrimination. In fact, it is only due to its wholehearted acceptance of the democratic model, that Buddhism could so easily spread and thrive throughout Asia.

Conclusion

From the above discussion it is quite clear that Buddhism carried out a successful experiment of democracy with topmost commitment and sincerity. It not only cherished the democratic values, but also institutionalised them in the form of a Saṅgha and a law book. The Buddha through his conduct and teachings impressed upon his followers the democratic principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. He applied these principles to create a model of ideal society, religion, and polity. The Buddhist Saṅgha followed this model even after the passing away of its master. It showed the world that democracy can be successful, if it is practised in its letter and spirit. As long as the Saṅgha practised democracy with utmost sincerity, it remained a powerful force of social and religious reform. However, when it became dependent on royal patronage and gave up its socialist ideal of no possession, it lost its vigour and capacity to shape the society.

Thus, from this golden chapter of the Indian democracy we can learn the lesson of the success and failure of democracy even in the modern world. Garfield (2016) has

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[19]This method was used in the second council held at Vaiśālī to settle the dispute between the Vajjiputtiya monks and those supporting venerable Yaśa over the ten points of disciplinary conduct.

successfully argued in favour of the compatibility and complementarity of Buddhism and liberal democracy. In his opinion "not only are Buddhism and liberal democracy compatible, but that they are complementary in a deep sense: democracy, I argue, is strengthened by values drawn from Buddhist moral and social theory, and Buddhist moral and social theory gains concrete institutional and procedural specificity when it is articulated through the framework of liberal democratic theory" (Garfield 2016: 269). The Tibetan government-in-exile has taken an initiative to create a democratic model of governance by formulating a national charter based on a Buddhist view of moral and social life and adopting a liberal democratic social ideology (Garfield 2016: 269).

As the Dalai Lama observes "[n]o system of government is perfect, but democracy is closest to our essential human nature. It is also the only stable foundation upon which a just and free global political structure can be built. So it is in all our interests that those of us who already enjoy democracy should actively support everybody's right to do so." History of the world has shown us that the freedom and liberty are the fundamental aspirations of human beings and democracy alone can fulfil them.

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A Note on Buddhist Education

Pradeep Gokhale*

There is intrinsic or essential relation between Buddhism and Education. One can say that Buddhism is essentially an educational religion. The intrinsic goal of Buddhism is to educate people, to give them wisdom, understanding of the essence of good life. And this characteristic of Buddhism distinguishes Buddhism from other religions. In Pali Buddhism which is generally called Theravāda Buddhism, the religious education focused more on moral-spiritual development of life. Due to the advent of Mahāyāna Buddhism at the hands of the philosophers like Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, the focus of Buddhist education changed to metaphysical knowledge of non-essentialist and idealist kind. Similarly when Buddhism had interaction with other philosophical systems, the philosophers like Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti brought logico-epistemological discussions at the centre of the Buddhist education. The first part of the note will be concerned with understanding the notion of Buddhist education from Pali sources. The second part will be concerned with the Mahāyānist and logico-epistemological turn the Buddhist education took. In the third part I will hint at the challenges posed by modernity before Buddhist education.

Theravāda Approach to Buddhist Education:

The Buddha as a teacher:

The Buddha often assumes the role of a teacher. Though he is a spiritual leader of the Buddhist way of life leading to emancipation, he is not a spiritual Guru like the one accepted in other religions, and spiritual cults. In other spiritual cults, the Guru is supposed to have a special spiritual power with the help of which he directly enlightens or emancipates his disciples or devotees. The Buddha is not a spiritual Guru of that type. He declares in Dhammapada:

"You have to make hard efforts (for your achievement of the final goal). The Buddhas only tell you the way"[1].

Hence giving instructions (*anuśāsana*) is said to be the greatest marvel (*Prātihārya*) of the Buddha.

The Buddha was said to be the *śāstā* (teacher) of human beings and gods. (Gods according to Buddhism were regarded as mortal beings, though born in higher worlds). Though he was described as the teacher of humans and gods, he did not claim himself to be God or Son of God or Incarnation of God and so on. He was an enlightened human

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[1]"tumhe hi kiccaṁ ātappaṁ, akkhātāro tathāgatā"

being. He had found out through hard efforts a way of good life and he was teaching it to others. When the Buddha got enlightenment, he had to face an impasse, because he thought that the Dharma (that is, the Truth, the way) he had got was too difficult for the people to understand. So he would better keep mum, and not teach what he knew to others. Then Sahampati Brahmā approached him and persuaded him to undertake the task of teaching with the hope that there will be at least some who will understand. The Buddha started imparting his knowledge to others and he got many students ready to traverse the path he discovered. Buddha's formation of the Sangha order can be understood a formation of the group of students fully committed to the pursuit of the path leading to the final goal. The students belonging to this group had to follow certain disciplinary rules (Vinaya) and traverse the noble eight-fold path.

Buddha's approach to education

Buddha's approach to education was different from what is generally held in the case of religious or spiritual education. In religious and spiritual education, the following things are generally advocated:

1) Uncritical faith in the priest or the spiritual guru

2) Uncritical faith in a religious scripture

3) Uncritical acceptance of religious tradition

Contrary to this Buddha advised to Kālāmas when they wanted to know which path of religious/moral life is to be followed:

"O Kālāmas, do not accept anything on mere hearsay (*anussava*). Do not accept anything by mere tradition (*paramparā*) . Do not accept anything on account of rumours (*itikirā*). Do not accept anything just because it accords with your scriptures (*piṭakasampadāna*). Do not accept anything by mere supposition (*nayahetu*). Do not accept anything by mere inference (*takkahetu*). Do not accept anything by merely considering the appearances (*ākāraparivitakka*). Do not accept anything merely because it agrees with your preconceived notions (*ditthinijjhānakkhanti*). Do not accept anything merely because it seems acceptable (*bhabbarūpa*). Do not accept anything thinking that the ascetic is respected by us (*samaṇo me guru*).

But when you know for yourselves- these things are immoral (*akusalā*), these things are blameworthy (*sāvajjā*), these things are censured by the wise(*viññu-garahitā*), these things when performed (*samattā*) and undertaken(*samādinnā*), conduce to ruin (*ahita*) and sorrow (*dukkha*)- then indeed you reject them.

When you know for yourselves- these things are moral (*kusala*), these things are blameless (*anavajjā*), these things are praised by the wise (*viññuppasatthā*), these things,

when performed and undertaken, conduce to well-being (*hita*) and happiness (*sukha*) - then do you live and act accordingly."[2]

Education system available in Buddha's time was two-fold. The first aspect of it was education for development of professional skills necessary for making livelihood. The second aspect was moral-spiritual-religious education for making life happy and attaining the final goal of life. Out of them the first type of education was governed by the system of varṇa and caste and hence it was available in one's own family or one's own community. The second type of education, which was moral-spiritual-religious was diversified into different religious cults or traditions. One dominating tradition was of course Vedic tradition. But the spiritual education of Vedic tradition was available to men of higher castes. The Buddha was also critical about the non-Vedic religious cults which advocated different perspectives and practices which Buddhism classified into two extremes: the path of self-mortification on the one hand and that of indulgence with sensuous pleasures on the other. At theoretical level they followed one of the two extremes: eternalism *(śāśvatavāda)* on the one hand and annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*) on the other. Against this background by forming Sangha order the Buddha opened a new educational system for moral-spiritual-religious development, which avoided both the extremes. It involved moral self-disciplining without self-mortification, At theoretical level it avoided eternalist spiritualism as well as nihilist materialism. He made his education not only open to all castes but made 'de-casting oneself' a condition for getting admitted to the order. Just as waters of different rivers, when they enter the ocean, lose their different identity and all simply become sea-water, similarly, when a bhikkhu formerly of any caste, entered the Sangha, lost his caste identity and simply became a member of the Sangha. In this sense Buddha's educational program was meant for all human beings and not for chosen few[3]. Initially he established Sangha only for men. The main reason was practical feasibility. But when the Buddha's step mother Mahāprajāpati Gotamī with a large group of women wanted to enter the Sangha and when the Buddha's disciple Ānanda persuaded the Buddha to admit women to the Sangha, the doors of moral-spiritual-religious education were opened for women at par with men.

The Nature and Presuppositions of Moral-spiritual-religious education of Buddhist type:

Here it should be made clear as to what we mean by moral, spiritual and religious education. By moral education we can mean the means through which students understand what is a good conduct, a bad conduct, what is right, what is wrong and also choose the

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[2]Narada (1988: 284-5)

[3]There were some conditions for admission to Sangha. As Sai (2014: 138) reports: " At 8 years of age one could go to any Vihar or Sangh according to his own will….No one could get admission into the Sangh without consent of his parents. Patients of infectious diseases like Leprosy, T. B., Eczema etc. and Government servants, slaves and soldiers were not allowed to be admitted into Sanghs. However, there was no discrimination of any kind on the basis of caste or creed."

path of good and right. In terms of virtue ethics it can mean developing moral dispositions in human beings, making them or transforming them into virtuous beings. Spiritual education is concerned with helping students to realize themselves, their own true nature. Religious education is a wider concept which includes moral and spiritual elements but is not restricted to them. Religious education is primarily concerned with helping the student to reach the ultimate goal of life, which may be termed as salvation, liberation, Nirvāṇa and so on, which would be defined according to the metaphysical dogmas or doctrines of the given religion. Religious education in this sense includes developing religious faith in the followers of the religion and also training them into various kinds of religious practices such as rituals, devotional and spiritual practices.

With this background let us consider what connotations these terms have in the Buddhist context. What are the presuppositions of the moral, spiritual and religious education of the Buddhist type is also an important issue. In the case of Buddhism, particularly Theravāda Buddhism, the three types of education seem to have moral education at their centre. In Buddhism moral education primarily means learning to perform kuśala karmas and avoiding akuśala karmas. But it also means development of moral dispositions in persons and leading them to moral perfection which is the same as *Arhat*-hood. In Buddhism moral perfection involves purification of mind, removing immoral roots namely greed, delusion and hatred and developing an insight into the impermanent, non-substantial and unsatisfactory nature of phenomena. This insight is developed through meditation. Buddhism accepts Nirvāṇa as the ultimate goal of life. But this goal is to be achieved by eliminating craving and elimination of craving is essentially moral purification of mind. In this way even the religious education of Buddhist type essentially has a moral aspect.

Buddhism as religion is not completely free from transcendental belief system, but it is at minimum level as compared to other religions. Unlike other religions it does not contain belief in God or eternal soul. It promotes belief in the doctrines of karma and rebirth, but it accepts them not as a dogma based on scriptures, but as means to justification of morality.[4]

Similarly, though Buddhism advocates faith *(śraddhā)*, it is defined as confidence based on knowledge. It is not something to be blindly adhered to. So the Buddhist education does not presuppose human nature as essentially consisting of soul-like substance, but as a complex of mind and body, capable of consciousness, passion and compassion, ignorance and wisdom. Education according to Buddhism consists of reducing and controlling passions and developing compassion, removing ignorance and confusion and developing wisdom about the truths of life.

[4]Some modern interpreters of Buddhism do not regard the belief in rebirth as a necessary aspect of Buddhism. One of the bases of the doctrine of rebirth in Buddhism has been the twelve-linked chain of dependent origination *(pratītya-samutpāda)*. But Buddhadasa Bhikkhu, the engaged Buddhist monk philosopher of Thailand (1906-1993) explained the doctrine without reference to previous birth or next birth. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar (1891-1956) regarded morality as the very essence of the Buddha's Dhamma. But he did not accept the doctrines of Karma and Rebirth as they are traditionally attributed to Buddhism.

Entrance to the Buddhist Educational System: Refuge to the three Jewels and other rules of conduct

While entering the Buddhist educational system a student has to express commitment to the three jewels accepted in Buddhism: the Buddha (Enlightened one), Dharma (Buddha's Teaching) and Sangha (The Order of Monks and Nuns). Although it looks as if it is propagation of uncritical faith in the three, the threefold refuge is often interpreted in a more abstract and non-dogmatic way. Refuge to the Buddha is not refuge to a particular person Śākyamini Buddha, but to Enlightenment as such. Similarly taking refuge to Dhamma does not mean following the Sutta literature literally but following what is essential in it. And Refuge to Sangha does not mean refuge to the members of the Sangha, but to the path of purification that they are supposed to be following.

A student who enters Sangha has to follow certain rules of conduct which include the five precepts: Non-injury (Not harming any living being), Non-theft (Not taking what has not been given), Celibacy (Avoiding sexual misconduct), Truthfulness (Avoiding lies, slandering, harsh and frivolous talk) and Avoiding intoxicating things. In addition to the five precepts the other rules to be followed in the Sangha were: Not taking interest in music, dance, play-show etc.; not taking food at improper time; not using luxurious and scented things and not accepting the gifts of gold, silver etc.

The content of the Buddhist education:

Though the field of knowledge as such is very vast, the Buddha was not concerned with each and everything under the sky (and beyond the sky). He did not answer each and every question asked by his disciples; rather he refused to answer some of the questions because they were not related to the major problem of life namely the problem of suffering. Buddha's teachings in this way were focused on the problem of suffering: What is its nature, what is its root-cause, how is the state of absolute cessation of suffering and what is the way that leads to the absolute cessation of suffering. These are called the four noble truths (*ariyasacca/āryasatya*). Under the first noble truth he was concerned not only with the painful situations such as disease, old age, death and the circumstances of privation and undesired association, but the un-satisfactoriness that constitutes the very conditioned being. According to his diagnosis the common causes of these sufferings lie in craving (*taṇhā/tṛṣṇā*) and misconception (*avidyā*) where the latter can be called the root-cause of the former. While talking about misconception the Buddha maintained that all the phenomena or conditioned objects are in fact impermanent, insubstantial and unsatisfactory (*anicca/anitya*, *anattā/anātma* and *dukkha/duḥkha*), but we wrongly conceive them as enduring, substantial and satisfactory. Because of this misconception we develop attachment towards them and this leads us to suffering. Through attachment we develop immoral dispositions such as greed, hatred and lust and due to them perform various immoral acts which are harmful to ourselves and others. Is all this inevitable? If suffering and un-satisfactoriness

is written in our very conditioned existence, is cessation of suffering impossible? On this the Buddha maintained that absolute cessation *āvācā)* of suffering, which he called *nirvāṇa* is possible even within this human life. Though our conditioned being is unsatisfactory, it becomes the cause of suffering if we develop carving towards it. We can stop craving if we develop right understanding *(sammā diṭṭhi)* of the true nature of the phenomena. We will be happy if we think in right way *(sammā saṅkappo)*, speak truth and avoid slandering, harsh words and frivolous talk *(sammā vācā)*; if we behave morally *(sammā kammanto)*, adopt a righteous mode of livelihood *(sammā ājīvo)*. In order to make all this second nature, deliberate efforts *(sammā vāyāmo)* towards developing right dispositions and reducing wrong ones are necessary. One will have to cultivate one's mind through right mindfulness *(sammā sati)* and right concentration *(sammā samādhi)*. This is popularly called the Noble Eight-fold Path.

*Tri-*śikṣā *:* Śīla*,* Samādhi **and** Prajñā

The Buddha in this way offered an eight-point program of moral-spiritual development of a person which takes care of behavioral, emotive as well as cognitive aspect of human personality. That is why this eightfold path is sometimes consolidated as three-fold training (*Tri-*śikṣā) which can be presented as follows:

Triśikṣā	Training of what?	Meaning	Correlation with the Eightfold path
Śīla	*Adhiśīlaśikṣā*	Training of the conduct	Right Speech, Right Action Right Livelihood
Samādhi	*Adhicittaśikṣā*	Training of the mind	Right Effort Right Mindfulness Right Concentration
Prajñā	*Adhiprajñāśikṣā*	Training of the intellect	Right Understanding Right Thought

Classified in a different way, *Śīla* referred to observing the five precepts, which have already been explained before. *Samādhi* referred to Concentration meditation, which is also called *Śamatha* and *Prajñā* referred to development of insight through *Vipassanā* meditation.

Concentration meditation includes practicing single-pointed-ness of mind on the objects such as *kasiṇa*s (a material object), one's own body, parts of body, functions of body such as breathing as it takes place naturally, the impurities and also the qualities of the three jewels and so on. It also includes the contemplation of the great emotional attitudes namely loving kindness (*Maitrī*), compassion (*Karuṇā*), gladness towards successes of others (*Muditā*)

and equanimity (*Upekṣā*) These four attitudes are popularly called *brahmavihāra*s (divine abodes) and are to be practiced towards all living beings. Concentration meditation is aimed at developing peace of mind. In early stages of this meditation one's mind may be full of disturbances and thoughts, but through the continuous practice one can experience peaceful state of mind free from thoughts and disturbances.

Vipassanā was a special kind of meditation introduced by the Buddha. It was aimed at development of *prajñā* (wisdom), that is, insight into the true nature of things. A key to understand *Vipassanā* is mindfulness (*Sati/Smṛti*) meditation. It consists of developing mindfulness of the impermanent, non-substantial and unsatisfactory character of various kinds of objects.

The noble eightfold path or *Triśikṣā* in this way constitutes the core of the educational program the Buddha offered to his disciples. We find this type of program followed in Theravāda Buddhist communities even today. It was primarily the program of monastic education but it had the potential to be extended to the laity as well. We find that in Myanmar there is a living tradition of Vipassana meditation course based on the model of *Triśikṣā* which is indiscriminately offered to all. In the last century Mr. Satyanarayan Goenka took it as legacy from a Vipassana master Sayaji U Ba Khin and propagated it in India and various other countries.

The Buddhist education whether the one practiced in monasteries or made available for laity, was supposed to be based on the Pali *Tipiṭaka*s and other non-canonical sources such as *Milindapañho, Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho* and *Visuddhimaggo*. Reading, reciting and studying these texts has been an inevitable part of monastic Buddhist education of Theravāda type.

The Buddha is said to have given instructions in Pali (to be more precise, Māgadhī) language. But he did not insist on Pali language to be used as the medium of instruction or the standard source for instruction. For him the message of the Buddha may be conveyed in any suitable language, preferably in the language of the audience.

Part II: New Turns to Buddhist Education: Mahāyāna turn and Logico-epistemological turn

(A) Mahāyāna turn:

The form of Buddhist education is discussed above following the Theravāda school of Buddhism. Mahāyāna tried to replace Theravāda understanding of Buddhism by a different approach with the following features:

In Theravāda, the Buddha was an enlightened being, but he was not God or incarnation of God or an eternal metaphysical being of any kind. He was a mortal person. Mahāyānists conceived of Buddhahood or *Dharmakāya* as the eternal reality (though not eternal in the

sense of an eternal substance). The Buddha-hood was regarded as the very nature of reality. It was superior to the Buddha as a person, namely the Śākyamuni Buddha.

Mahāyānists replaced the *Arhat* ideal of Theravāda by *Bodhisattva* ideal. *Bodhisattva* is the being who realizes Buddha nature in himself or herself. He or she is an altruist person who postpones his/her liberation indefinitely for the liberation of all beings.

Every being carries the seed of Buddha-hood in himself or herself. Anyone can take Bodhisattva vow. In place of conventional practice of precepts, what is important in the Bodhisattva's life is attaining perfection (*pāramitā*) in the virtues such as charity, good conduct, forbearance, energy, concentration and wisdom.

Mahāyāna Buddhism has its own *sūtra* literature different from the *sutta* literature contained in the Pali *Tipiṭaka*. Though Mahāyāna regards the teachings contained in the Pali *Tipiṭaka*s as the Buddha's own word, these teachings are regarded as containing the lower vehicle meant for spiritually unintelligent persons. Mahāyāna canonical literature is not in Pali, but in Sanskrit, not in classical Sanskrit, but what can be called Pali-influenced Sanskrit.[5] Mahāyāna Buddhism consists of two sub-schools. Mādhyamika and Yogācāra. Nāgārjuna (1st century AD) and his followers established and developed with arguments the Mādhyamika tenets of Buddhism. They argued that the true nature of reality and Buddhahood is void (*śūnyatā*). It is beyond logic and language. On the other hand Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (4th century AD) established and developed the Yogācāra tenets of Buddhism. They argued that only consciousness is real and external world is unreal. Realization of ultimate reality through mystical experience in this way obtained central place in Buddhism at the hands of Mahāyāna thinkers.

The common feature of Yogācāra and Mādhyamika philosophical approaches was that the ultimate reality to be reached according to them was beyond thought and language and it was to be reached by examining everyday experience and linguistic practices. The study of such a critical exercise became an important part of Mahāyāna education.

In Mahāyāna type of Buddhist education the model of three-fold training (*triśikṣā*) namely morality, concentration and wisdom (*śīla-samādhi-prajñā*) is not abandoned, but its focus changes; particularly the content of *prajñā* changes. The insight for Mādhyamikas does not stop at the three characters namely impermanence, non-substantiality and unsatisfactoriness, but it culminates into void (*śūnyatā*) character of everything. Similarly for Yogācārins the insight should culminate into pure consciousness or 'consciousness only' (*cittamātratā*). One can claim here that in Mahāyāna type of Buddhist education, the center shifts from morality and meditation to metaphysical insight.

Mahāyāna Buddhist education has also branched out in two other directions. Tantrism and Zen. Tantric Buddhism which is also called esoteric Buddhism, involves secret

[5]Edgerton (1921) terms this Sanskrit as Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit

techniques to be learnt from a spiritual master to reveal and actualize the true nature of reality. Zen Buddhism is known for Koan, which refers to an anecdote describing an interaction between a Zen master and student which demonstrates the master's insight into the nature of reality. Though in both these schools the ultimate goal is non-conceptual, direct insight into the Buddha nature, the methods used are different from mainstream Buddhism of Theravāda or Mahāyāna type. Both Tantra and Zen are vast and complex topics which I will not be able to deal with here.

(B) Logico-epistemological Turn

When Buddhism had to interact with the epistemology, logic and Metaphysics of the Brahmanical systems such as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it had to develop its own epistemology and logic and also to combat with the metaphysics of universals (*sāmānya/jāti*) and composite wholes (*avayavin*) which supported them. This task was performed by the Buddhist logicians Diṅnāga (5th century AD) and Dharmakīrti (7th century AD). They developed the epistemology of two *pramāṇa*s namely perception and inference and their respective objects namely real unique particulars and mentally constructed universals. Dharmakīrti developed the theory of inference based on universal and necessary relation of *vyāpti*. This epistemology and logic proved to be a powerful tools to combat with the rival systems such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Pūrvamīmāṁsā and soon they became a necessary component of Buddhist education.

The metaphysics of Yogācāra or Mādhyamika Buddhists was idealist or anti-essentialist whereas the epistemology of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, which accepted unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) as essentially real, was realist and essentialist. But in the course of history Mahāyānists appropriated the epistemology and logic of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti either by interpreting them in idealist terms or fitting them as conventionally true in the two truth model of conventional truth and ultimate truth (*lokasaṁvṛti-satya* and *paramārthataḥ satya*). In this way the two turns in Buddhist education system: Mahāyāna turn and Logico-epistemological turn were reconciled in the educational system of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Curriculum at Nālandā and Vikramaśilā

The earliest large universities such as Nālandā and Vikramaśilā of North India focused on the Buddhist education of the above kind. These universities adopted a complex curriculum consisting of five major and five minor branches of learning:

Five Major Branches:

1	*Adhyātmavidyā*	Buddhist Philosophy
2	*Hetuvidyā*	Logic and Epistemology
3	*Śabdavidyā*	Grammar

4	*Cikitsāvidyā*	Medicine
5	*Karmasthānavidyā*	Arts and Crafts

Five Minor Branches:

1	*Kāvya*	Poetics
2	*Chandas*	Metrics
3	*Kośa or Abhidhāna*	Lexicography
4	*Nāṭaka*	Theatre
5	*Gaṇita, Jyotiṣa*	Arithmetic, Astrology and Astronomy

Out of these ten major and minor branches, the first two were the most important ones. Under *Adhyātmavidyā* the philosophy contained in Mahāyāna sūtras and in the works of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and commentaries and Sub-commentaries of these works was studied. Under *Hetuvidyā*, the works of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti and commentaries and sub-commentaries of their works were studied. The students had to master these works and use the arguments from them in actual or artificial debate situations. Buddhist education in this way assumed a more metaphysical and polemical shape. Most of the other branches of knowledge (Grammar, Poetics, Metrics and Lexicography) were mainly useful for the study of the above-mentioned philosophical texts. The remaining branches (Medicine, Art and Craft, Theatre and Astrology) were not meant for themselves or for any mundane purpose, but ultimately for enabling and enriching religious life of Mahāyāna Buddhist type.

The education system of the universities of Nālandā and Vikramaśīla was followed in the monastic Buddhist institutes in Tibet. The same curriculum is followed in Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries in India even today.

III. Buddhist Education and the challenges of modernity:

The monastic Buddhist education system is playing the role of causing moral-spiritual development of monk community as well as laity and also preserving the logico-epistemological tools which can be used in the controversy between Brahmanical and non-Brahmanical traditions. But today Buddhist education has to face some challenges due to the changed circumstances.

We have seen that Buddhism focused on moral spiritual education whereas professional education system was taken care of by the Varṇa-Caste system. Though Buddhism was critical about the hierarchies imposed by Varṇa and Caste, it did not make the transformation of the society its primary program. This creates a discrepancy between the egalitarian monastic education and non-egalitarian social tradition, on the cooperation of which it depended. The question is whether the Buddhist education system can percolate with the society through formal and informal methods in such a way that it becomes a

means to social transformation. Education system of this type should not bifurcate between moral education and professional education. In fact this is implied by the concept of right livelihood (*samyak ājīva*), one of the limbs in the noble eight-fold path. This also suggests that today the Buddhist education should be more laity-oriented than it was before.

Buddhist educational system, like any traditional religious educational system has to come to terms with science. As Dr. Venkata Siva Sai puts it:

"Today's youth is well-educated. They have knowledge of science, philosophy, psychology and so forth. Not satisfied with hearing only the story of Buddha's life and the Jātaka tales and thereby generating faith, they now want to know how the doctrine of selflessness relates to quantum physics and how Buddha's Teachings on patience can be integrated into modern psychology."[6]

He rightly observes:

"Young people who have a modern secular education will not believe in rebirth just because Buddha said so. They want to understand the logical proof for it and to know current examples of people who have memories of their previous lives."[7]

It is possible to take one step ahead and ask whether the core of Buddhism either in the form of morality and meditation or the Buddhist epistemology and logic cannot be appreciated without taking recourse to the belief in rebirth. Some modern interpreters of Buddhism such as Buddhadasa Bhikkhu of Thailand and Dr. B. R. Ambedkar of India do not regard belief in Rebirth as a necessary part of Buddhism. Buddhism in this way opens the possibility of education which is religious in so broad a sense that religion becomes coextensive with secularity.

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[6]Sai (2014: 16-17)

[7]Sai (2014: 17)

Buddhist Logic and its Development: Some Remarks*

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Abstract

*T*here are two major ways in which Buddhist Logic is developed. The first one is represented by Nāgārjuna-Candrakīrti tradition through the use of dialectics and the second way of development is found in the works of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti through the use of hetu (probans). This second way of logic has further been developed by the works of Jinendrabuddhi and Ratnakīrti. The paper is an attempt to show the historical development of epistemic logic as developed by the Buddhist philosophers and their relevance for our time.

Key words: *catuṣkoṭi, niṣedha, para-consistent logic, causal relation, identity relation, uniform concomitance, svalakṣaṇa.*

Introduction:

From the debating model of the *Kathāvatthu* (in Pàli) to the Vaitaṇḍic *prasaṅgapādāna* of Nāgārjuna-Candrakīrti tradition there is an interesting phase of the development of Buddhist Logic that later on leads to meta-logical interpretation of 'negation' which, according to some modern logicians, is very close to Para-consistent Logic of today. It is said to be a logic which is free from 'consistency-phobia'. This is one kind of development of Buddhist Logic in the early stage and the concern of this stage is more on epistemology through dialectics for refutation of counter-thesis. This may be called the stage of 'No Thesis Argument'. No effort is seen there to introduce formalism and to defend one's own position. This phase is based on the dialectics that works through four-cornered negation. However, though it does not deny the empirical validity of *pramāṇa*, it denies any claim in favour of its independence. This speculative networking of *pramāṇa* is based on uncritical acceptance of mutually conflicting ideas and on critical analysis nothing is found as absolute, independent and categorical.

Another phase of the development of Buddhist Logic starts with the works of Diṅnāga on the nature of *liṅga* or sign and the sign-signed relation. It has the interest of leading to epistemological issues as focused in *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, which provides the ground work for the development of Buddhist Epistemology in a new direction. Later on, Dharmakīrti (c. 600 – c. 660 CE) gave the master-stroke that provided the momentum through *Pramāṇa-Vārttika* and *Pramāṇa-Viniścaya*. He was considered in those works as a Sautrāntika Buddhist philosopher although in later days he contributed much in the development of

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Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda school of Buddhist philosophy. But Dharmakīrti's work on Logic is also very important for understanding the epistemological blossoming in later Buddhist Epistemology. His *Nyāyabindu* (*Essence of Logic*) seems to be a condensed form of the main issues of *Pramāṇa-Vārttika*. He has also done hair-breath analysis of Reason or *Hetu* in his *Hetubindu* (*A Drop of Reason*).

However, before Diṅnāga, as said earlier, Nāgārjuna developed a kind of Meta logic in 2nd century A. D. All the three— Nāgārjuna, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti—were masters of different streams of Buddhist logic and they made Gautama's Nyāya logic as their *pūrvapakṣa*, the thesis for refutation. Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti belong to different Buddhist schools of Philosophy and they have different ontological positions too. For Nāgārjuna, everything is devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*), that is to say, everything has conditional and inter-dependent existence. But Dharmakīrti holds that a real thing is *svalakṣaṇa*, a unique particular, and even the concomitant invariable relation for inference is grounded on the intrinsic nature of the things related by it. So, it appears that both Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti {Dharmakīrti} influenced the development of Indian Logic in two different directions. Of course, Dharmakīrti's works have much affinity to Diṅnāga's logical thinking and this way of development of the Buddhist Epistemology contributed much to philosophy of language that works through the signifier-signified relation in Jinendrabuddhi and introduction of binary oppositions by Ratnakīrti in *Apoha-siddhi*. Of the afore-said three important logicians of the Buddhist school – viz. Nāgārjuna, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti— Nāgārjuna develops a logic for understanding philosophy through meta-philosophical analysis of concepts which is otherwise known as *prasaṅga* (dialectical method of contextual refutation), *prasaṅgāpādāna*, a special kind of *reductio ad absurdum* argument using simple negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*). This is also known as *catuṣkoṭi-niṣedha* – 'four-cornered negation' and the problem of self-referential statements is the main charge that is being raised against Nāgārjuna by his philosophical opponents. The case of Dharmakīrti is little bit different. Since the Buddhist Logic develops out of refutation of the Nyāya logic and Dharmakīrti's exercise of logic, like that of Diṅnāga, centres around 'probans' (*liṅga / hetu,* sign, reason), let us have a brief presentation of Gautama's view on inference and 'probans' (*liṅga / hetu*).

History of Philosophical Thought in India shows that Buddhist Logic has been developed not in isolation but in a continuous process of borrowing from the logical thought by other thinkers and later on through criticism of Nyāya philosophers. Nāgārjuna develops his logic through the point-to-point refutation of *Nyāyasūtra* of Gautama in *Vaidalyasūtra* (which is also known as *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*). However, in this short paper, I propose to discuss the issue with reference to Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti only and leave any detail discussion on Diṅnāga for another paper.

It is better to begin with the Nyāya view of inference, because the Nyāya view is treated as

the main *pūrvapakṣa* (thesis under refutation) by all logicians belonging to the Buddhist school.

A brief account of Gautama's View:

Gautama in the *Nyāyasūtra* speaks of three types of inference based on three types of *liṅga-liṅgī* relation. [10, 64] Vātsyāyana elaborates these with examples. The first of these is called *pūrvavat*, the second is called *śeṣavat* and the last of these is called *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* inference. The first one of these inferences is from the cause to the effect based on the causal relation between *liṅga* and *liṅgī* (the probans, the sign and the probandum, signified). From the rising of the black cloud as cause we can infer the effect that it will rain. The second one is the inference from the effect to the cause. When we see that there is current and fullness of the river with water we infer that there was rain in the upper region of the river in question. The third one is not causal in this sense. It is based on invariable concomitance which is, whether causal or non-causal, is not determined on the basis of the particular instances of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*, but is understood at a more general level. From the perception of an object at some place which was earlier in some other place is now inferred as due to the movement of that object in question. Each of these forms of inference, according to Vātsyāyana, however, may be illustrated in two ways. We have already explained one way.

The Alternative Way:

Let us now see an alternative way. Here the word *pūrva* means 'two objects x and y were previously perceived' as invariably connected. Now "an object similar to one of these is perceived. From this is inferred an object similar to the other, though the object thus inferred is not perceived now" [10, 65]. In this alternative version of inference the word Śeṣavat stands for residual usually called in Bengali *pariśeṣa*. When all the possibilities are eliminated what remains is called *pariśeṣa*. Suppose, I am to know in which class 'sound' belongs when I know that features of being existent and non-eternal qualify it. Does it belong to the class of substance, or quality or action or universal or unique individuality? All these are possible alternatives. Now let us eliminate one after another. We cannot call it substance, because in order to be so it must have been an inherent cause and being single it cannot satisfy the condition of being substratum of quality and action as inhering in many. We cannot call it action, because subsequent sound causally arises out of it. The defining features of neither universal (*sāmānya*) nor unique individuality (*viśeṣa*) are fit to it. Now what remains only the possibility of being a quality? From this it is established that sound is a quality. About the third form of inference Vātsyāyana says that when both *liṅga* and *liṅgī* (probans and probandum) are not perceptible, the *liṅgī* is inferred from a *liṅga* which has the same feature 'with any other object'. The existence of self may be inferred from the existence of desire etc. We know that desire etc. belong to the class of quality. So it must have a locus called substance. And the self is the substratum of desire etc. Now the third one is called *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna*. Ordinary way of defining it is that it is an inference based on the *liṅga* (probans) which is neither a cause nor an effect. According

to Vātsyāyana, the first way of defining the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* by Gautama has been discussed earlier. But a Naiyāyika like Uddyotakara says that this earlier version of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* is, in fact, a special case of śeṣavat *anumāna*. But the alternative way of defining *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* by Vātsyāyana cannot be accused of this. In this case both the probans and the probandum are imperceptible. But the probandum (*liṅgī*) is cognized from a probans (*liṅga*) 'having the same nature with any other object' [9, 66]. Inferring the existence of the self from the existence of desire etc. is cited as an example of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna.* The self is the substratum of desire. Desire is a quality and a quality has substance as its substratum where it resides. In *pūrvavat anumāna* the invariable relation that holds between *liṅga* and *liṅgī* is an object of direct perception. It is just contrary in the case of *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna.* According to Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, Vātsyāyana's this mode of defining *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa anumāna* is also subject to difficulties as suggested by the later Naiyāyikas like Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra. Without the application of śeṣavat *anumāna* (residual inference), according to them, the very instance of inferring the existence of the self from the existence of desire etc. remains incomplete. For the sake of logical parsimony the details of argument are not discussed here.

But the later Nyāya scholars since Gaṅgeśa have given emphasis on invariable or uniform concomitance of *hetu* (probans) with *sādhya* (probandum) as the sufficient condition for defining *vyāpti*. In other words, the role of causal relation of the earlier Nyāya is now reduced to a relation of uniform or invariable concomitance. It is adequate to infer the presence of x from the presence of y *if and only if* (hence forth, *iff*) we uniformly see together x and do not see y without x. If in the presence of x always there is presence of y, it is called a case of *anvaya (tat sattve tat sattā)* and if, on the other hand, in the absence of y always there is absence of x, then it is called a case of *vyatireka (tadasattve tadasattā)*. This is, in short, the Nyāya view of inference.

Nāgārjuna-Candrakīrti tradition

When we speak of the development of Buddhist Logic, we try to see how the development of logic does differ on account of difference in ontological presuppositions of the schools of Indian philosophy. But we also see difference among philosophers of the same school in broad sense. Different streams, to speak of Buddhist Logic, have been developed throughout a few centuries. Inference (*anumāna*) is considered as the foremost object of discussion in logic. A model of logically-warranted inference can be traced in the Buddhist debating manual titled *Kathāvatthu.* Another type of the development of logical warrantee emerges out of the debate having the feature of 'refutation only' (*vitaṇḍā*). This is also a development of the philosophical method of Sañjaya, a senior contemporary of Gautama Buddha and that method is often called 'the method of eel fish' (*amarāvikṣepavāda*) [2, 453-457]. This technique has been enriched by Nāgārjuna who interpreted the concept of 'negation' as a 'commitment-less-denial' (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) to support his philosophical

position called 'emptiness' in a technical sense. It may be called a system of logic having many possible values.

Among the Buddhists, again there are two dominant trends – one developed by Madhyamaka philosophers who engage themselves more on philosophical foundation of Logic, an analysis of modality of the world of experience keeping in mind also the meta-level understanding of language. For them, if something is claimed as necessary, it must be possible, though if something is possible it is not necessarily necessary. The role of *modal operators* is more important in understanding philosophy through language, because only through these we can have an access to the actual world or the ontology of experience and accordingly we can plan our program for future in contextual consideration of the actual state of affairs. Obviously, such logic cannot allow any exclusive or absolutist claim based on pure assumption and therefore the so-called law of Excluded Middle has no appeal to this logic. Here some modern logicians have tried to see in it some elements of what is called *Para-consistent Logic* today. They call Nāgārjuna (c. 150 CE) as the forerunner of *Para-consistent Logic* [3, 16]. But I am not sure about such possibility. What I understand by Nāgārjuna's use of 'negation' is meant for refutation of opponents' views and it is used for criticizing every thought for leading one to thoughtlessness. It is not another thesis called the thesis of 'ineffability' beyond four-cornered negation. It is a case of simple negation where one is not compelled to accept the counter-thesis. There is exclusive division of 'is' and 'is not'. But this type of logic in its rudimentary form can be traced to Sañjaya's theory of logical escapism, *amarāvikṣepavāda* in Sanskrit and *amarāvikkhepavāda* in Pāli [7, 105-109]. Sañjaya was a senior contemporary of Gautama Buddha and Suppiya was his disciple. It is said that Pyrrho, the Greek dialectician was a student of Suppiya (Supriya in Sanskrit) at Taxila [1, 328]. In Nāgārjuna, however, we see a developed form of 'four-fold negation' of Amarāvikṣepavādins.

Like Sañjaya-Nāgārjuna line of using 'consistency-phobia-free' logic. It is against all kinds of orthodoxy and puritanism in logic. Orthodoxy and puritanism are based on exclusive position which denies the explanation of the actual world. Actual world is beyond our absolutistic and deterministic scheme of logic. This use of logic is based on mere speculation and not on critical judgement about the actual world. In other words, there is no single set of programs or problems in the possible world. So any relational use of negation cannot explain the world of experience with its set of deterministic values. The crux of so-called inconsistency lies with the basic assumption of explaining the world with a single set of programs where both 'P' and 'not-P' cannot be accepted as theorems. But a system of Logic which is tolerant to the so-called 'inconsistency principle' can accept both 'P' and 'not-P' as they respond to two sets of individual context, *prasaṅga* in Sanskrit.

Naturally in such an approach the concept of 'negation' has a very important role. It is to be noted here that in all logical approaches the use of negation colours the school's

epistemological claims and ontological positions. Different logical systems have been built up depending on different senses of use of the concept of 'negation'. In a two-valued system of logic the relation of a thesis, 'P' and its negation, i.e. 'not-P', is exclusive and thus if you negate 'P' then it is necessary to accept the counter-thesis 'not-P'. But for the user of 'pure and simple' (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) negation there is no such necessity, because he believes in 'context-bound negation' and in such a use of negation when you negate a thesis 'P', it is possible to negate 'not-P' also. In actual world nothing is absolutely determined and fixed in our knowledge situation. The world of 'unknown' is 'larger' than the world of 'known'. Among non-exclusive and innumerable possibilities 'P' represents only one and 'not-p' one more and the sum-total of 'P' and 'not-P' does not cover the scope of 'all'. That is why, in refutation of the Nyāya claim with regard to *pramāṇa* and *prameya,* Nāgārjuna has used the Sanskrit word '*niṣedha'* (negation) and also from the refutation of doubt to the refutation of the point of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*). The word *niṣedha* is ordinarily translated into English as 'negation'. But the word 'negation' is used as *propositional negation* called in Sanskrit *paryudāsa pratiṣedha* as well as '*simple negation'* called in Sanskrit *prasajya pratiṣedha,* ("*aprādhānyaṁ vidheryatra niṣedhe pradhānatā prasajya pratiṣedho sau kriyayā saha yatra* ñān / *prādhānyaṁ hi videheryatra niṣedhopradhānatā/ paryyudāsa sa vijñeyo yatrottarapadena* ñān//") [11, 298]. In the first type of negation, if we negate 'P' as false, we are compelled to admit 'Not-P' as true. But in 'pure negation' we negate something without any commitment, that is to say, without any possibility of admitting 'the counter-thesis'. Here Nāgārjuna's use of the Sanskrit word *niṣedha* is to be understood in the second sense of negation, that is to say, as 'refutation—pure and simple'. Nāgārjuna's view of four-cornered negation is important, because it is a necessary condition for understanding his philosophy. For him, the denial of the Law of Excluded Middle does not invite any contradiction.

Diṅnāga

As different from this meta-logical approach another dominant stream of Buddhist Logic was initiated by Diṅnāga who approximately flourished the 5th Century A. D. (c. 480—c. 540 CE) and his followers. A parallel logical system to the Nyāya Logic is developed by him where both deductive and inductive ways of reasoning are presented in a novel way and that logical way has much contribution to the development of *pramāṇaśāstra*, epistemology in India. In the history of Buddhist Logic the period from c. 400 – 1100 is considered as the most creative period. Diṅnāga developed logic in two works namely *Hetucakraḍamaru* and *Nyāyamukha*. The text of these works, we are told, are not available in Sanskrit and survived only in Tibetan translation as 'gtan tshings kyi hkhor lo gtan la dbab pa'. Pandit Bodhisattva and Bhikṣu Dharmāśoka are popularly known as the Tibetan translators. *Hetucakraḍamaru* is also known as *Hetucakranirṇaya* [14, 16-19]. Here Diṅnāga has three concerns – *hetu, anumeya and dṛṣṭānta*—probans, probandum and example. He dealt with in detail three

distinguishing marks of hetu.   He has developed three types of *liṅga*, the inferential sign which is popularly called '*trairūpya*' in Sanskrit. "There will be the presence, the absence as well as both the presence and the absence (i.e. presence in some part, while absence in another) of the *hetu* in the *anumeya* (that which is to be proved, probandum). If there be the presence of *hetu*, the conclusion will be correct, while the absence thereof will make it invalid. If there be both the presence and the absence (of the *hetu* in the *anumeya*) the conclusion will be doubtful just like an invalid one…There will be the presence, the absence as well as both (of the *hetu*) in the *sapakṣa* (that which is analogous to the *pakṣa—anumeya* or the object of inference). And similarly in the *vipakṣa* (that which is opposed to the *pakṣa*) there will be the presence, the absence, as well as both the presence and the absence of the *hetu*. So there will be three classes of the threefold *hetu* (i.e. nine varieties in all)"[7, 16-17]. The distinguishing marks that characterize the *hetu* are as follows:

"1. It should be present in the case (object) under consideration. 2. It should be present in a similar case or a homologue. 3. It should not be present in any dissimilar case, any heterologue." [7, 6] Out of epistemic interest Diṅnāga has formulated *hetucakra*, a wheel of reason with the use of two conditions, namely, *vipakṣa* and *sapakṣa*. The wheel consists of a set of nine different possibilities satisfying some conditions for a case of sound inference, but only two of them can satisfy all the three conditions necessary for a sound inference. Let us represent all these possible cases [14, 19-29]. (1) *Hetu* (*probans*) is present in all the cases of both *vipakṣa* and *sapakṣa* ; (2) *Hetu* (*probans*) is present in no case of *vipakṣa* but in all cases of *sapakṣa* ; (3) *Hetu* (*probans*) is present in some cases *vipakṣa* and in all cases *sapakṣa* ; (4) *Hetu* (*probans*) is present in all cases of *vipakṣa* is but in no case of *sapakṣa* ; (5) *Hetu* (*probans*) is present in no case either of *vipakṣa* or *sapakṣa* ; (6) *Hetu* (*probans*) is present in some cases of *vipakṣa* but in no case of *sapakṣa* ; (7) *Hetu* (*probans*) is present in all cases of *vipakṣa* and in some cases of *sapakṣa* ; (8) *Hetu* (*probans*) is present in no case of *vipakṣa* and in some cases of *sapakṣa* ; (9) *Hetu* (*probans*) is present in some cases of *vipakṣa* and in some cases of *sapakṣa*.

Matilal represents them in the following table and in the given table the sign '+' stands for 'all', the sign '±' stands for 'some', and the sign '−' stands for 'none'. [7, 8]

1 + *vipakṣa* + *sapakṣa*	2 - *vipakṣa* + *sapakṣa*	3 ± *vipakṣa* + *sapakṣa*
4. + *vipakṣa* – *sapakṣa*	5. – *vipakṣa* – *sapakṣa*	6. ± *vipakṣa* – *sapakṣa*
7. + *vipakṣa* ± *sapakṣa*	8. – *vipakṣa* ± *sapakṣa*	9. ± *vipakṣa* ± *sapakṣa*

There are nine possible cases. But none other than the serial numbers 2 and 8 can satisfy

the three necessary conditions for a *good reason* (sign), and the conjunction of these three necessary conditions constitutes a sufficient condition. When the reason is a *pseudo-reason*, we cannot have a sound inference. This is certainly an improvement in the development of Buddhist logic in India. [7, 8]

There are nine possible cases in Diṅnāga's *hetucakra* (*circle of probans*) and this theory of three forms of sign is technically tied up with his theory of meaning "exclusion" (*apoha*). The word 'logic' may be used here to mean that 'a sign is the sufficient logical assurance about the correctness of the resulting inference'. [7, 7] Another work of Diṅnāga titled *Nyāyapraveśa* is also important to begin one's study of Diṅnāga. But for the application of his logic or inference we are to look into *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the celebrated work on Epistemology.

According to J. M. Bocheński [4, 13], in two cultural spheres logic has been developed rigorously – Western cultural sphere where logic followed mathematical model and Indian cultural sphere where logic followed linguistic model— and thereby in India it gives the foundation of epistemology and the development of philosophy of language [2, 35]. In Indian cultural sphere again, there are two dominant varieties – one developed by the Nyāya School, which often comprises non-artificial language or clarifications of natural language with various concepts. Their use of logic is based on the assumption of two exclusive ontological categories – positive and negative (*bhāva* and *abhāva*). Their description of the world is based on 'relation as real'. Like Naïve realists of the West, they assume certain conceptual categories. On the other hand, the Buddhist philosophers have tried to develop a *modal* view of Reality and thereby they are interested in analysing the actual state of affairs. There is nothing called substance, everything is in the state of modes. Therefore, consideration of modality and context is understood here in a dialectical process of reasoning. The success of a philosophical claim depends upon the highest possible explanation it can give considering the context. Their interest lies in pragmatism.

I shall now elaborate the arguments of Dharmakīrti for the development of the Buddhist Logic by way of criticizing the position of Naiyāyika Gautama.

Dharmakīrti's Critique of the Nyāya view of Inference:

Now let us see how Dharmakīrti refutes the Nyāya view, specially the view of early Nyāya. For Dharmakīrti, the Naiyāyikas could not give any cogent argument in favour of their theory of inference. In other words, they fail to explain the ground for admitting uniform concomitance of *hetu* and *sādhya* (*probans* and *prabandum*). If x is to be an invariable mark for y, from the presence of x we can infer the presence of y and if this is admitted then it must also be admitted that both x and y are related by their intrinsic nature [5, 16]. Now if x is present while y is absent then presence of x cannot be called a sufficient condition for the presence of y. For y it is an instance of deviation. But non-deviation is

the necessary condition of *vyāpti* in accordance with its defining features (*lakṣaṇa*). That is why, Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* objects that if x and y are not related by their intrinsic nature, then we are to admit that 'x deviates from y.'

According to Dharmakīrti, two conditions namely, causal relation, and identity of essence are individually necessary conditions but conjointly sufficient condition for the non-defective defining features or the *lakṣaṇa* of being a relation by intrinsic nature [11, 16]. For Dharmakīrti, causal relation and identity of essence are two possible relations. Suppose, there is no necessary tie between A and B; in that case, we cannot say that A is invariably concomitant of B. This amounts to say that A is not necessarily identifying stamp of B (*"tad-apratibanddhasya tadavyabhicāra-niyamābhāvāt"*) [5].

Let us now see the development of the debate between Nyāya scholars and Dharmakīrti. For the former, there is no necessity to say here that h and s are universally tied up. But for Dharmakīrti, h and s are related universally and this is a necessary relation. It does not amount to say that all inferences admitted by the Nyāya are unsound—*"kārya- kāraṇa-bhāvād-vā svabhāvād- vā- niyāmakāt avinā-bhāva-niyamo'darśanān na, darśanāt"* [6]. Let us take an example. Suppose x is endowed with a particular taste say y, since x is endowed with a particular color called z. Here x stands for the āśraya, locus, y is the *liṅgī*, the probandum and z is the *liṅga*, the probans. The concomitance is of the form: for anything x if x has z then x has y. Now we cannot say that z and y are causally related. We cannot also say that there is the relation of essential identity between the two. This does not mean the unsoundness of this inference. Dharmakīrti only shows that both y and z are co-effects of x [3, 17]. Let us now see how it is explained by Dharmakīrti. About essential identity Dharmakīrti says that such a relation holds between a genus and a species, and "even between a genus and a member of the genus"(*rūpādināpi hi rasādder-avinābhāvo na svataḥ kintu svakāraṇāvyabhicāradvāraka iti tatkāraṇotpattirevāvinābhāvanibandh anam*) [5].

It may be noted that according to Diṅnāga, there are two types of inference for one's own understanding (*svārthānumāna*) and for 'others' understanding (*parārthānumāna*). The issues concerning epistemology and psychology apart from logic are the primary concern of the first one and the issues concerning 'demonstration' or evidence in the process of language use in order to convince others is the primary concern of the second.

The first is grounded on the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of the *liṅga* (probans) and the second is based on the *liṅga* (probans) which is causally connected to 'the property to be confirmed (*tad-utpatti*) [3, 18] In addition to these two types of inference Dharmakīrti deals with another type of inference in the *Nyāya-bindu* which 'shows that some property is not present in the given locus' (*anupalabdhi*) [16,109]. As an example of the third type of inference we may say that because no book is apprehended (*anupalabdha*) upon this table

now, there is no book upon the table in question. This type of inference is a development upon the earlier types conceived by Diṅnāga and Matilal praised it as 'more useful' [3, 18].

It is often argued that 'This is a tree, since this is a *siṁśapā*. Here 'this' is the locus, being a tree is the *liṅgī* or *sādhya*, and the *liṅga* or *hetu* is *siṁśapā*. Now 'being a tree' is the *viśeṣaṇa* (adjective) of the genus (*jāti*) and 'being a *siṁśapā* is the *viśeṣaṇa* of the species of the tree. 'Tree' is a class say, 'Y' and under this class *siṁśapā* is a species or sub-class. X cannot belong to *siṁśapā* species if it does not belong to the class of tree, Y. In this sense there exists a necessity of the relation of identity between X and Y. But question arises: How a Nyāya philosopher would view this version of inference proposed by Dharmakīrti?

Here a Nyāya philosopher would argue that 'This is a *siṁśapā*, since it is a tree'. Here 'this' is the locus, *pakṣa*, and 'being a *siṁśapā* is the *liṅgī* or *sādhya*, and 'being this tree' is the *liṅga, hetu* (probans). For a Nyāya philosopher, this 'tree-ness' is *viśeṣaṇa* and this is also the *svarūpa*, the very nature of this tree. Here Dharmakīrti would also say that 'being a *siṁśapā* 'tree-ness' is the *svabhāva* of not only of this tree but of all *siṁśapā* tree' [3, 18] and we cannot ignore, according to Dharmakīrti, the essential identity of all *siṁśapā*-s and trees, a relation that necessarily holds between species and a genus.

Here the Nyāya philosopher differs from Dharmakīrti. For him, the word *svarūpa* stands for 'own nature of a thing'. Dharmakīrti makes a difference between something as it is, and that thing as it is known. This may indirectly inspire the later Nyāya philosophers to develop a very important concept called '*avacchedaka*', the distinguisher. The Nyāya philosophers have given emphasis on the importance of the law of universal concomitance between prabans (*hetu*) and prabandum (*sādhya*) whereas the Buddhist philosophers have given emphasis on the importance of probans (*hetu*) in their respective theories of *anumāna* (inference). In other words, the Nyāya view is *vyāpti-centric* whereas the Buddhist view is *hetu-centric*.

Concluding Remarks

However, it is interesting to see how this development of logic differs because of difference in ontological presuppositions. Accordingly, we see difference among philosophers of the same school in broad sense. Though both Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti belong to Buddhist school of Philosophy, they differ in their ontological positions. For Nāgārjuna, everything is devoid of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*). Nāgārjuna's dialectics (*prasaṅga*) as a method of de-conditioning might be a distant precursor of Derrida's method of 'Deconstruction' which functions through a sense of 'defference' (i.e. a peculiar combination of 'differ' and 'deffer'). Never the less, Dharmakīrti holds that a real thing has *svalakṣaṇa* and even the concomitant invariable relation for inference is grounded on the intrinsic nature of the things related by it. Both Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti influenced the development of Indian Logic in two different directions. [3, 18] For the Nyāya, the main focus is on the notion

of universal concomitance (*liṅga-liṅgī-saṁbandha*) for the ancient school and *vyāpti-saṁbandha* for the new school of the Nyāya philosophy). But for the Buddhists, especially for Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, it is the nature and role of reason, probans, *hetu* that occupies the central position in their epistemic logic and this has immense influence in understanding language and meaning in the writings of Jinendrabuddhi (8th Century A.D) and Ratnakīrti (10th Century A.D). In his *Mahāvaiyākaraṇa-kārikā-vivaraṇa-pañjikā* Jinendrabuddhi refers to Diṅnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and says that a word becomes meaningful only with comparison and recognizing a difference and therefore only by positive or negative description by itself is not enough to be understood. Binary opposition of affirmation and negation works together in understanding the meaning of a word. Language does not create meaning of any object; rather the chief concern of language is to uncover the meaning of object. When I say 'human being' to uncover its meaning I want to mean that since human being is not a tree, not a hill, not a river, not a cow, so I want to mean by human being by using the word 'human being'; here it works through a comparative process of 'acceptance-rejection'. Any word in order to be meaningful presupposes it's opposite, negative word and therefore any claim of universality regarding the meaning of a word is subject to doubt. So from the analysis of reason, *hetu* there is a gradual development of Buddhist epistemic logic to philosophy of language which is expressed in the use of signifier-signified-relation. This might remind us Ferdinand de Saussure's Semiology. We know that Th. Stcherbatsky's two volumes of *Buddhist Logic* were published in 1930. There might be a possibility of looking at this work by the 20th century French thinkers.

The contribution of Buddhist epistemological logic to the arena 'Semiology' is yet to be explored. Th Stcherbatsky in his *Buddhist Logic* (volume 2) has devoted a substantial portion in Appendix IV to Jinendrabuddhi [13, 384—400]. And Sign = signifier-signified relation, according to Jinendrabuddhi, is not universal, not permanent but 'context-bound'. The relation between signifier and language is not a necessary universal relation as there is universal necessary relation between a creeper (*latā*) and its leaf (*patra*). Analysis of this kind of development in Buddhist Logic from Diṅnāga to Jinendrabuddhi deserves another full paper. May I leave that excursion for another such occasion?

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Progressive Development of Knowledge *(Paññā)* in The Concept of Emptiness *(Suññatā)* in Nikāya.

(Brenda) Huong X. Ly*

The concept of Emptiness, known as *Suññāta* in Pāli and *Sunyatā* in Sanskrit, is a prominent and foundational idea in Mahāyana Buddhism. It is attributed to the eminent teacher Nagarjuna, who lived in the 3rd century CE. His concept evolved into a profound philosophical tenet within Mahāyana Buddhism, and Nagarjuna is celebrated as its founder. Mahāyana practitioners take great pride in this teaching. However, the concept of Emptiness is less emphasized in Theravāda Buddhism, and at times, it is even misunderstood as it is a non-teaching of the Buddha. Several factors contribute to this misconception, including the intricate and abstract language used to elucidate the philosophical concept of Emptiness by Nagarjuna and his followers. Additionally, there has been a historical tendency to prioritize the study and research of Pāli literature within Theravāda Buddhism, which may not have provided as much exposure to the Mahāyana teachings, including the concept of Emptiness.

It's important to note that while the emphasis on Emptiness may differ between Theravāda and Mahāyana traditions, both share a common foundation in the teachings of the historical Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama. The variations in emphasis and interpretation are part of the rich tapestry of Buddhist thought and practice that has developed over centuries and across different cultural and geographical contexts. This article presents the concept of Emptiness (Suññāta) found in Pāli Literature offering a progressive path for the development of knowledge and wisdom (Paññā) through three key stages: learning (*sotamayapaññā*), contemplation (*cintāmayapaññā*), and cultivation (*bhāvanāmayapaññā*).

Developing Knowledge on *Suññāta* through Learning (*Sutamayā Paññā*) and Rational Thought *(Cintāmayā Paññā)*

Sutamayā Paññā is the knowledge obtained from learning from any sources, official training such as academic setting or unofficial source such as from reading books, internet. *Cittāmayā Paññā* is the knowledge gained after learning, pursuing a logical thought or conclusion.[1] Emptiness is a recurring theme in numerous suttas within the Nikāya, each of which offers a distinct philosophical perspective. For instance, In *Mahāvedalla Sutta,* in a notable teaching by Mahāthera Sāriputta to a group of monks, he provided a specific definition of Emptiness. (*suññā)* that "the unshakable mental liberation is empty of lust,

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[1]*Encyclopaedia of Buddhism,* Jotiya Dhirasekera (Ed. In chief) Vol. IV, Sri Lanka: Government of Sri Lanka, 1979, P. 169

empty of hatred, empty of delusion"[2] (*Sā kho panākuppā cetovimutti suññā rāgena, suññā dosena, suññā mohena*)[3]. This is also the pure state for an *Arahat* like Mahāthera Sāriputta always dwells in, as he was replied to Lord Buddha when he was asked (*Suññatāvihārena kho ahaṃ*). It should be understood that an Arahat is a being who has achieved full enlightenment and is completely free from the three poisons: lust (*lobha*), hatred (*dosa*), and ignorance (*moha*) which also means the state of *Nibbāna*. Therefore, the emptiness in this context means *Nibbāna*.

In other context, Emptiness also signifies the profound teachings of Buddhism encompassing the deep insights into the nature of reality, the self, and existence. In some suttas in Nikāya, Buddha also indicates his teaching is deep and hard to understand as mentioned in the *Anisutta* that "discourses that are words of the Tathagata — deep, deep in their meaning, transcendent, connected with emptiness"[4] *(ye te suttantā tathāgatabhāsitā gambhīrā gambhiratthā lokuttarā suññatapaṭisaṃyuttā)*. The teaching of the Buddha that is considered deep, transcendent that is the Dependent Origination (*paṭiccasamupada*) as that what was his first thought right after his enlightenment.

Then, while he was alone and in seclusion, this line of thinking arose in his awareness: "This Dhamma that I have attained is deep, hard to see, hard to realize, peaceful, refined, beyond the scope of conjecture, subtle, to-be-experienced by the wise. But this generation delights in attachment, is excited by attachment, enjoys attachment. For a generation delighting in attachment, excited by attachment, enjoying attachment, this/that conditionality and dependent co-arising are hard to see. [5]

The passage above suggests that Dependent Origination is considered a profound teaching because it is intricately connected to the concept of emptiness. Dependent Origination explores the interdependent nature of all phenomena, revealing how everything arises in dependence on other factors. This understanding of interconnectedness and interdependence is a key aspect of the profound wisdom associated with both Dependent Origination and the concept of emptiness in Buddhism. This sutta simply provides teachings on what emptiness is, helping to elucidate and clarify the concept of emptiness within the context of Buddhist philosophy.

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[2]Bhikkhu Bodhi, Middle Length Discourse, Mahāvedalla Sutta,

[3]*Majjhima Nikāya 43 -Mahāvedallasutta, Suttacentral*, https://suttacentral.net/mn43/pli/ms?lang=en&layout=plain&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin

[4]Bhikkhu Bodhi (transl), *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*: The Drum Peg (SN. 20.7), Boston, Wisdom Publication, 2000, p.p 708-709.

[5]Bhikkhu Bodhi (transl), *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*: The Brahmā's Request p. 231. (SN. 6.1) *Adhigato kho myāyaṃ dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodho santo paṇīto atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paṇḍitavedanīyo ālayarāmā kho panāyaṃ pajā ālayaratā ālayasammuditā1 ālayarāmāya kho pana pajāya ālayaratāya ālayasammuditāya duddasaṃ idaṃ ṭhānaṃ yadidaṃ idappaccayatā paṭiccasamuppādo*

Indeed, in another context, emptiness can also be synonymous with the concept of "*anatta*," which means selflessness or the absence of a permanent, unchanging self. Emptiness and anatta both point to the idea that there is no inherent, independent self in individuals or phenomena, and they are interconnected concepts in Buddhist philosophy. In the *Suñña Sutta*, the word *suññā* is explained in relation to world – "the world is empty" (*suñño lokoti vuccati*), and this is how the sutta offers the explanation of how world is empty:

Insofar as it is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self: Thus, it is said, Ananda, that the world is empty. And what is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self? The eye is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self. Forms... Eye-consciousness... Eye-contact is empty of a self or of anything pertaining to a self.[6]

The passage initially provides an explanation of emptiness concerning the self and anything related to the self. It introduces the concept of selflessness, which is closely connected to the six senses, their respective sensory doors, and the objects of perception. These components together form the basis for our consciousness. There are 18 factors, both internal and external, that enable us to perceive the external world. These 18 factors are considered selfless because they coexist, and whatever they are used to perceive or cognize is also selfless, as it depends on these 18 factors for its existence. In essence, it lacks inherent substance.

The world itself, being the object of perception, is also viewed as selfless. This perspective aligns with the Buddha's assertion that the world is empty. The analogy presented in the sutta gradually establishes the logical connection between the emptiness of the self and the emptiness of the world. This progression helps individuals grasp the true essence of selflessness, which is rooted in emptiness

This sutta serves as a valuable tool for individuals seeking to grasp the concept of emptiness at an analytical level. It achieves this by initially employing the concept of the world, which is composed of numerous factors, as a tangible starting point. Subsequently, the sutta guides individuals to establish a connection between this concept of the world and the idea that the six senses, six sense objects, and six consciousnesses are also characterized by emptiness. This gradual progression aids in deepening one's understanding of emptiness and its application to various aspects of existence.

Developing Knowledge on *Suññātā* Through Application/Practice (*Bhāvānamayā Paññā*)

The depiction of emptiness in the *Nikāya* not only conveys a philosophical tenet but

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[6]Bhikkhu Bodhi (transl), *The Connected Discourses of the Buddha*: Empty is the World, p.p 1163-1164. (SN. 35.85) *Cakkhuṃ kho ānanda, suññaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā, tasmā suñño lokoti vucati. Kiñca Ānanda, suññaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā. Rūpā suññā attena vā attaniyena vā, cakkhuviññāṇaṃ suññaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā, cakkhusamphasso suñño attena vā attaniyena vā yampidaṃ cakkhusamphassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitaṃ sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā tampi suññaṃ attena va attaniyena vā.*

also serves as a guide for practical application. It offers a way of practice that enables individuals to experientially understand and embody the concept of emptiness in their spiritual journey. This practical aspect emphasizes that emptiness is not merely an abstract idea but a transformative realization that can be integrated into one's daily life and meditation practice to attain wisdom and liberation from suffering.

In The Purification of Alms food Sutta *(Piṇḍapātapārisuddhi Sutta),* Lord Buddha teaches monks to dwell in the state of *Suññāta* by reflecting on: "if a monk should wish, 'May I often dwell in a dwelling of emptiness,'" . . . was there in my mind any desire, passion, aversion, delusion, or irritation for forms cognizable via the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body? If there is, one should abandon it, if not, then one should dwell in refreshment and joy, training & joy, training day & night in skillful.[7] Beside contemplate on the any attachment to the form of eye, one should contemplate deeper level that is any five strings of sensuality (*kāmaguṅā*) desires those lead to lust, five hindrances (*nīvaraṇā*). If there is desire then he should abandon (*pahānāya*) them five clinging aggregates (*pañcannaṃ upādānakhandhānam*) apprehended (*pariññāya*), if it is not comprehended to him should meditate and comprehend on these five clinging aggregates. Otherwise, he can dwell on in refreshment & joy, day and night in these skillful qualities.

In same sutta, Buddha also indicates another method of dwelling in Emptiness by establishing the faculty of mindfulness in Four Foundation (*satipaṭṭhāna*). If one is satisfied with establishment one dwells on in refreshment and joy, day and night in these skillful qualities. One should reflect on 37 Enlightenment factors (*Bodhipakkhiya*).[8] Moreover, one should reflect on whether tranquility (*Samatha*) and Insight (*Vipassanā*) have been developed. Finally, the last factors those he should reflect on clear knowing (*vijjā*) and release (*vimutti*) realized in me. If all these aspects are not developed, one should develop, and if one already developed, one should dwell his mind on the refreshment and joy on day and night. Therefore, the way of applying *suññatā* in practice is by reflection on the mind.

In *Cūḷasuññatā sutta* offers a different application of practice of *Suññatā*. Buddha taught the way of practice of *suññatā* that is one free from the distortion of one's perception, and the present of a singleness based on the perception. Buddha gave examples:

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[7]Thānisarro Bhikkhu (Transl.) *The Purification of Almsfood, Piṇḍapātapārisuddhi Sutta ,* Dhammatalks. org, https://www.dhammatalks.org/suttas/MN/MN151.html *(MN 151)* https://suttacentral.net/mn151/pli/ ms?lang=en&layout=plain&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin *Bhikkhu sace ākaṅkheyya: 'suññatāvihārena bahulaṃ vihareyyā'ti, tena, sāriputta, bhikkhunā iti paṭisañcikkhitabbaṃ: . . . atthi nu kho me tattha cakkuviññeyyesu rūpesu chando vā rāgo vā moho vā pavāpi cetaso'ti? Sace, sāriputta, bhikkhu paccavekkhamāno evam jānāti: . . . yena ca maggena gāmato piṇḍāya paṭikkamiṃ, natthi me tattha cakkhuviññeyyesu rūpesu chando vā rāgo vā doso vā moho vā paṭṭighaṃ vāpi cetaso'ti tena, sāriputta, bhikkhu nā teneva pītipāmojjena vihātabbam ahorattānuskkhinā kusalesu dhammesu*

[8]*Bodhipakkhiya:* four right exertion *(sammappadhā*), four bases of power (*catāro iddhipādā*), five faculties (*pañcindriyāni)*, five strengths (*pañca balāni*), seven factors for awakening (*satta bhojjhaṅgā*), Eight Noble Paths (*aṭṭhangiko maggo*)

He discerns that 'Whatever disturbances that would exist based on the perception of human being are not present. Whatever disturbances that would exist based on the perception of wilderness are not present. There is only this modicum of disturbance: the singleness based on the perception of earth. He discerns that 'This mode of perception is empty of the perception of human being. This mode of perception is empty of the perception of wilderness. There is only this non-emptiness: the singleness based on the perception of earth. Thus he regards it as empty of whatever is not there. Whatever remains, he discerns as present: 'There is this.' And so this, his entry into emptiness (*suññatāvakkanti bhavati*), accords with actuality, is undistorted in meaning, & pure.[9]

According to above passage, the application of *suññāta* in practice seems very simple. whatever appears in front of one's eyes, one just sees as it exists just as "the singleness based on the perception," and if whether does not exist in front of one's eyes, then one just see it is "empty of whatever it is not there." This practice seems to be very concrete and simple way of practice. However, it is so simple for a complicated fabricated mind of human being. Usually, whatever does not exist in front of one's mind, he/she still describes the scenario according to assumption, imagination, and fabrication. For instance, when one enters an empty room, he will not simply see the empty room; he instead thinks why the room is empty, the room is old or new, room is small or large etc. All these judgements come from human's mind habitual to judgement, assumption, imagination, and fabrication. All of these states of mental factor are considered distorted perception. It does not meet the value of fidelity of the actual existence. However, if one starts train one's mind to be mindful and see the truly with the actual existence (*yathābhūta*) in the present moment. Then this considers one truly the door entering the cultivation of the emptiness (*suññatāvakkanti bhavati*) and the emptiness here means mind is "pure" (*parisuddhā*) and "free from distorted meaning" (*avipallatthā*).

Another method that allows one to experience the absolute timeless emptiness that means the experience and the achievement is independent from the timeline – past, present and future. According to *Kaccānagotta sutta*, Kaccāna experienced the realm of emptiness through mindfulness on the function of the both mental and physical body which is the technique in *satipaṭṭhāna*. Through this technique, he could experience the impermanence of the five aggregates body and understand how this body of five aggregate are inter-

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[9]Bhikkhu Sujato (transl._ M.N. 121 - The Lesser Discourse on Emptiness, Suttacentral.net https://suttacentral.net/mn121/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=plain&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=false&script=lat in So evaṁ pajānāti: 'ye assu darathā manussasaññaṁ paṭicca tedha na santi, ye assu darathā araññasaññaṁ paṭicca tedha na santi, atthi cevāyaṁ darathamattā yadidaṁ—pathavīsaññaṁ paṭicca ekattan'ti. So 'suññamidaṁ saññāgataṁ manussasaññāyā'ti pajānāti, 'suññamidaṁ saññāgataṁ araññasaññāyā'ti pajānāti, 'atthi cevidaṁ asuññataṁ yadidaṁ—pathavīsaññaṁ paṭicca ekattan'ti. Iti yañhi kho tattha na hoti tena taṁ suññaṁ samanupassati, yaṁ pana tattha avasiṭṭhaṁ hoti taṁ 'santamidaṁ atthī'ti pajānāti. Evampissa esā, ānanda, yathābhuccā avipallatthā parisuddhā bhavati.

influenced[10]. Through the practice of dwelling fully on the present moment, he experienced the function and the cause of the existence of the five aggregates selflessness in the present moment. Therefore, it is truly empty in the past and future. Based on these two statements extracted out in the Udāna commentary - "*assa no ca me siyā*" which means "were there not, there could be not by me", and "*na bhavissati na ca me bhavissati*" which means "there will not be, nor will there be for me", it is obvious indicating Kaccāna delighted in experience the true emptiness[11]. Through Kaccayana sutta, the concept of emptiness encompasses the key attributes such as the impermanence, the selflessness, and timelessness, and therefore, understanding emptiness involves the practice in order to recognize its essence which is characterized by these three qualities.

Conclusion

Nikāya offer fully on the developing knowledge on concept of *suññatā* from definition and factors related to emptiness to enhance in learning, contemplation, and path of practice. Concepts of *suññatā* in Pāli literature are presented in simple and concise language at the level of learning and contemplation. However, it would very difficult to attain knowledge from practice as one needs to practice insightful meditation (*vipassanā*) in order to gain the true knowledge from experience and penetration. This is the ultimate goal for practice. The language is the medium for conveying the teaching so one can learn and contemplate, as it is purposeless if one just stops at the level of learning and analyzing. Therefore, it is said in *Dhammapada* that:

❍ Better than a thousand words that are senseless and unconnected with the realization of Nibbāna, is a single word of sense, if on hearing it one is calmed.

(Sahassamapi ce vācā anatthapadasamhitā ekaṃ atthapadaṃ seyyo yaṃ sutvā upasammati)[12].

❍ Better than the recitation of a hundred verses that are senseless and unconnected with the realization of Nibbāna, is the recitation of a single verse of the Teaching (Dhamma), if on hearing it one is calmed".

(*Yo ca gāthā sataṃ bhāse, anatthapadasamhita, ekaṃ dhammapadaṃ seyyo, yaṃ sutvā upasammati)[13].*

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[10]Bhikkhu Sugato (transl.), S.N. 12.15 Kaccānagottasutta, https://suttacentral.net/sn12.15/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=plain&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin

[11]Peter Masefield (transl.) – *The Udāna Commentary* "Kaccāna" London, Pali Text Society, 1995, P.p. 966-967.

[12]Daw Mya Tin (transl.), The *Dhammapada*: Verses and Stories, verse 100, 1986. https://www.tipitaka.net/tipitaka/dhp/index.php

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Lālan Philosophy on the World Philosophy: A Review

Md. Ashikuzzaman Khan Kiron*

Abstract

If we are looking for the history of the origin of *Baul* philosophy or *Lālan* philosophy, then we have to go to the root of Buddhist *Sahajiyā Sādhanā*-song practice during the *Pala* period in Bengal from the 7th to the 8th century AD. Later, from the tenth century to the fifteenth century, the journey of this philosophy gradually progressed through different paths. Between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the practice of this philosophy became more popular at the hands of the *Baul Samrāta Lālan Shāh*. Just as *Lālan* had a *Guru*, *Lālan's Guru* also had a *Guru,* and subsequently, *Lālan's* disciple was also made in the same vein. And these disciples captured the philosophy of *Lālan* and delivered the world philosophy to the court. Apart from this, the researchers of *Lālan* philosophy and wise sages are also trying to know and understand this philosophy. World poet *Rabindranath Tagore* played a leading role in presenting *Lālan* philosophy in the world court. All are researching *Baul's* songs, *Lālan's* songs, and *Lālan's* life to know and understand *Lālan*. It has created a place of extreme interest in the readership of *Lālan* philosophy. As a result, *Lālan* philosophy has spread beyond Bangladesh and India to countries like Japan, Europe, and America. The philosophy of nurture is a continuation of the ancient philosophy that started with philosophers like the *Greek* philosophers *Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle*. With the passage of time, *Lālan* philosophy has now entered the world of philosophy and has been able to gain ground. However, there is an influence of ancient Indian philosophy, including Buddhist philosophy, in this philosophy. The discussion paper presents the fact that nurturing philosophy has become an important part of world philosophy. An acceptable assessment of how the content and ideas of this philosophy have inspired people has been presented. The main goal of this article is to highlight whether this philosophy really deserves to be included in world philosophy.

Keywords: *Lālan* Philosophy, World Philosophy, *Baul*, Soul, and Humanity.

Introduction

Lālan is the name of a philosophy. *Lālan* is the name of an ideology. *Lālan* is the name of a *Baul* religious faith among the *Bauls*. As a result, *Lālan* has become a global philosophy over time. In *Lālan's* philosophy, man and humanity' are seen as the main things. There is no extravagance of any particular religion or divine or social profession in the name of religion. Although not falling under any particular religion, *Baul* philosophy has brought together three different streams of people, and they have been able to reach a certain consensus.

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And that consensus is man of mind', which is God living in the human body. That god is worshipped in *Baul* or *Lālan* philosophy. And for this reason, the journey of philosophy, which started in *Cheuriā* (*Ākhrā*) in the *Kushtia* district of undivided India-Bangla, that is, present-day independent Bangladesh, has reached the status of world philosophy by crossing India, Japan, Europe, and America in modern times. *Lālan* philosophy is one of the many philosophies practiced or studied from ancient times to the present day. The name of world poet *Rabindranath Tagore* is remembered first and foremost for bringing the philosophy of *Baul* or *Lālan* to the court of the world. Because he is the one who brought this philosophy to the attention of researchers, scholars, and geniuses around the world. And through such a journey, *Lālan* philosophy has now become known in world philosophy and has been able to take the seat of respect. *Lālan* philosophy has gained a place of honors in world philosophy through a philosophical trial. The main reason for this is its inherent content, education, and acceptance. Those issues are presented in the discussion article.

Problem

The questions or problems that first came to mind or were worked on in order to prepare the discussion research paper can be specifically mentioned. For instance, to give people a basic understanding of *Lālan*, to highlight *Lālan's* place in world philosophy, to demonstrate how *Lālan's* songs can influence people all over the world and how they can use them in their own lives, and to emphasis the need for more research on the life and contributions of the humanist *Baul* philosopher *Lālan*. So this article has been written to find the solution to these questions.

Research Methodology

Baul's philosophy has gained popularity around the world for the last two hundred years. This philosophy began to be practiced during the Pala dynasty. And the universal poet *Rabindranath Tagore* played a key role in the popularity of this *Baul* philosophy. However, to prepare the research paper, *Bauls'* song collections, books written and compiled by various researchers, literature, historical texts, oral discourses, research papers, etc. A qualitative method has been used for this study.

Literature Review

There have been several works on *Baul* philosophy in Bangladesh, India, and other countries around the world. Among the works that have been done in the *Baul* philosophy of the world, it is worth mentioning: *In The Bauls of Birbhum* (Roy, 1994), the author has discussed in this text religious practices of *Bauls*, social organization, nature and media of social and cultural communication of *Bauls*, continuity, and change. *In the book Lalon Shah the Great Poet* (Hossain, 2009), caste theory, influence on the life and writings of *Lālan* authors *Rabindranath Tagore* and *Nazrul Islam*, evaluation of *Lalon's* poetry, modernism in

Lalon's poem, etc. have been discussed. *City of Mirrirs Songs of Lālan Sāi, Text, Translation, and Commentary* (Carol, Cantu, and Zakaria, 2012), they have edited the songs of *Lālan Fakir* using both oral and written sources. *Fakir Lalon Sha and his Songs* (Hossain, 2015) in this book *Lālan* song meaning is explained various things. *Fakir Lālan Sāi philosophy and sociology* (Hossain, 2016). The topic of the book is *Lālan's* life, social movements, and various aspects of *Baul's* philosophy practice.

Discussion

***Lālan Sāi* in the list of world philosophers**

World philosophers can be divided into several periods. Such as: the pre-Socratic philosophical age. Philosophers of this era are: *Periander* (7th century BC), *Gautama Buddha* (623-543 BC), *Solon* (638-558 BC), *Thales* (635-543 BC), *Anaximander (*610-547 BC), *Mahavira* (599-599 BC) 527), *Anaxagoras* (500-428 BC), *Anaximenes of Miletus* (585-525 BC), *Pherecydes of Syros* (6th century BC), *Cylon of Sparta* (6th century BC), *Bias of Priene* (6th century BC), *Cleobulus of Lindos* (6th century BC), *Anacharsis* (6th century BC), *Pitakas of Mitylene* (unknown), *Pythagoras* (582- BC 496), *Theano* (mathematician), *Xenophenes* (557-470 BC), *Heraclitus* (535-475 BC), *Parmenides* (510-440 BC), *Leukiplus* (5th century BC), *Anaxagoras* (500-428 BC), *Empedocles* (BC 490-430), *Gino of Elea* (490-430 BC), *Hippias* (485-415 BC), *Georgius* (483-375 BC), *Protagoras* (481-420 BC), *Philolos* (480-405 BC), *Antiphon* (480-411 BC) , *Melissus of Samos* (470 BC-unknown), *Prodicus* (465-390 BC?), *Herodotus* (5th century BC), Ancient Philosophers. Philosophers of this era are: *Pericles* (495-429 BC), *Aspasia* (469-406 BC), *Socrates* (469-399 BC), *Diogenes Apolloniatis* (460 BC—unknown), *Democritus* (460-370 BC), *Archytus* (428-347 BC), *Diogenes* (412-323 BC), *Plato* (429-347 BC), *Stilpo* (380-330 BC), *Megar Euclid* (435-365 BC), and *Aristotle* (384 BC–322 BC). Fifteenth to Sixteenth: *Machiavelli* (1469-1527 AD), *Francis Bacon* (1561-1626 AD), *René Descartes* (1596-1650 AD), *Thomas Hobbes* (1588-1679 AD), *John Locke* (1602-1704 AD), *Baruch Spinoza (*1602-1677 AD), *George Berkeley* (1685-1753 AD), *Edmund Burke* (1729-1797 AD), *Augustus Comte* (1798-1857 AD), *Georg Wilhelm Hegel* (1770- 1831 AD), *John-Jacques Rousseau* (1712-1778 AD), *Gottfried Leibniz* (1646-1716 AD), *Immanuel Kant* (1724-1804 AD), *Lālan Sāi* (1772-1890 AD). 19th-century philosophers: *Friedrich Nietzsche* (1844-1900 AD), *Vilfredo Pareto* (unknown), *Saren Kierkegaard* (unknown), and *Bertrand Russell* (1872-1970 AD). 20th Century Philosophers: *Martin Heidegger* (1889-1976), *Ludwig Wittgenstein* (1889-1951), *John Ruhls* (unknown), *Friedrich von Hayek* (unknown), *Thomas Samuel Kuhn* (1922-1996), *Karl Popper* (1902- 1994 AD). It goes without saying that, apart from these philosophers, Muslim philosophers have played an important role in the world of philosophy. For example: *Al Kindi* (810-873 AD), *Al Farabi* (872-951 AD), *Al Ghazali* (1058-1111 AD), *Ibn Rushd* (1126-1198 AD), and *Ibn Khaldun* (1332-1406 AD). There are probably many philosophers out there who have not yet been discovered or known.

Because there are many philosophers of good quality, it is not possible to know them. For many years, it was unknown how to nurture. Even his followers may not have had such a place in the history of the world. Similarly, *Gautama Buddha* and *Mahavira* and many of their followers remain unknown. However, with the passage of time, it is expected that philosophers and researchers will see the way information technology is advancing in the world.

Lālan Philosopnhy

'*Baul Samrāta Lālan's* lifetime was from 1772-1890 AD. That means 'he was born on October 17, 1772' (Haq, 1999). and died on October 17, 1890. However, there is disagreement among researchers about his lifetime. Keeping in mind the need to reduce the length of the article, the differences in his lifetime are not further discussed.

Lālan presented his own philosophy to the people in the disciple tradition through songs composed during his lifetime. From the Greeks to ancient India, various philosophers have propounded various dimensional philosophies and theories and are remembered in the world for doing so. Some of them have expressed doctrines on the theories of inanimate-living, soul-spiritual, materialism, God, etc. But *Lālan* has highlighted people and humanity through his songs. Not only that, he placed people above all. He glorified humanity. He said God is omnipresent among people. That's why he presented the 'Man of Mind Theory'. Self-liberation is possible in the pursuit of this person. The songs he composed were mainly for teaching his disciples. But he did not compose songs to entertain people. Although, over time, some of his songs have been performed in many venues for entertainment, 'There is disagreement about the number of songs he composed. However, *Lālan* researcher *Shaktinath Jha* has highlighted the number theory of the most acceptable songs. The research and reading communities have recognized his work as being the most acceptable. According to his research, the number of *Lālan's* songs is 663 (Hossain, 2019, Based on *Lālan Shāh's* song, the discussion about *Lālan's* position in world philosophy is advanced.

Lālan Philosophy on the World Philosophy

Philosophical thought is the first thing that works behind every creation in the world. It is not easy to create anything without philosophical thinking. So before comparing *Lālan's* song with philosophy, an idea about philosophy needs to be taken first. Since philosophy is related to human senses and feelings, it is not based on universal concepts, so it is difficult to define philosophy properly. But let's try to get an acceptable idea. 'From the beginning of creation, when man learned to think, the journey of philosophy can be assumed to have started. Researchers believe that philosophy originates from the wonder, doubt, and curiosity of the human mind. Some scholars believe that the origin of philosophy lies in the spiritual consciousness of people. That is, philosophy originated from the curiosity, search for truth, wonder, doubt, practical need, and spiritual thirst of thinking people.

So it is very difficult to present a single or universal definition of philosophy (Hossain, 2019).' *Plato* said, 'The aim of philosophy is to gain knowledge of eternal and essential things. Hence, the branch of knowledge that deals with the essential nature of matter is called philosophy (Rahman & Dhali, 2010).' The German philosopher *Kant* excelled in philosophy by writing many valuable books. According to empiricist philosopher *August Comte*, 'Philosophy is the father of all sciences (Rahman & Dhali, 2010).' The English word for philosophy is 'Philosophy'. And the English word 'Philosophy' comes from the Greek '*Philos*' and '*Sophia*'. It means passion and knowledge, or wisdom, respectively. That is, the etymological meaning of the word 'Philosophy' is knowledge or affection for truth. Philosophy in the general sense is called seeing, but in Indian philosophy it means seeing the spiritual truth and realizing the nature of truth.

Philosophy is as old as human history. Its journey began with the advent of intelligent mankind. There may be some differences in the presentation of people's thoughts due to cultural and modern influences, but the main place of thinking is on the same continuum. Therefore, through the discussion of different philosophies, it can be seen that various issues have been developed among people to solve philosophical questions, and world philosophy has progressed based on them. *Lālan* philosophy has been presented in various standards of world philosophy.

According to epistemological theory, the development of human society and human beings is said to be through the development of knowledge. This doctrine is recognized as a basic and essential doctrine of philosophy. This doctrine advances three questions. They are: A. What is the source of knowledge? B. What is the nature of knowledge? C. What is the validity of knowledge? However, in Western philosophy, two approaches—skeptical and arbitrary—could be observed. Western philosophers' post-Renaissance expressions expressed various theories about this epistemology. Among them, intellectualism, empiricism, and intuitionism are particularly worth mentioning.

The ancient Greek philosophers *Plato*, *Aristotle,* etc. were supporters of rationalism. This doctrine is very ancient. According to this doctrine, the source of correct knowledge is rational. True knowledge can be gained through growthists. The characteristic of this knowledge is universality. Descartes, the father of modern philosophy, gave clear views on rationalism. He said, 'We gain knowledge by geometric descent from our instincts (Rahman & Dhali, 2010).' When it comes to the philosophy of empiricism, the first person who comes to mind is the ancient Greek anthropologist and sophist. He was later joined by *Thomas Hobbes*, *John Locke*, *Bishop George Berkeley,* and *David Hume*. According to this doctrine, experience or sense perception is the only way to gain knowledge of worldly matters. As a result, knowledge can be gained through intuition. But here, by following the ascension method and building the knowledge base (Rahman & Dhali, 2010), Knowledge is a matter of perception. Such was the idea of ancient epistemological analysts. As a result,

they considered intuition to be the only source of knowledge. Mediaeval Sufis believed in such doctrines. Later, that is, in modern times, the French philosopher *Henri Bergson* advanced this doctrine. He says, intuition is intellectual compassion. He thinks intellect cannot impart proper knowledge. The intellect can describe the signs of things but cannot perceive their form.

Now let us discuss *Fakir Lālan Shāh's* method in the discussion of epistemology. *Lālan Sāiji* has sometimes tried to explain epistemology by taking a skeptical approach. Just as skeptics want to blindly believe everything, skeptics don't want to do the same. *Lālan Shāh* did not give importance to indirect knowledge, but he gave importance to direct knowledge. The *Bauls* say-

> *Jā dekhinā dui nayane*
> Tā māninā ourur vacane.'
> That is, what cannot be seen with two eyes?
> Do not accept the words of the *Guru*.

The word is very important. *Sāiji* did not want to believe in anything unseen. So he said again:

<div align="center">

'Allah hari Vajana pūjana
Sakali mānuser srijana
Anāmaka acenā vacana
Ñjana-indriye nā smbhabe.'
(Chawdhury, 2008)
That is, "All worships and prayers
Are nothing but man-created
Human imagination cannot conceive
The depiction of an invisible phenomenon."

</div>

(Hossain, 2015)

Here, *Lālan Sāiji* believes in *Karl Marx's* theory of materialism. That is to say that we cannot gain knowledge about anything beyond direct ignorance. Knowledge can only be gained through sense perception. *Fakir Lālan Sāi* says,

<div align="center">

'Maner bhāva prakāshite
Vāshār sristi e jagate
Ācānaka adharake dharte
Bhāsā bakya nāhi pābe.'

</div>

(Hossain, 2015)

That is,

<div align="center">

"Language is innovated on earth.

</div>

To express the feelings of human mind
Language cannot find proper exposure
"For the representation of an unknown object."

<div align="right">(Hossain, 2015)</div>

Lālan explained his theory by assimilating skepticism and empiricism. He explains form and formlessness and says that everything is empty to him except man. He said-

'Mānusa Chārā mana re āmāra
Dekhbi saba sūnyakāra
Lālan kaya mānusa-ākāra
Vajane pākhi.'

That is,

my mind is without people.
I will see all the blanks.
Lālan is a few people-sized
Bhajan will be available.

Allah, Hari, and God created man in his own image. Therefore, unknown knowledge can be gained through worshipping people. Zero means another zero. Here, *Lālan* is a thoroughly empiricist philosopher. However, it is true that it is not possible to observe everything with limited human capacity. So *Lālan* said,

'Sāi āmāra kakhana khele kona khelā
Jiber ki sādhaya āche gune pare tāi balā.'

<div align="right">*(Uddin, 2001)*</div>

That is,

Sāi, when do you play any game?
To say what living beings are capable of it?

Here it appears that the absolute is sometimes not grasped by experience. The object of knowledge is sometimes manifested as a being, sometimes as a substance, sometimes as a quality, and sometimes as an idea. So *Lālan* says:

'Keuha bole prāna pākhi
Sune cupe cepe thāki
Jal ki hutasan machi pok pawan
Keu bale nā tā nirṇaya kare.'

That is,

'Some say life bird
I keep silent after listening
Water is fire; baseball is the bird in the earth?

Determine what no one says.'

When the object of knowledge is not grasped, various thoughts work in his mind. Questions about size and shape then arise in his mind. So that being is sometimes a bird, sometimes a thief, sometimes a fish, sometimes a light man, and sometimes a man of mind.

Lālan has taken on the role of a supervisor to achieve success in cultivation. He has acted in the role of skeptic, rejecting the speculative path. He assimilated himself by applying all methods without accepting any method of philosophy arbitrarily. In this context, Md. *Solaiman Ali Sarkar* says, '*Lālan's* discussion of knowledge begins with the skeptical method and ends in the union of the human soul and the Supreme Soul through the acquisition of divine knowledge through the *empiricist, intellectual, intuitive, love-bhakti* method (Sarkar, 1994).'

Several world-renowned philosophers have given rise to various questions related to 'body-mind or soul' in the world of philosophy and have given philosophical theories and explanations. *René Descartes*, *Nicolas Malebanse*, *Arnold Guilincks*, *Benodict Spinoza*, *William Godfried Leibniz*, *Thomas Huxley,* and others are notable among them. It goes without saying that the theories of these philosophers are well-discussed philosophical truths around the world. Now let's see what kind of philosophical explanation *Fakir Lālan Sāiji* gave about body and mind. According to *Sāiji*, body and mind are two separate yet interrelated entities, and one influences the other. He explained the body as the passive entity and the mind as the active entity, saying that the mind plays the role of ruler of the body. It can be said that the will of the mind is the will of the body. So *Lālan Fakir* talks about the *Sādhanā* of the mind before the *Sādhanā* of the body. He emphasized settling the mind. The great man *Gautama Buddha* also presented various theoretical explanations of the mind in the *Chitta* class of the *Dhammapadas* of the *Tripitaka*. He has given an excellent explanation of how the mind guides people. He said-

Manopubbṃgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomyā.

(Mahāsthavir, 1954)

That is, mind is the precursor of religions; mind is their chief, and they are composed of *manomaya* and mind.

He also said-

Anubasassuta cittassa ananvāhatacetaso
Puññapappahīnnassa natthi jāgarato bhayaṃ.
(Mahāsthavir, 1954)

That is, the awakened person whose mind is unattached and steadfast, who has shunned

the bonds of sin and virtue, has no more fear of falling.

Buddha also said about body and mind:

> *Kumvūapamaṃ kāyamiṃ viditva*
> *Nagarūpamaṃ cittamidaṃ ṭhapetvā,*
> *Yodhetha māraṃ paññāyudhena*
> *Jitanca rakkhe aniveseno siyā.*

<div align="right">

(Mahāsthavir, 1954)

</div>

That is, considering this body fragile, considering this mind as fortified as a city, fight the devil with wisdom, carefully guard the treasure thus won; but don't get attached to it.

Lālan emphasized the need for the mind to be a guru and said,

> *Kene dubli nā mana gurur caraṇe*
> *Ese kāla samana bādhabe konadine.*

<div align="right">

(Uddin, 2001)

</div>

That is,

> *why did the mind sink at the Guru›s feet?*
> *Come tomorrow Shaman will tied up ever*

Lālan Fakir, like *Descartes* and *Spinoza*, holds that body and mind are separate but interrelated entities. That is, the transformation of one transforms the other. However, it should be noted here that *Lālan Fakir,* in his theory of interaction between body and mind, established the mind as the phenomenon influencing the body.

Now let us come to the explanation of the philosophical theory of creation. Philosopher Thales collected various materials from the knowledge and science of different countries while discussing cosmology and came to the conclusion that water is the primordial element of creation. According to him, everything originates from water, and everything takes place in water. That is, he talked about evolution. The origin and development of organisms are the culmination of a continuous series of evolutions. *Darwin* said in his book '*The Origin of Species' that* a type of animal like '*Jelly*' is the primitive organism of the world. As a result of the emergence of these primitive organisms, 'fish' and various types of aquatic plants were created. Through their evolution, aquatic, amphibian, and mammal animals are created. After that, in the process of evolution, monkeys and humans were born from monkeys (Rahman & Dhali, 2010). *Lālan* said in this regard:

> *Andhakārer āge chilo sāi rāge*
> *Ālkārete chilo ālera upara*
> *Karechilo ekbindu hoilo gamvira sindu*

Vāsila dīnvandhu nāya lācka bachara.
Andhakāra dhandakāra nirākāra kuokāra
Tāra pare holo huhuṃkāra
Huhuṃkāre sabda holo, fenārūpa haye gela.
Nīra gamvīra sīi vāslen nirnatar.
Huhuṃkāre jhaṃkāre mere diptakāra haya tāra pare
Dhandha dore chilena paroyāra
Chilena sāi rāgera pare, surāge āsraya kare
Thakhana kudarti karilo nihāra.
Jhakhana kukāre kuo jhare, baṃ aṅga gharsana kare
Tāito holo meghera ākāra
Meyera rakta bice sakta holo, dimba tule khale nilo
Fakir Lālan bale līlā camatakāra.
(Chawdhury, 2008)

That is

"Before the Dark Age God was in the state of love
He was in form of Al in Alkar
Then a drop of Noor (light) is dispatched.
And from that Noor a deep ocen was created
God floated Himself therefore nine laks years for the next nation.
After dark state, there were illusion states,
A Big Bang took place for the creation
For that Big Bang a horrible sound occurred
And the spume was the result.
God then took his seat on the water.
With the crumbling after the Big Bang
A luminous state commenced
In that definite state God was insane mood of devotion
That resulted into a perfect aspriation for the beloved
Then He took shelter in a supernatural form.
When it was poured down
He got an abrasion on his left side.
He got solid shape with the menstruation of women
And she took up the egg in his arms.
Fakir Lālon says,
It's an amazing game of good."

(Hossain, 2015)

Through this verse, Fakir *Lālan Sāi* has highlighted the entire evolution of cosmology.

In his language, among the 11 stages of evolution, the fifth stage comes with the word *Huhhuṃkar*, which is comparable to the *'Big Bang Theory'* of science. The *'Big Bang Theory'* of science is more or less known to everyone, so an attempt was made to refrain from increasing the scope of the essay by explaining that theory.

There are two types of evolution in philosophy. One is mechanistic evolution, and the other is purposeful evolution. Mechanistic evolution states that there is no creator or intelligent force involved in the creation of the universe. Purposive evolution is the opposite of mechanistic evolution. That is, according to this theory of evolution, a controller controls everything. *Fakir Lālan Sāiji*, however, advocated objective evolution. He said-

> *'Epāre ke ānilo,*
> *Pāre ke nibe balo,*
> *Lālan kaya, tāre volo*
> *Kena re kare helā.'*

That is,

> *Who brought it here?*
> *Tell me who you can take.*
> *Lālan said, forgate him*
> *Why do you neglect it?'*

By someone's will, we have come to the other side, and by his will, we will go to the other side again. Through this discussion, the concept of God is found. God has occupied an important place in religion and philosophy since ancient times.

God is seen as a spiritual entity in various theistic religions, and so too is God seen as a spiritual force. Most philosophers, like theologians, have interpreted God as a spiritual and all-powerful entity (Hossain, 2019). Concepts and beliefs about God are discussed in orthodox, *Judeo-Christian,* and Islamic religions. The ancient Greek philosopher *Plato* was the first to provide a holistic concept of God. After this, *Aristotle*, *Stoics*, *Descartes*, *Kant,* and the philosopher *Hegel* successively offered the concept of God. But *Lālan* in his philosophy presents God as the coordinator of all religions. According to him, God is an absolute being. And from this entity, the universe and the animal kingdom were created. He identified God as formless. *Lāla*n called God a man of mind, *Parsi of Arshi Nagar*, *Alek* man, *Adhar* man, and Rasa man. He has portrayed the nature of *Ishwar* through his songs.

> *'Ki balabo sei parsir kathā*
> *Hasta, pada, skandha, māthā-nāire*
> *Se kshaṇeka thāke sūnyera upara*
> *Ksaṇeka vāse nīre.'*
> *(Hossain, 2015)*

That is,

what can I tell of this neighbor?
Hands of legs, shoulders or heads
He has none.
Now that he is up in the air,
Now deep in water.

(Hossain, 2015)

According to *Lālan*, the unman fest form of God is formless. And he called the existent entity sākāra or *ākāra,* or size or shape. *Lālan* says about size or shape:

Kakhana dhare ākāra
Kakhana haya nirākāra
Keu bale sākāra sākāra
Apāra vebe hai Volā.
That is,
When to take shape
When is formless?
Someone say Sākār Sākār

I was naive to think that it was impossible.

Various philosophies have interpreted God as formless. *Lālan* agrees with that view and says that God was formless in the first stage of creation. After creating this world in flesh, He manifested Himself best after creating man in His own image. Therefore, according to *Lālan*, the image of man is the image of God. In other words, the God of care is the guardian. So *Lālan* said:

'Āpana surāte adhama gathalena dayāmaya
Naile ki pherestādera sejadā dite kaya'.
Āllah ādama nā haile
Pāpa haito sejdā dile
Sereki pāpa jāke bale
E dvīna-duniyāya.

(Hossain, 2015)

That is,

God has made Adam in His own image.
Otherwise, angels were not to be ordered
To prostrate on the feet of Adam.
If Adam were not Allah
It would be a great sin.
To prostrate on the feet of Adam
Which is termed 'Shirk'

In the Islami terminology on earth.

(Hossain, 2025)

That is, the God of Nurture has made His best manifestation in the form of Adam at the stage of creation. Its meaning is that God incarnate is captured in this form of Adam and is playing the world in his mind. So he emphasized again:

Mānusa vajale sonāra habi
Naile pare ksyāpāre tui mūla hārābi.

(Hossain, 2015)

That is,

"You will be the solemn human being
Through offering worship towards man
Otherwise you, crazy, must fail to achieve the target."

(Hossain, 2015)

Although God is a benevolent entity in all religions and philosophies, he is a separate entity from this human being. In other words, even though God is benevolent, he does not benefit people directly by mixing with them. But the God of Care is the human guru incarnate. The Guru directs him from his touch to freedom from all worldly burning pains (Hossain, 2019). *Lālan* has repeatedly spoken about *Guru's Charan Bhajan*. He believed that one can get the taste of freedom from sorrowful birth only by worshipping the beautiful God. The *murshid* can have divine knowledge. And self-knowledge can be gained through it. And when you gain self-knowledge, you know yourself.

Conclusion

In view of the above discussion, it can be said that the philosophy propagated by *Lālan* is undoubtedly comparable to world philosophy. He tried to establish his philosophy through his songs. His songs are not only songs, but also his thoughts, which are found in harmony with the thoughts of the great philosophers of the world. And people have these kinds of thoughts about care. The theories and information that *Lālan* imparts through his songs may not solve all problems, but they teach us to think deeply about life and the world. That *Lālan* is a philosopher is perfectly true and is easily understood by the above argument. He cherished the lofty minaret of equality and love in the generous sphere of indiscriminate humanity. Keeping pace with time has become relevant all over the world today. And the scope of that relevance is increasing day by day. Nurturing is constantly becoming a new topic of interest and curiosity. As a result, *Lālan* is now a very familiar face in the worldview, and his thoughts and songs can be considered to be rediscovered in the future. So it can be said without any hesitation or doubt that *Lālan* philosophy is now an essential part of world philosophy.

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SADDHĀ (FAITH)

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to delve into and illuminate the significant characteristics, functions, types, and benefits of *Saddhā*. *Saddhā*, a *Pāli* term often translated as faith, confidence, trust, belief, or conviction, transcends the realms of mind and matter. It is a wholesome *Cetasika* that influences the *Citta*, prompting virtuous actions such as performing rituals, engaging in prayer, chanting suttas, making offerings, observing precepts, sharing merits, concentrating the mind, and developing wisdom. *Saddhā* holds immense importance in the development of an individual, being recognized as one of the noblest qualities and a potent tool for progressing along the spiritual path towards the highest bliss.

The significance of *Saddhā* as one of the noblest qualities and a powerful tool is evident in the teachings of the Buddha. It plays a crucial role in overcoming hindrances, aligning with the Buddha's assertion of the five strengths (pañcabala), where *Saddhā* is recognized as one of these strengths. Additionally, *Saddhā* is integrated into the framework of the 37 *Bodhipakkhiya Dhamma* (factors of enlightenment) and is acknowledged as one of the seven *ariya dhana* (noble treasures). Consequently, *Saddhā* stands out as a noble quality and a potent tool for individuals, serving as a means to break free from the cycle of *saṃsāra* and attain the bliss of *nibbāna*.

Keyword: *Saddhā, Pāli, Citta, Cetasika, pañcabala, Bodhipakkhiya Dhamma, ariya dhana, saṃsāra, hindrances, virtuous, wisdom, nibbana.*

Introduction

Generally, many people believe that the sole avenue to accrue merit is through ritualistic practices such as sutta chanting, prayer, ceremonial worship, offering of food, water, fruits, and flowers to the Buddha, or involvement in volunteer work. Undoubtedly, these practices serve as tangible expressions of one's faith. Hence, in this specific context, it can be asserted that faith motivates individuals to engage in certain ritual performances. However, in numerous instances, these rituals are conducted with the aim of seeking blessings to overcome misfortunes from supernatural beings, including the Buddha. When these aspirations are fulfilled, individuals often develop a robust faith in specific deities or the Buddha. In such cases, ritual performances become a means to access and express faith, ultimately contributing to the development of social welfare.

From a Buddhist standpoint, the aforementioned ritual performances are deemed insufficient and represent only initial steps in fostering faith. True faith development in

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Buddhism necessitates a comprehensive process, not solely for the betterment of social welfare but also for the attainment of wisdom. In Buddhism, cultivating faith or confidence in the Triple Gems-Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṇgha- entails embodying the qualities of the Triple Gems in practical application.

Definition and Interpretation of Saddhā

Dr Ari Ubeysekara has quoted the definition of faith in the *Oxford Dictionary* as "(a) complete trust or confidence in someone or something" and as strong belief in the doctrine of a religion, based on spiritual conviction rather than proof. The word faith is derived from the Latin word fides and old French "feid", meaning confidence or trust in a person, thing or concept[1]. According to Wikipedia, the etymology of faith is thought of dating from 1200–1250, from the Middle English "feit" via Anglo-French "fed", Old French "feid", feit from Latin fiden[2].

In Buddhism, *saddhā* has been translated into English as 'faith,' 'trust,' 'devotion,' or 'confidence.' However, beyond these translations, *saddhā* encompasses additional qualities, including "reasoning and investigation," as highlighted by Ashin Indacara's quote from the commentary. These eight definitions and translations of *saddhā* are elaborated upon as follows:

1. "*Saddhoti: dānassa phalaṁ atthīti saddahati:* belief in the results or consequences of *dāna* (charity; *Silakkhandhavagga* commentary)." [3] This indicates that faith arises when one seeks for good results from their act of giving. In other words, there is a wish of getting paid back.

2. "*Saddhoti: saddhāya samannāgato:* the accomplishment of *saddhā* (*Majjhimapaṇṇāsa* commentary)."[4] The accomplishment of *saddhā* includes the accomplishment in Buddha, *dhamma*, precepts, and the Four Noble Truths.[5] For instance, in the *Dighajanu (Vyagghapajja)* Sutta: Conditions of Welfare, Buddha indicates what is the accomplishment in faith as so: *one has a truly faith in Buddha in the Enlightenment of the Perfect One (Tathagata): Thus, indeed, is that Blessed One: he is the pure one, fully enlightened, endowed with knowledge and conduct, well-gone, the knower of worlds,*

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[1]Ari Ubeysekara**, "**Faith (*Saddha***)** in Theravada Buddhism," drarisworld.wordpress.com Aug 17, 2016, faith-saddha-in-theravada., accessed on March 10, 2020 at 7.40 pm hrs.

[2] Wikipedia, "*Faith*," last edited Mar 23, 2020 at 15:12: en.wikipedia.org › wiki › Faith., accessed on March 23, 2020.

[3]Ashin Indacara, "*Buddhist Perspective on the Development of Social Welfare*," Ch. 4, p. 152, Shodhganga, Aug 01, 2011: shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in bitstream 11, Ch. 4, saddha and caga-sa.. accessed on March 23, 2020 at 7.45 pm hrs.

[4]*Ibid*.

[5]*Ibid*., p. 148.

the incomparable leader of men to be tamed, the teacher of gods and men, all-knowing and blessed. This is called the accomplishment of faith.[6]

3. *Saddhoti: kammaphalasaddhāya saddho, pothujjanikeneva ratanattayapasādena pasanno:* faith or belief in the result or consequences of *kamma* (actions) and the Triple Gems called the *Buddha*, *Dhamma* and *Sangha* (*ratanattaya*) in which worldly people believe. This indicates that faith arises simply because of the Triple Gems, which get imprinted on one as the superior authority. In this aspect of having faith is very similar to the worldly faith on a creator that can punish or forgive to one's action. This is considered false faith in Buddhism, because in Buddhism, one has the ownership of their kamma either it is wholsome or unwholesome. In other words, that faith arises without understanding what is the true meaning of the Triple Gems.

4. *Saddhoti: Buddha-dhamma-sanghaguṇānaṁ saddahanatāya saddho:* it is called *saddhā* because of faith in the (qualities) of the *Buddha*, *Dhamma* and *Saṅgha*. This definition conveys the message that one's belief arises from the nine qualities of the *Buddha*,[7] six qualities of the *Dhamma*,[8] and nine qualities of the *Sangha*.[9] Understanding the

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[6]Narada Thera (transl.), Dighajanu (Vyagghapajja) Sutta: Conditions of Welfare. 1997: https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an08/an08.054.nara.html., accessed on October 1, 2021 at 8.15 pm hrs.

[7]*Bhagavā arahaṃ sammāsambuddho vijjācaraṇasampanno sugato lokavidū anuttaro purisadammasārathī satthā devamanussānaṃ buddho bhagavā ti* (He is indeed the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One, perfect in insightfulness into reality and in conduct, the Sublime One, one who knows the world [of phenomena] [according to reality], the unexcelled trainer of men to be tamed, the teacher of devas and men, the Enlightened One, the Blessed One).

Venerable Varado, "Illustrated Glossary of Pāli Terms" under "*saddhā*," *Creative Commons Zero v1.0*, Apr 28, 2018: https://pali-glossary.github.io/content/glossary.html#_saddh%C4%81., accessed on March 23, 2020 at 9.05 pm hrs.

[8]*Svākkhāto bhagavatā dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhī ti*

(The teaching is well explained by the Blessed One, fathomable in this lifetime, realizable in the here and now, intriguing, personally applicable, to be realized by the wise for themselves).

Venerable Varado, "Illustrated Glossary of Pāli Terms" under "*saddhā*," *Creative Commons Zero v1.0*, Apr 28, 2018: https://pali-glossary.github.io/content/glossary.html#_saddh%C4%81., accessed on March 23, 2020 at 9.10 pm hrs.

[9]*Supaṭipanno Bhagavato sāvaka-saṅgho Ujupaṭipanno Bhagavato sāvaka-saṅgho Ñāyapaṭipanno Bhagavato sāvaka-saṅgho Sāmīcipaṭipanno Bhagavato sāvaka-saṅgho Yadidaṃ cattāri purisayugāni aṭṭha purisa-puggalā, esa Bhagavato sāvaka-saṅgho Āhuṇeyyo, pāhuṇeyyo, dakkhiṇeyyo, Añjalikaraṇīyo, anuttaraṃ puññākkhettaṃ lokassā ti* (The Saṅgha of the Blessed One's disciples has entered on the good way; The Saṅgha of the Blessed One's disciples has entered on the straight way; The Saṅgha of the Blessed One's disciples has entered on the right path; The Saṅgha of the Blessed One's disciples has entered on the proper way; That is to say, the Four Pairs of Men, the Eight Types of Persons; The Saṅgha of the Blessed One's disciples is fit for gifts, fit for hospitality, fit for offerings and fit for reverential salutation, as the incomparable field of merits for the world).

Venerable Elgiriye Indaratana Maha Thera, "Vadanāp," Kuala Lumpur: Buddha Dharma Education Association, 2002, pp. 7–8.

qualities of the triple gems means to understand the knowledge or wisdom, truth and achiever. So, understanding the qualities of the triple gems help one to have faith.

5. *Saddhoti: ranattayaguṇānaṁ saddhatā:* faith in the attributes of the Triple Gems (*Buddha*, *Dhamma*, *Saṇgha)* and the person who believes in it should practice meditation on Triple Gems.

6. *Saddhoti: lokiyalokuttarāya saddhāya samannāgato:* the accomplishment of faith in both the mundane and supramundane or secular life and reclusive life. This means one applying Buddha's teaching in practice especially in meditation so that they gain *jhāna* (absorption) and insightful knowledge which leads them to attain sainthood. In this particular faith, one should understand the teaching, and strongly believe on the teaching which helps ones to gain happiness or knowledge (*paññā*) as those are the dominant motive for ones to have strong faith in practice.

7. *Saddhoti: Buddhādiguṇesu parapaccayavirahitattā sabbākārasampannena avaccapasādena samannāgato, na parassa saddhāya paṭipattiyaṁ gamanabhāvena:* the accomplishment of faith in the attributes of the Triple Gems with strong and stable belief, and without ever changing to another faith. Since one believes in Buddha's teaching and experiences the benefits from practice, their faith is unshakable and inconvertible.[10]

8. *Saddhoti: kammañca, phalañca saddahitvā dadāti:* faith in charity together with belief in *kamma* and *kammaphala* (the result of *kamma*).[11] This implies that charity manifests from the mental factor, generosity that is connected with faith, *kamma*, and the result of action. In this case, one has understood the teaching of *kamma* which generate the strong faith which manifests in their wholesome act. Therefore, one's wholesome act has a close association with developed faith, through the understanding of the action, and the result of the action.

The Characteristics and Function of Saddhā

In Buddhism, the characteristics of *saddhā* signify a profound connection with strong belief rather than a superficial adherence. The distinctions between deep and superficial beliefs have been explored earlier. Additionally, *saddhā* encompasses a "controlling faculty" that aids in purifying associated mental factors. *Saddhā* is likened to the universal monarch's unique emerald, clarifying water by settling dirt at the bottom or evaporating heat, resulting in a cup of cool and purified water. Similarly, when *saddhā* aligns with

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[10]Ashin Indacara, "*Buddhist Perspective on the Development of Social Welfare,*" Ch. 4, p. 150, Shodhganga, Aug 01, 2011: shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in bitstream 11, Ch. 4, saddha and caga-sa.. accessed on March 23, 2020 at 8.12 pm hrs.

[11]*Ibid.*

consciousness (citta), defilements dissipate, leading to a cool and clear mind[12].

For instance, understanding the attributes of the Triple Gems and applying the teachings on *kamma* dispels doubts about one's actions or thoughts. Deep knowledge of *kamma* and the Triple Gems allows individuals to donate or assist those in need without hesitation or doubt regarding their generosity. Consequently, faith is cultivated in these instances.

According to the Expositor (Atthasālini), *saddhā* possesses an additional characteristic known as aspiring[13]. The function of aspiring faith is akin to crossing floods, achieving freedom from pollution, and involving object factors of stream-winning as its proximate cause. It is likened to being simultaneously hands, property, and seed[14]. In *Milinda Pañha*, s*addhā's* characteristics are further elucidated, encompassing "clarification" (*sampasādana*) and "inspiration" (*sampakkhandana*) [15]. The characteristic of "clarification" is that when faith arises, the five hindrances[16] are destroyed during meditation.[17] This implies that the characteristic of "clarification" involves the stages of enlightenment. To overcome these hindrances, one must engage in meditation, comprehend teachings through personal experiences, and realize the Path and fruition. The hindrances are mental defilements that hinder mental development in meditation. Unwise attention to sensory stimuli gives rise to these defilements, which can be prevented and eliminated through wise attention. This involves recognizing impermanence, suffering, and non-self, as opposed to wrongly perceiving them as permanent, pleasant, and self. The characteristic of "clarification" is the application of wise attention to sensory objects, embodying right views and a correct understanding of their impermanent, suffering, and non-self nature. On the other hand, the characteristic of "inspiration" is described as faith arising when one perceives how the minds of others have been liberated, aspires to attain what has not yet been reached, experience what has not yet been felt, and realize what has not yet been understood[18]. In essence, "clarification" stems from one's personal understanding of the teachings, practical application, and self-experience in eliminating the five types of distractions. This leads to a more robust belief strengthened by personal experience and verification. There is a subtle difference between the levels of "inspiration" and "clarification." The level of "inspiration" serves as encouragement and motivation drawn from others' achievements in practice,

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[12]Pe Maung Tin (trans.), *The Expositor (Atthasālini)*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2016, pp. 157–58.

[13]*Ibid*., Pe Maung Tin (trans.) p. 158.

[14]*Ibid*., Pe Maung Tin (trans.) p. 158.

[15]Bhikkhu Pesala (trans.), *The Debate of King Milinda*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2nd edn., 2009, p. 7.

[16]Sense-desire (*kāmacchanda*), hatred (*paṭigha*), sloth and torpor (*thīna-middha*), restlessness and brooding (*uddhacca-kukkucca*), and doubts (*vicikicchā*). Nārada Mahā Thera, *A Manual of Abhidhamma*, Kuala Lumpur: Buddhist Missionary Society, 5th edn., 1987, p. 48.

[17]Bhikkhu Pesala (trans.), op. cit., n. 14.

[18]*Ibid*.

appearance, and knowledge. However, it lacks the self-verification obtained through personal practice and experience, as seen at the level of "clarification." Consequently, it is evident that faith at the level of "inspiration" may not be as robust as at the level of "clarification." This two types of Saddha will be discussed later in detail.

Saddhā assumes a crucial role, particularly in the moral dimension, which encompasses subjective and objective aspects. The subjective facet of faith involves the exploration of truth, while the objective aspect entails confidence in objects. In the pursuit of truth, faith serves as the impetus for searching and understanding the underlying reasons. Once truth is unveiled, it reinforces faith, contributing to its profound development. Both these facets of faith are integral to psychological and spiritual growth.

In Buddhism, faith is recognized as a potent force for the spiritual journey, enabling one to navigate through the challenges and difficulties, symbolized as crossing the flood. *Saddhā*, therefore, holds a significant position in the quest for wisdom and the attainment of ultimate bliss. It is described as the fundamental principle underlying all virtuous deeds (*puññakiriya vatthuni*) [19].

For those lacking a foundation in faith, it becomes a hindrance, impeding the pursuit of truth. This absence is akin to a dark cloud obscuring sunlight, obstructing the clarity needed for the search for truth and understanding in one's spiritual journey.

Types of Saddhā

Two types of faith are identified: "clarification" (*sampasādana*) and "inspiration" (*sampakkhandana*), categorized based on the characteristics of *saddhā*. However, in Buddhism, the development of *saddhā* with the characteristic of "clarification" is emphasized. This is exemplified in the story of *Vakkali*, who initially had faith in the Buddha due to the physical appearance of the Buddha. Whenever *Vakkali* saw the Buddha, he experienced happiness. When *Vakkali* fell seriously ill and faced impending death, he desired a personal meeting with the Buddha to pay homage. Requesting a fellow monk to convey his intention, the Buddha agreed and visited him. *Vakkali* expressed his longstanding wish to see the Buddha in person, citing physical weakness as the hindrance. In response, the Buddha redirected *Vakkali's* focus, stating, "Enough, *Vakkali*! Why would you want to see this rotten body? One who sees the teaching sees me. One who sees me sees the

[19]Beni Maddhab Barua, "Faith in Buddhism," *Studies in Buddhism*, ed. Binayendra Nath Chaudhury, Calcutta: Saraswat Library, 1974, p. 236.

teaching. Seeing the teaching, you see me. Seeing me, you see the teaching." [20]

This story imparts several crucial messages. It discourages the development of faith solely based on others' fleeting physical beauty, which is subject to decay and destruction. Instead, it advocates for the cultivation of faith through active learning and the acquisition of knowledge, as faith becomes stronger when false views are dispelled. Those who possess the right view or understanding of the dhamma can truly perceive enlightenment, akin to seeing the Buddha. This serves as both encouragement and verification of the importance of the dhamma in fostering robust faith, forming the foundation for the development of concentration and wisdom.

According to Ashin Indacara, there are four classifications of *saddhā* in the commentary of *Majjhimapaṇṇasa*[21] as follows:

"Sā panesā āgamanasaddhā, adhigamasaddhā, okappanasaddhā, pasādasaddhā-ti catubbidhā." (Oncoming or arrival faith[22], attainment or knowledge faith[23], setting in or putting in[24], clearness, brightness, or purity[25])

1. *"Tattha sabbañubodhisattānaṁ saddhā abhinīhārato paṭhāya āgatattā āgamanasaddhā nāma."* **Āgamana-saddhā:** confidence of *Bodhisattva* (Buddha-to-be). This sort of *saddhā* started to appear from the beginning of the solemn wish of a Bodhisattva in which he wants to be Buddha.

2. *"Ariyasāvakānaṁ paṭivedena adhigatattā adhigamsaddhā nāma."* **Adhigama-saddhā:** confidence of the Noble Disciples (*ariyasāvaka*). This sort of *saddhā* starts to appear when he has got the life of a noble disciple called *sotāpanna* (stream-winner).

3. *"Buddho, dhammo, saṅgho-ti vutte acalabhāvena okappanaṁ okappanasaddhā nāma."* **Okappana-saddhā:** belief in the Triple Gems called Buddha, *dhamma* and the sangha, without any change at in them.

[20]Bhikkhu Sujato (trans.), "With Vakali," SuttaCentral, n.d.: *suttacentral.net sujato, accessed on March 13, 2020 at 8.20 pm hrs. (Cirapaṭikāhaṃ, bhante, bhagavantaṃ dassanāya upasaṅkamitukāmo, natthi ca me kāyasmiṃ tāvatikā balamattā, yāvatāhaṃ bhagavantaṃ dassanāya upasaṅkameyyan ti.*

"Alaṃ, vakkali, kiṃ te iminā pūtikāyena diṭṭhena? Yo kho, vakkali, dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati; yo maṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati. Dhammañhi, vakkali, passanto maṃ passati; maṃ passanto dhammaṃ passati).

[21]Ashin Indacara, *Buddhist Perspective on the Development of Social Welfare*, Ch. 4) p. 150, Shodhganga, Aug 01, 2011: shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in bitstream 11, Ch. 4, saddha and caga-sa.. accessed on March 23, 2020 at 7.05 pm hrs.

[22]Agamana, Āgamana: 18 definitions https://www.wisdomlib.org › definition › agamana., accessed on July 04,2022 at 9.18pm hrs

[23]https://www.wisdomlib.org › definition › adhigama, accessed on October 29, 2021 at 11.42 am hrs

[24]*https://www.wisdomlib.org › definition › okappana, accessed on October 29, 2021 at 11.45 am hrs*

[25]https://www.dhammawheel.com › ... › Pāli, accessed on October 29, 2021 at 11.50 am hrs

4. *"Pasāduppatti pasādo nāma":* belief in something, or an ordinary belief.

The 1ˢᵗ, 3ʳᵈ., and 4ᵗʰ are the types of *saddhā* which belong to "inspiration," as it acts as the encouragement for the Bodhisattva to cultivate attaining of Buddhahood, and inspiring the qualities of the *Buddha*, *dhamma*, and *sangha* in the third one. The second type of faith arises from self-verification by the elimination of five hindrances in meditation when attaining the stage of a *sotāpanna*.

Importance and Benefits of Saddhā

Saddhā serves as the initial step in a spiritual journey and is indispensable for navigating the ocean of birth and death. Without *saddhā*, further spiritual practice becomes unattainable. An apt analogy is the lack of compliance with a doctor's prescribed treatment when one lacks faith in the doctor and the medicine, hindering the recovery process. Similarly, in Buddhism, genuine confidence (saddhā) in the Buddha, Dhamma, Sangha, and the understanding of *kamma* and its consequences are essential to traverse the ocean of suffering. *Saddhā*, therefore, cannot be imposed externally through tradition, authority, or hearsay; rather, it must be cultivated through exposure to the Buddha's teachings, scrutiny, and personal experience.

Saddhā marks the initial step in the gradual practice of *sīla, cāga,* and *paññā*, and its absence hinders further spiritual development. The *Kasi Bhāradvāja Sutta* in *Saṃyutta Nikāya* illustrates this point, where Brahman Kasi Bharadvaja initially lacked faith in the Buddha and was reluctant to offer food. He even criticized the Buddha saying that, "Recluse, I do plow, and do sow, and having plowed and sown I eat. You also, recluse, should plow and sow; having plowed and sown you should eat."[26] However, after hearing the Buddha's teachings, his understanding grew, leading him to request permission for both lower and higher ordinations. Through ardent practice, he attained the highest bliss, emphasizing that true *saddhā* arises from understanding the teachings and results in a strong determination that motivates one towards the ultimate goal of complete liberation. This underscores one of the paramount benefits of developing *saddhā*.

Once the right *saddhā* is cultivated, the benefits will follow. According to the *Saddhā* Sutta, there are five advantages for those who possess *saddhā,* as they will:[27]

1. the first people to gain compassion from good persons;

2. the first people for others to visit;

3. the first people to receive alms;

[26]Piyadassi Thera (trans.), "*Kasi Bharadvaja Sutta:* Discourse to Bharadvaja, the Farmer," *Accesstoinsight, 1999: www.accesstoinsight.org tipitaka sn07.011.piya.htm., accessed on March 22, 2020 at 9.14 am hrs.*

[27]Thanissaro Bhikkhu (trans.), "*Saddha Sutta:* Conviction," *Accesstoinsight*, 1998: *www.accesstoinsight.org tipitaka an05.038.than.html., accessed on March 23, 2020 at 9. 16 am hrs.*

4. the first people to be taught *dhamma*; and

5. reborn in a good destination, in a heavenly world after death.

In contemporary society, numerous challenges and conflicts arise due to divergent beliefs. Many individuals harbor blind faith *(amulika saddhā)*, lacking support from self-investigation and analysis. Instead, people often unquestioningly accept teachings, ritual practices, and doctrines based on tradition, influential figures, and fear. This blind adherence can easily contribute to communal and religious conflicts in society. The Buddha, in the *Kālāma Sutta*, explicitly taught the principles of *kālāma*, listing ten points that one should not accept blindly:

❍ Do not rely on information acquired through repeated hearing *(anussava)*.

❍ Do not base beliefs solely on tradition *(paramparā)*.

❍ Do not accept something merely because it is a rumor *(itikirā)*.

❍ Do not unquestioningly follow what is written in a scripture *(piṭaka-sampadāna)*.

❍ Do not form beliefs based solely on surmise *(takka-hetu)*.

❍ Do not accept an axiom without thorough consideration *(naya-hetu)*.

❍ Do not be swayed by specious reasoning *(ākāra-parivitakka)*.

❍ Do not adhere to a biased notion that has been pondered over *(diṭṭhi-nijjhān-akkhantiyā)*.

❍ Do not rely on another's seeming ability *(bhabba-rūpatāya)*.

❍ Do not form beliefs based solely on the consideration that a monk is our teacher *(samano no garū)*. [28]

These ten points convey a crucial message aimed at fostering communal peace and harmony, as well as preventing social and religious conflicts. The guidance suggests that individuals should refrain from blindly adhering to any teaching or belief. Instead, one should employ their own conscience, reason, and experience when choosing to embrace a particular faith. In essence, faith ought to be a matter of personal choice, with individuals making decisions based on their understanding, reasoning, and experiences. Respecting each individual's choice contributes to the overall health of contemporary society.

In various suttas, the Buddha consistently emphasizes the importance of cultivating true faith for promoting peace in society. For example, the *Kasi bharadvaja Sutta* in *Sutta Nipāta, Khuddaka Nikāya*, asserts that "conviction is my seed, austerity my rain, discernment my

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[28]*Bhikkhu Sujato (trans.), "Kesamutti_Sutta,"* Wikipedia- The Free Encyclopedia, edited Feb 06, 2020: *en.wikipedia.org wiki Kesamutti_Sutta, accessed on March 22, 2020 at 10.00 am hrs.*

yoke and plow." [29] Saddhā, being the seed of all wholesome states, is indispensable for the development of social welfare and the establishment of peace and harmony in society.

Conclusion

Saddhā plays a crucial role in both personal and social development, contributing to the promotion of peace in society. It serves as a guide for cultivating wholesomeness, acting as a fundamental influence in the birth of virtuous actions. Any mental action devoid of *saddhā* lacks the potential for wholesomeness. Consequently, *saddhā* significantly impacts the wholesome mental factors of individuals. For instance, in the practice of giving *(dāna)*, the presence of *saddhā* is essential for the donor to execute the act seamlessly, benefiting both the giver and the recipient by fostering happiness.

The connection with *saddhā* enables one to overcome greed, hatred, and delusion, serving as a foundational path toward the higher realms of spirituality. It proves to be a pivotal factor in meditation, leading to the attainment of the highest bliss. True *saddhā* not only plays a vital role in individual self-development but also emerges as a key contributor to the promotion of a harmonious society and world peace.

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An Analysis of Dharmakīrti's Refutation to the Mind-Body Relations with A Special Reference to the Commentaries of Tibetan Scholars

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The mind-body relation is an indispensable aspect of Eastern and Western philosophy, where the relationship of these two vary between dualism and non-dualism/monism. Dualist proposes the mind and body as two independent realities, which is presented well in Cartesian Dualism and the ancient Indian Samkhya school. In contrast to dualists, non-dualists like Advaita Vedanta refute the fundamentally dualist existence. The Buddhist school of Indian philosophy also made their stand on the mind-body relation. For instance, in the Sautrāntikas school, the material body/object such as a vase is a cause (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of *Indriya pratyakṣa* (direct sense perception), who perceives a vase. This shows that one needs to depend on the material body/objects (*rūpa*) to have sensory perception of that object. In contrast to it, the Vijñānavāda school asserted an absence of different substantial existence of the apprehended material body/object and the apprehending subject (*gzugs-dang gzugs-'dzin tshad-ma rdzas-gzhan gyis stong-pa*) as there is an emptiness of independent external object (*phyi- rol don-tu drub-pa'i stong-ba'stong-pa nyi*), which shows the Buddhist idealists thought on the mind-body relation. Though the Buddhist schools have presented their theory of the mind-body relation, a detailed refutation of the non-Buddhist concept of the mind-body relation is done by the seventh-century Indian Buddhist scholar, Dharmakīrti, in his *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter of Pramāṇavārttikā. He presented the refutation under the title "The existing of many previous and next lives", which comes under Dharmakīrti's *Jagaddhitaiṣitā*[2] topic. The main objective of Dharmakīrti's argument against the non-Buddhist concept of mind-body relations is to prove the existence of many past and future lives. His opponent refuted this claim, arguing that compassion cannot be practised repeatedly for many lives because there is an absence of many previous and next lives as the mind is supported by the body when the body is destroyed, the mind is also

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destroyed.[3] To prove this statement, an opponent made three possible relations between the mind and body:

A. Body as the cause of mind (cause and effect relation)

B. Mind is the quality of Body (substance and quality relation)

C. Mind as the nature (*svabhāvaḥ*) of the body (being nature of body relation)[4]

These three relations cause the reduction of the mind into a mere body or a body's part, which leads to epiphenomenalism and the materialist concept of Mind-body relation. Through this article, the researcher has attempted to demonstrate Dharmakīrti's opponent who accepted these mind-body relations and the refutation towards these relations, which are presented in Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, in the context of a commentary written by the three Tibetan scholars of 14th to 15th century, Gyaltsab Dharma Rinchen, Khedrub Gelek Pelzang and Gorampa Sonam Senge.[5] The researcher has also presented commentarial differences presence among these three scholars in some sections and presented an analytical study on Dharmakīrti's refutation to the opponent's view of the mind-body relation. For this, there is an application of hermeneutical, analytical, comparative, and qualitative methods. Hence, to get a better insight into Dharmakīrti's refutation towards the non-Buddhist theory of mind-body relation, the present article is divided into two sections The Opponent of Dharmakīrti's refutation to three relations and Refuting three relations of the mind and body.

Opponent of Dharmakīrti's Refutation towards three relations.

Before initiating Dharmakīrti's refutation towards the opponent's three relations, it is essential to recognise an opponent to whom he is refuting these mind-body relations.

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[3]"(The Lokayatas) say: "(Compassion) is not accomplished through accustomation, Because the mind is based on the body"- From *Is Enlightenment possible? - Dharmakīrti and rGyal tshab rje on Knowledge, Rebirth, No-Self and Liberation* (p.223), by Roger R. Jackson,1993, Snow Lion Publications.

[4]Franco stated in the book *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*, that the third relation is capacity and possessor of capacity, which is discussed under the sub-topic of mind and body relation under the rebirth section of this research.

[5]A. *Tshad-ma rnam-'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas-pa'i rnam-bsad thar-lam phyin-ci ma-log-par gsal-bar byed-pa (Pramāṇavārttikā (first and second chapters):Critically Edited Pramāṇavārttikā of Dharmakīrti along with its commentary by Gyalstab Je,* Phunstok Dhondup (Ed.),2008, Gelugpa Students' Welfare Committee (XXXVII GSWC).
B. *Tshad-ma rnam-'grel gyi rgya-cher bshad-pa rigs-pa'i rgya-mtsho stod cha.* Dharmakīrti and Khedrub Je, Edited by Lobsang Tenzin , 1998, Gelugpa Students' Welfare Committee.
C. *Rgyas-pa'i bstan-bcos tshad-ma rnam-'grel gyi rnam-bshad kun-tu bzang-po'i 'od-zer zhes bya-ba bzhugs-so, stod cha, An extensive commentary on Dharmakirti's Pramāṇavārttikā Volume I,* Kunkhen Gorampa Sonam Senge, 2018, Sakya Thorim Lobtai Sherig Lhentsok.

Among the ancient Indian philosophical schools, Cārvāka[6] school, which is also known as Lokāyata,[7] is a prominent materialist who accepts the reduction of mind into matter or body. One of the core philosophies of Cārvāka is "The Non-existence of many lives as the mind ceases with the cessation of the body". A scholar with such a philosophical thought presence from the ancient Buddha's period as Ajita Kesakamblī, one of the six major *śramaṇa* teachers and the contemporary of the Buddha, gave this doctrine of annihilation to Buddha, which is shown in *Sāmaññaphala Sutta.* [8]

Though Dharmakīrti had not explicitly stated Cārvāka/lokāyata as the opponent, Tibetan commentators Gyalstab, Khedrub and Karmapa[9] of Pramāṇavārttikā accept Lokāyata, who does not accept the existence of previous and next lives,[10] as the sole opponent of three relations. Sakya scholar Gorampa wrote nihilist (*uchevada*) as the opponent, which is Cārvāka in my assumption because the sole ancient Indian nihilist philosophical school at that time is Cārvāka as it is stated in *Buddhist logic*, "From among the six successful popular preachers who were wandering through the villages of Hindustan during the life-time of Buddha, two at least were materialists."[11] Kagyu scholar Karmapa Chödak Gyatso presented a brief summary of Cārvāka philosophy before commenting on *Pramāṇavārttikā*'s rebirth section, which give more certainty that an opponent is Cārvāka. He presented the five denials of Cārvāka; the denial of cause, effect or result, unseen object, validity and valid beings and presented the poetic statements of Indian Scholars to elaborate on some

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[6]Cārvāka is known in Tibetan as "Tsu-rol mdzes-pa ba" and lokāyata as "jig-rten rgyang phan-pa or 'jig-rten rgyang 'phen-pa."

[7]This was Lokayata, alternatively called Cārvāka or Barhaspatya philosophy. It is called Lokāyata because it was prevalent (*āyataḥ*) among the people (lokesu). From *Lokāyata : A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism* (p.1), by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, 1959, People's Publishing House.

[8]*Sāmaññaphala Sutta* (The Fruits of the Homeless Life): "Your Majesty, there is nothing given, bestowed, offered in sacrifice, there is no fruit, or result of good or bad deeds, there is not this world or the next, there is no mother or father, there are no spontaneously arisen beings, there are in the world no ascetics or Brahmins who have attained, who have perfectly practised, who proclaim this world and the next, having realised them by their own super-knowledge. This human being is composed of the four great elements, and when one dies the earth part reverts to earth, the water parts to water, the fire part to fire, the air part to air, and the faculties pass away into space." From of *Dīghā Nikāya* (*The Long Discourses of the Buddha*) (p.95-96), by Maurice Walshe,1995, Wisdom Publications.

[9]*Tshad-ma legs-par bshad- pa thams-cad kyi chu-bo yongs-su 'du-ba rig-pa'i gzhung-lugs kyi rgya-mtsho zhes bya-ba las Dang-po Tsha-ma grub-pa'i le'u bzhugs so*, Dharmakīrti and Karmapa Chödrak Gyatso, 2018, Kargyud Relief and Protection Committee.

[10]Here, Cārvāka who doesn't previous and future lives is specify because there is a presence of Cārvāka who accepts the existence of seven previous and next lives which it is written in text "*The (Grains) ear of Scripture and Logic an Essentail Compendium of Tenents Vol I, Grub-mtha' snying-po kun-las btus-pa lung-rigs snye-ma zhes-bya-ba stod-cha* (p.21) of Acharya Sempa Dorje, 2021, Diwakar Publication.

[11]From *Buddhist Logic, Vol. I* (p.16), F. Th. Stcherbatsky,1962, Dover Publication Inc.

denials. For instance, Riśi Juktopchen (*'jug stobs-can*)[12] verse on the denial of cause (the object arises without any cause) in verses, is also present in Aryadeva's (3rd century) *Skhal itapramardanayuktāhetusiddhi- nāma*.

- ❍ The roundness of peas, the long sharpness of pointed up[13] thorns and
- ❍ The bright design of the peacock's feather and
- ❍ The sunrise and down flow of water are
- ❍ Not made by anyone, the cause is their intrinsic nature.[14]

According to Gyaltsab, Khedrub and Karmapa, the opponent Cārvāka stated that the Buddha's compassion cannot accomplished by cultivating compassion for many lives because there is an absence of many previous and future lives as compassion and the other mental states are result or depend on a body that the mind perishes when the body perishes. Though they wrote Cārvāka as an opponent in the initial commentary of *Pramāṇavārttikā*'s rebirth section, they gradually mentioned other Indian philosophical schools in the later section of their commentary as they presented Vaiśeṣika concepts of universal (*sāmānya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karman*), while refuting the concept of mind as the quality of body in terms of simultaneous support and supporter in verses 69-70.[15] Also, there is mention of Vaiśeṣika's thought in Khedrub commentary while refuting the opponent's view on the Body that if lokāyata, you, accepted a body as the substantial cause of the mind, what type of body (is lokāyata) accepting as the substantial cause of the mind, are (you) accepting like Vaiśeṣika that the whole (*yan-lag can*) substantially different gross body as the substantial cause of the mind or accepting an indivisible atom body (*Paramāṇu*) as the substantial cause, (both of these two) are refuted by analysing.[16] The mentioning of Vaiśeṣika philosophy in this section raises the question of whether they are Dharmakīrti's opponent, who asserted three relations. There is a presence of two reasons that show the

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[12]It is difficult to find the Indian name of this scholar. Acharya Sempa Dorje named Juk Topchen as a follower of *B*ṛihaspati, founder of the Lokāyata system in his text "*An Essential Compendium of Tenets*" (Dorje, 2021, p. 19).

[13]Karmapa used a past tense word zengs (gzengs) which means to lift or point upward. In the Āryadeva verse, a word "zer" (gzer) is used which represent as nail or spike in his verse.

[14]"Sran-zlum tsher-ma gzengs-ring rno-ba dang/ rma-bya'i sgro gshog ri-mo bkra-ba dang/ nyi-shar chu-bo thur-du 'bab-pa ni/ sus-kyang ma-byas ngo-bo nyid-kyi rgyu." (Dharmakīrti & Karmapa, 2018, p. 61)

[15]Verse 69-71a: de-ltar min-na rigs ma-yin/ 'bo-ba yin-ni gegs-byas phyir/ chu-sogs kyi-ni rten-'gyur gyi/ 'gro-ba med-can yod-tan spyi/ las-rnams la-ni rten ci-dgos/ 'dis-ni 'phrod-pa 'du-ba dang/ 'phrod-pa 'du-ba can-rgyu dang/ rigs-la sogs-pa rnam-gnas nyid/ Rten-med phyir-na bsal-ba yin/ (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, pp. 402-403)

[16]Rgyang-phan khyod lus sems-kyi nyer-len du 'dod-na lus ji lta-bu zhig sems-kyi nyer-len du 'dod/ bye brag-pa 'dod-pa lta-bu'i lus rags-pa yan-lag can don-gzhan gcig khas blangs-nas de yid-blo'i nyer-len du 'dod-dam/ 'on- te/ rdul phra-rab kyi-lus nyer-len du 'dod ces brtags-nas 'gog-pa yin-la/ (Tenzin, Palzang, & Dharmakīrti, 1998, p. 530)

prime opponent is Cārvāka; Firstly, Dharmakīrti made the refutation towards these three relations with a prime goal to establish the existence of many previous and future lives, but Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika school accept rebirth that they cannot accept the perishing of mind with the perishing of body. Also, there is the presence of scholars from this school who worked on both of these schools such as Aviddhakarṇa and Bhāvivikta who wrote both Cārvāka and Nyāya works that it is not unimaginable to determine their possibility of introducing Vaiśeṣika thoughts in Cārvāka school.[17] Secondly, Gyalstab mentioned Cārvāka as opponent[18] in his commentary as he stated that "Though this whole is a fundamental doctrine of Vaiśeṣika, the opponent of these verses is lokāyata because (Vaiśeṣika concept of a whole) is a part of refuting the analysing nature of body that acts as the support when lokāyata asserted body is the special support of the mind."[19] The mentioning of Vaiśeṣika thoughts in Khedrub's commentary on refuting an opponent's view on the Body shows if lokāyata accepts the whole (*yan-lag can*) substantially different gross body as substantial cause of the mind, he will start to accept Vaiśeṣika thought. Thus, Vaiśeṣika thought used in this section of the commentary to refute Cārvāka concept of the body, not to present the opponent as Vaiśeṣika.

Refuting Three Relations of Mind and Body

The three possible relationships between mind and body, which present Carvaka's concept of the mind-body relation are the cause and effect relation, substance and quality relation and mind is the nature (*svabhāvaḥ*) of the body.[20] These three relations are discussed and refuted in detail by Tibetan commentators. Dharmakīrti did not mention these relations

[17] From Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth (p.142), Eli Franco,1997, wien: Arbeitskreis Fur Tibetische Und Buddhistische Studien Universitatwien.

[18] Franco didn't accept Gyaltsab's stand by stating, "Of course, such comments should not be accepted blindly, and our knowledge today of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā texts is far superior to what rGyal tshab could have known from the texts at his disposition, but the comment as such is thought-provoking and points at a genuine problem in Dharmakīrti's text." (Franco, 1997, p. 154). Though Franco did not accept Gyaltsab's stand on the sole opponent as Cārvāka, It is difficult to say the opponent is not Cārvāka as Gyaltsab and Khedrub made their commentary with a reference to the Indian commentators and both are renowned academic scholars from Tibetan Buddhist philosophical school, who spent years in studying Indian Buddhism that it would be inappropriate to assert that they make a random assumption of an opponent as Cārvāka.

[19]   Yan-lag can 'di bye-brag pa'i rtsa-ba'i dod-pa yin kyang/ rgyang-phan lus yid-blo'i rten khyad-par can-du 'dod-pa na/ rten byed-pa'i lus-kyi ngo-bo la dpyad-nas 'gog-pa'i yan-lag yin-pas/ gzhung-'di dag-gi phyir-rgol ni rgyang-phan yin-no. (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 414)

[20] Franco wrote a relation between capacity (śakti) and possessor of capacity (Franco, 1997, p. 96) instead of mind is the nature of body relation. His primary research is based on the writings of Indian commentators such as Devendrabuddhi, Prajñākaragupta, Ravigupta and Manorathanandin that he presents the relation between the capacity and possessor of capacity but here it focuses on the commentary made by Tibetan scholars that the three relations will be base according to them. Though Franco stated capacity (śakti) and possessor of capacity relation, it does not contradict with *svabhāvaḥ* relation stated by the Tibetan commentators as the capacity is not different from possessor of capacity nor its presence without the possessor. Thus, the capacity is the nature of the possessor which means *svabhāvaḥ* of the possessor (object)

in the initial verse of presenting opponent view[21] and presented these relations and their refutation in the later section of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter but Gyaltsab, Kherdrub and Gorampa presented all three relations in the initial section when they were presenting their commentary on it.[22] They mentioned Cārvāka as an opponent but it's difficult to assert Cārvāka acceptance of all three relations due to the lack of evidence that proves Cārvāka's writings on these three relations in present times. However, at least two of the relations are well-attested as Cārvāka doctrines, in the sense that they can be easily and naturally understood from the *Bṛhaspatisūtra. BS* A5 describes the phenomenon of life as the capacity of the four material elements, comparing it to the power of intoxication that arises from ferment, etc. *(kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat)* (Franco, 1997, p. 98). Though Cārvāka accepted or unaccepted the three relations of mind and body, Dharmakīrti refuted these three relations, which shows of the opponent of his rebirth section either accepts three relations of mind-body relation simultaneously or accepts these relations sequentially with a logical refutation of the prior relation led to the acceptance of the subsequent relation.

Refuting the Cause and Effect Relation of Mind and Body

The first relation of the mind and body is the cause and effect relation[23], where the mind is supported by the body because it is the product of the body that the mind ceases with the cessation of its cause, the body. A brief argument on this relation is present from verse 37a[24] but a detailed refutation is made from verse 48b.[25] Dharmakīrti made an argument that if

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[21]Verse 35: blo-ni lus-la brten-pa'i phyir/ goms-pas grub-pa med ces-na/ (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 376)

[22]Gyaltsab stated, "rgyang-phan pa na-re/ snying-rje skye-ba du-ma goms-pas grub-pa med-de/ skye-ba snga-phyi du-ma med-pa'i phyir/ der-thal/ yid-blo rtog-pa ni lus-la brten-pas/ lus zhig-pa na/ de-yang 'jig-pa'i phyir/ dper-na/ sgron-me la 'od-ltar/ lus-kyi 'bras-bu'am/ chang-dang myos-pa'i nus-pa ltar/ lus-kyi yon-tan nam/ rtsig-pa dang de-la brten-pa'i ri-mo ltar/ rang-bzhin gyi tshul-gyis brten-no zhe-na/ (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 376).

Khedurb stated, "de-yang rgyang phan-pa dag blo-lus la brten-par 'dod-pa la brten-tshul gsum bshad-de/ rgyan las blo ni lus kyi bdag nyid dang /lus 'bras lus kyi yon tan dang /de ltar lugs gsum la brten nas/goms pa grub pa med par 'dod/ces 'byung ba ltar/chang dang myos par byed pa'i nus pa bzhin du blo lus kyi bdag nyid du gyur pa'i sgo nas lus la brten pa dang /_sgron me dang de'i 'od bzhin du blo lus kyi 'bras bur gyur pa dang / rtsig pa dang de la brten pa'i ri mo bzhin du blo lus kyi yon tan du gyur pa'i sgo nas lus la brten pa ste/_de ltar brten tshul gsum gi sgo nas blo ni lus kho na la brten par 'dod do" (Tenzin, Palzang, & Dharmakīrti, 1998, p. 493)

Gorampa stated, "Chad lta-ba na-re/ snying-rje chos-can/ skye-ba du-mar goms-pas grub-pa med-de/ skye-ba snga phyi med-pa'i phyir-te/ rtog-bcas kyi blo-ni lus-la brten-pa'i phyir-na lus zhig-pa na blo rgyun chad-pa'i phyir/ brten-tshul yang chang-la myos-pa'i nus-pa ltar blo-lus kyi bdag nyid dam/ sgron-me la 'od ltar lus-lyi 'bras-bu'am/ bu-ram la mngar-ba ltar lus-kyi yon-tan gyi tshul-gyis brten-no zhe-na/ (Sengay, 2018, p. 232)

[23]The researcher wrote a detailed explanation of three refutations in the context of the commentary made by Gyaltsab, Kherab and Gorampa and also tried to present the differences made by these three scholars while commentating on verses made on refuting three relations.

[24]Verse 37a: lus-nyid 'ba'-zhig las-skye min/ (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 378)

[25]Verse 48b: de-blo bzhin-du 'dzin-'gyur phyir/ (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 389).

the sense faculties are the cause of mind, it is either the dominant cause (*adhipati pratyaya, bdag-rkyen*) or substantial cause (*upādāna, nyer-len*) of mind. If it is the dominant cause, the mind cannot be produced from the body with a sense organ because the mind cannot apprehend the object clearly as the eye cognition. It cannot be produced from the collection of all sense faculties as each sense faculty has its different abilities to generate its own particular cognition and also mind would not generate from the collection of all sense faculties if there is an absence of a sense faculty. Mind is also not produced from the dead body because there is an absence of a previous substantial cause of mind.

The opponent argued that if the mind and body are not cause and effect, why do they co-exist? It is replied that they arise from a single cause, which is their previous karma that they co-exist even though they (the mind and body) are not the support and supported. For instance, the five sense faculties are not the support and supported still they exist together. The opponent continues with his query that the body is a dominant cause of the mind because the mind gets affected by the transformation in the body such as consuming poison will affect the thinking process of the mind. It was replied that the transformation happened not because the body was a dominant cause of the mind but because the poison was the object (*dmigs-yul*) of the body cognition which was later cognised conceptually by the mental cognition (mind) that it did not make a direct effect on the mind. Thus, the transformation happens due to the object of observation not due to the dominant cause. In Gormapa's commentary of this section, he presented that if the mind is directly dependent on the body because the changes in the mind happen due to having pain or sickness in the body then the blood and so forth from the pierced weapon may also become the support of the mind because these also lead to changes in the mind.[26]

Gyaltsab and Khedrub mentioned that the body cannot be the special indispensable cause (*ldog-byed kyi rgyu khyad-par can*) of the mind because the special indispensable cause should be such that the presence of the cause previously, there is an arise of effect and without the prior existence of a cause, the result is absent. For instance, the lamp and light of the lamp, where the lamp gives direct assistance to the lamp light and its light always succeeds its direct substantial cause, the lamp. But the mind can neither arise with the previously present of the body nor that with the body's existence, there is an existence of the mind.

The second argument is made on the body being the substantial cause of the mind. If the body is a substantial cause of mind, it should be present where there is a presence of the body, but one can see an absence of the mind in the presence of a body in the dead body. The

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[26]Gorampa's extensive commentary on Pramāṇavārttikā, *Rgyas-pa'i bstan-bcos tshad-ma rnam'grel gyi rnam-par bshad pa kun tu bzang-po'i 'od zer* (p.241): Gzhan-la mtshon bsnun-pa'i khrag-la sogs-pa'i phyi'i-don 'ga'-zhig kyang chos-can/ khyod yid-blo'i rten-du thal/ khyod-kyi sgo-nas kyang yid 'gyur-ba yin-pa'i phyir-ro/

opponent may argue that it was due to the absence of favourable condition Breath such as the fainted person. This is not acceptable as inhalation and exhalation of breath are present with the presence of the mind but if breathing is the result of the body, then the dead body also needs breathing as there is the presence of cause body. Therefore, the inhalation and exhalation or the increase and decrease in breathing are due to the mind because, without the presence of mental assertion, the breathing factor is not possible. Also, if breathing is the cause of the mind, there is an increase and decrease of the mind with the increase and decrease of breathing.   The opponent argued that such as the woods, which are charmed by the mantra,[27] are not the cause of the fire, the adverse condition of three humors, wind, bile and phlegm hindered the residing of mind in the body that at the time of death the body is there but an absence of the mind. Thus, the dead body is not a cause of the mind. If such is the case, the question arises to the opponent of whether the dead body will revive the mind as there is an extinction of contradictory causes poison, wind, bile and phlegm because the body is the cause of the mind. The opponent argued again with an analogy that just as the ashes and coal cannot turned back to wood after the burning of wood and ceasing of fire. Likewise, there is no existence or bring back of the mind after the ceasing of the mind due to the disease, three humors or poison, etc. It is replied that it is not correct as there is a presence of medical remedies to bring back mind and body even if it was damaged by the cause of sickness such as three humors and others.

The analogy of wood's fire and its ashes or coal is not suitable with the body affected by three humors as the transformation made by fire on the wood is irreversible whereas the transformation made on the body by three humors or poison can be reversible like the transformation of gold into solid even it was melted by fire earlier.

The opponent replies that some illnesses are incurable, it cannot be cured and lead to death. This is argued that it is not a totally incurable illness but it's due to the absence of medicine or a doctor to cure that illness or due to exhaustion of life-propelled karma that the illness is described as incurable. The dead body can be revived with the mind if the three humors are only the cause of illness and illness can be curable. Also, the poisoned dead body can be revived with the mind and come alive with the exhaustion of the poison's capacity or by cutting the poisoned wound, which is bitten by a snake.

Thus, the body cannot be the substantial cause of the mind as one cannot see the change in the mind with the change of the body and there should be a transformation in the effect with the transformation of result in the substantial cause and effect relation. For instance, Lamp and the Lamp Light or the Clay and the Pot, where the transformation in lamp or clay, there is the transformation in the lamp and pot as the previous two are the cause of the latter.

Though Gyaltsab and Khedrub discussed the substantial or dominate (principle/ bdag

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[27]Gormapa stated woods which are the cause of fire cannot produce the fire if it is not sodden by water. P244 but Khedrub and Gyaltsab said the woods, which are charmed by mantra.

rKyen) cause and their relation with effect, their discussion on the cause in this section may on an unimpeded capacity of the direct cause or the last stage of direct cause (*dngos rgyu nus-pa thogs-med*) because they discussed such a type of cause that definitely rises an effect (*'byung-nges*), not that which has a possibility of giving an effect (*'Byung-rung*). The last stage of direct cause is a cause that definitely gives the result. Thus, the final death time mind of an ordinary human will definitely produce its homogeneous mind as it is the last stage of the present mind which is the direct cause of the proceeding mind. This shows the existence of the next lives.

Refuting the Substance and Quality Relation Between the Mind and the Body :

In this refutation, Gyaltsab and Gorampa presented Pramāṇasiddhi verses from 64 to 74a,[28] whereas Khedrub mentioned verses from 64 to 80a.[29] Dharmakīrti initiated this refutation by stating, that the body cannot be a support of the mind as the opponent suggested because it does not support the mind that is already existing and non-existent. The opponent argues that the body supports the mind by being a cause to abide the existing mind. It is opposed by Dharmakīrti that the body is not the support of an abiding the mind because the existence of the mind is not something different or apart from the mind, that the cause of abiding of mind is not different from the mind itself as the mind carries the abiding itself. The opponent countered that the mind and abiding nature of the mind are substantially different (*rdzas-gzhan*).

If the mind and its abiding nature are different, the body does not support the mind for its abiding. Also, there would be an absurd consequence that the mind would never perish until there is an existence of the body if the body supports the mind to abide. The opponent argued that though the body helps the mind not to perish, it will perish if it encounters with the cause of perishing. The same inadmissible consequences will be applied here if the cause of perishing is different from the cause of the mind. That is whether the perishing of the mind is the same or different from the mind. If it is the same, the cause of perishing is not some other cause besides the cause of the mind and if it is different from the mind, the perishing of the mind will not happen as they both are irrelevant. Thus, the body, which the opponent stated as the cause of abiding the existing mind, cannot let the mind not perish and persist because the cause of perishing will perish the mind.

An Opponent continued to argue that the cause of abiding is responsible for the abiding of the mind until it meets with the cause of perishing. Dharmakīrti replies that the mind

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[28]Verse 64a: yod med dag la rten med phyir……. Verse 74a: min na de gnas byed gzhan gang / (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, pp. 399-405)

[29]Verse 80a: de phyir sems la brten pa yin/ (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 408)

Though Khedrub verses division varies from Gyalstab and Gorampa, the researcher presents the commentary made from verses 64 to 74a that is accepted by all these three scholars as refutation to the substance and quality relation.

by its very essence has the nature of perishing, which is the nature of the mind that cannot be disapproved. Thus, the Pershing is an immanent to the own nature of the mind that the mind cannot abide without perishing. The opponent argues with an analogy that just like a container like a pot, sustains water that is already abiding without perishing so as the body sustains the mind. It is unacceptable that the pot and such support the water and such without letting it perish because the same admissible consequence will apply here too that the sustaining of water is different or the same with the water. If it is different, the water cannot be sustained as water and the sustaining of water is irrelevant and if the sustaining of water is the same as water itself then it does not need any other cause to sustain. It is replied by the opponent why there is common acceptance in general that containers are the support of water. It is due to the conventional sense but in reality, a container such as a pot assists the series of water without spilling it outside. Therefore, the container supports the continuity of the water series without letting it spill outside.

Here the support and supported are shown in another method as it is noticed by Franco that "however, there is another meaning of "support" that is acceptable to Dharmakīrti. When things perish at every moment, something is called "support" not because it causes continuity, but because it causes the series *(santati)* to be located at the same place (i.e., on the support)" (Franco, 1997, p. 140). The concept of support is applied to impermanent, not to permanent entities or non-existent objects such as Vaiśeṣika's concept of qualities, universal and action. These are not the support of water as they are absent with continuity from the previous moment to the next moment because they are not impermanent. Thus, the substance and quality relation between the mind and body is summarised by Dharmakīrti in verses 71-74a,[30] that if an object such as the mind is perished by the separate cause, the cause of the abiding mind will not able to abide the mind because the separate cause of perishing will perish the mind.

Even if there is an absence of a separate cause of perishing and the mind has its own nature to perish, the cause of sustaining the mind will not be able to abide the mind as it does not have the ability to abide it without perishing. If there is a presence of support that abides the already existent object such as the mind, there will be an absence of perishing as it follows there is an absence of the object such as the mind and so forth that will perish any time because all these arisen the object possess with non-perishing support such as *ātma* (self, soul), which are a permanent entity.

Gorampa didn't say the type of support that helps in abiding the objects without perishing and Karmapa suggested the permanent substance (*rtag-pa'i rdzas*) as he stated, "all the arisen object from cause possess a support of permanent substance, which sustain

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[30]Verse 71b: gal-te gzhan-las dngos 'jig-na……..
……..Verse 74a: min-na de-gnas byed-gzhan gang/ (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, pp. 404-405)

the object without perishing.[31] He did not mention which permanent substance supports the object but Gyaltsab and Khedrub mentioned that the permanent entity such as *ātma* (self, soul) and so forth are the support of all the arisen objects.[32] The source for Gyaltsab and Kherub on the *ātma* as support may be Devendrabuddhi's commentary as he also discussed a permanent entity *ātma* that always exists without separation in his commentary.[33]

Dharmakīrti continued his objection that if the object such as the mind has its own nature of perishing, the separate cause of existing that makes the object abide without perishing does not have the power not to perish the object. Also if the object doesn't have its own nature of perishing, there is no need for a separate cause for abiding the object as it won't affect object abiding. Therefore, if the thing is perishable in nature, nothing can make it continue and if it does not have a perishable nature, nothing can make it continue either. (Franco, 1997, p. 141)

Refuting the Mind is A Nature of the Body:

The verses division under this title varies among three Tibetan scholars[34] but they all accept the verses from 80b to 81a[35] under this refutation because the main arguments of refuting the mind is a nature of the body comes under verses 80b-81a. In this verse, it is shown that If a mind is not different from the body, the mental qualities of the mind should appear on the body. For instance, the qualities of listening (*thos-pa*) and reflection (*bsam-*

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[31]"Rgyu-las skye-ba can-gyi dngos-po kun mi-'jig par gnas-par byed-pa'i rtag-pa'i rdzas-kyi rten-dang bcas-pa yin-pa de'i phyir"-- *Tshad-ma legs-par bshad- pa thams-cad kyi chu-bo yongs-su 'du-ba rig-pa'i gzhung-lugs kyi rgya-mtsho zhes bya-ba las dang-po Tsha-ma grub-pa'i le'u bzhugs so (First chapter of Ocean of Literature on Logic)*(p.91), Dharmakīrti and Karmapa Chödrak Gyatso,2018, Kargyud Relief and Protection Committee.

[32]Gyalstab stated, "…...skye-ba can kun mthar bdag-la songs-pa'i rtag-dnogs kyi rten-dang bcas-pa yin-pa de'i-phyir." (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 404)

Khedrub also stated, "….skye-ba can kun mthar lus-dang bdag-la sogs-pa rtag-dngos kyi rten-dang bcas-pa yin-pa de'i-phyir (Tenzin, Palzang, & Dharmakīrti, 1998, p. 521).

[33]"Re-zhig bdag-la brten-pa'i bde-ba la sogs-pa gang dag yin-pa'i rten rtag-pa de dag-ni rtag-tu gnas-par byed-pa dang ma-bral ba'i phyir/ 'jig-pa med-pa nyid yin-no." From *rGya-gzhung gnad-che bdam-bsgrigs pod-phreng Tshad-ma 3.Tshad-ma rnam-'grel gyi 'grel-pa stod-cha: Commentary of Pramāṇavārttikā Part I* (p.348), Dharamkīrti and Devandrabuddhi, Edited by Thupten Jinpa, 2017, Indraprastha Press (CBT).

[34]Gyaltsab and Khedurb mentioned verses from 80b to 81a under this refutation, whereas Gorampa mentioned 80b to 85a.

[35]Namdrel Tharlam Sel-jey, Verses 80b-81a:

> Ji-ltar sems-la brten-byas nas/
> thos-sogs 'du-byed sems-la ni/
> dus- gsal tha-dad med-pa'i phyir/
> de-ltar lus-la yon-tan 'gyur/   (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 409)

The translation of the above verse: (If the mind is substantially identical to the body, then) just as the formations of listening, etc., Are based on the mind, so when, in the mind (there is awareness), (Those) qualities should (appear) as clearly in the body, because (Body and mind) are not different. (Jackson, 1993, p. 264).

pa) which appear clearly on the mind should appear on the body as the mind is not different from the body.

Khedrub has discussed this relation in more detail than the other two commentators, he stated that Cārvāka accepted the permanent body, which is not substantially different from the mind. In this manner, the mind is being supported by the body. If the permanent body without divisibility of its parts is not substantially different (*rdzas-gzhan min-pa*) from the mind, it should be a partless substantially identical (*cha-med rdzas-gcig*) (with the mind). If (the mind) is not different (from the body), (it should be) identical with the body that the body and the mind will become one. Then there will be an error of all the characteristics possessed by the person's mind directly appearing on the person's sense consciousness that perceives the body (because the mind is not different from the body but one with the body).[36]

Khedrub further stated that there is an error for those who accept the mind and body as partless substantially identical (*cha-med rdzas-gcig*) that the characteristic of the parent's mind is also characteristic of the body because the mind and body of the parent are not different. If the opponent accepts the characteristic of the parent's mind is the characteristic of the body then the newly birth's mind possesses the parent's intellectual, love, listening and so forth characteristics because whatever the characteristic of the parent's mind is also the nature of their body and only the parent's body is the substantial cause of the first mind of their son. For instance, one will establish the arising of the previous mind's character in the next mind through experience. But the mind's character cannot be seen possessing on the body nor all of the body's character is possessed by the mind. Thus, the mind is different from the body and it is not the nature of the body.

Gorampa has included four stanzas from verses 81b to 85a[37] in this section where it is shown that sentient beings take birth at inferior places such as the mother's womb not due to some permanent entity like *Iśvarā* and so forth but due to preceding of their desire to get happiness and avoid suffering with the presence of their self-attachment. Though the individual person like the opponent may not perceive the sentient being coming from previous lives or going to the next lives that does not mean there is an absence of such things. For instance, a weak-eyed person cannot perceive the thin smoke but that does not mean there is an absence of smoke. Also, the body of the intermediate beings, which is the subtle body, cannot be seen Cārvāka but that does not mean such beings are absent. Thus,

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[36]De-yang rgyang-phan ni lus rtag-par 'dod-pa yin-la/de-dang blo rdzas gcig-pa'i sgo-nas blo lus-la brten-par 'dod-pa yin zhing / de ltar-na rtag-dngos la cha-shas dbyer mi-rung bas lus de-dang rdzas-gcig yin-na cha-med rdzas-gcig yin dgos-la/ cha-med rdzas-gcig yin-na gcig yin-dgos pas lus-sems gcig-tu 'gyur-zhing / de ltar-na skyes-bu de'i blo-la yod pa'i yon-tan thams-cad skyes-bu de'i lus mthong-ba'i dbang-shes la yang mngon-sum du snang-bar 'gyur-ro zhes-pa'i thal-ba 'phen-pa yin-te/ (Tenzin, Palzang, & Dharmakīrti, 1998, pp. 524-525)

[37]Verse 81b: bdag-la chags-pa dang ldan-pas/……

…..verse 85a: ma-mthong phyir-na med-pa min/…. (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, pp. 409-411)

the primary cause of sentient beings to take birth in the world is their preceding cause of desiring happiness and false cognition of seeing suffering as pleasure, not due to the body.

In this section of the verse, Dharmakīrti does not discuss Karma as the cause of taking rebirth but focuses on the negative emotions such as self-attachment, desire to seek pleasure and false cognition of seeing suffering as pleasure for taking rebirth. He shows the two causes of rebirth, *avidyā* and *tṛṣṇā* in this section. Though there is the absence of the Karma concept which is considered one of the main causes of taking rebirth because sentient beings take birth in a specific type of being and realm according to his or her karma in Buddhism as it is mentioned in *Sutta Nipāta*[38] and Acharya Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakoṣakārikā*.[39] Dharmakīrti has not completely ignored the karma concept as he accepted it as a cause of taking birth in samsara besides desire and body. It is mentioned in verses 198[40] and 274[41] of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter that Arhat who has karma, cease from taking rebirth in samsara because there is an absence of cooperative cause "Desire" which shows that karma needs support from a desire to take birth in samsara because one takes birth in samsara through his three causes Karma, Desire and body. Dharmakīrti did not mention the karma theory in this section may be due to his awareness of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakoṣakārikā*, where the latter had written a detailed study on karma in his fourth chapter and also his rebirth opponent Cārvāka, who does not accept the Karma theory.

Conclusion

From the above discussion on Dharmakīrti's refutation to the mind-body relation under the light of Tibetan commentators, the following conclusion can be derived.

Dharmakīrti presented the opponent's thought on the mind and body relation through three relations, which are the body is the cause of mind (cause and effect relation), the mind is the quality of Body (substance and quality relation) and the mind is the nature (*svabhāvaḥ*) of the body. All these three relations were refuted subsequently, which shows either the opponent accepted all these three relations simultaneously or he accepted these sequentially with a refutation of a previous relation leading to an acceptance of the next

[38]Sutta Nipāta; Verse 654: *Kammuna vattatī loko, Kammnā vattatī pajā*
Kammanibandhanā sattā, rathass'āṇīva yāyato
Vāseṭṭhasutta, Mahā Vagga. It is translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids and Shew Zan Aung in translated book of Katha-vatthu as This Karma makes the world go round, Karma rolls on the lives of men. All beings are to karma bound as linchpin is to chariot-wheel- page 315.

[39]Abhidharmakoṣakārikā (Vol.140 ku): Las las 'jig rten sna tshogs skye.
The variety of the world arises from action.
Vasubandhu (p. 140-10b). Adarshah.

[40]Verse 198: gti-mug nyes-pa'i rtsa-ba ste/ de-yang sems-can 'dzin-pa yin/ de-med nyes-rgyu las khro-min / des- na brtse-ba nyes-med 'dod/ (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 509).

[41]Verse 274: las-dang lus-dag gnas-na yang/ gcig-med phyir-na rgyu-gsum can/ skye-ba srid-pa ma-yin te/ sa-bon med-par my-gu bzhin/ (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 562).

relation.

Dharmakīrti made the refutation of the mind-body relation to prove that the mind is not a part, effect or nature of the body but an effect of its homogenous cause, which is the previous mind. This shows the substantial cause of the present life's first mind is the last mind of the previous life and the substantial effect of the present life's last mind is the next life's mind, which proves the existence of previous and future lives.

According to Gyaltsab, Khedrub and Gormapa, the prime opponent is Cārvāka as Gyaltsab stated in his commentary that "Though this whole is a fundamental doctrine of Vaiśeṣika, the opponent of these verses is lokāyata because (Vaiśeṣika concept of a whole) is a part of refuting the analysing nature of the body that acts as the support when lokāyata asserted body is the special support of the mind."

Gyaltsab, Khedrub and Gorampa varied in the verses division of refuting three relations of the mind and body as Gyaltsab mentioned in verses: 48b to 64a[42] and verse: 74b to 80a[43] under the refutation to cause and effect relation of the mind and body whereas khedrub mentioned Verses from 48b to 64a and Gorampa mentioned verse 48b to 64a and verses 74b to 80a under this refutation. In the refutation towards substance and quality relation, Gyaltsab and Gorampa presented verses from 64b to 74a under this refutation and Khedrub verses from 64b to 80a. Lastly in the third refutation, Gyaltsab and Khedrub verses division under refuting the mind is a nature of the body varies from Gorampa but they all accept the verses from 80b to 81a as refutation to the mind is a nature of the body.

In the refutation of cause and effect relation, Gyaltsab and Khedrub mentioned a special indispensable cause of the effect ('*bras-bu ldog-pa'i kyi rgyu khyad-par can*), which definite rise of an effect ('*byung-nges*), not that which has a possibility of giving an effect ('Byung-rung).

In refuting the substance and quality relation between the mind and the body, Gorampa didn't mention the type of support that helps in abiding the objects without perishing but Gyaltsab and Khedrub mentioned that permanent entity such as *ātma* (self, soul) and so forth are the support of all the arisen objects and their source on taking *ātma* as support may be Devendrabuddhi's commentary as he also discussed a permanent entity *ātma*.

A refutation to opponent's the mind-body relation is a part of the rebirth section, which covers the largest section of his *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter. Dharmakīrti presented different logical refutations on three relations to prove the existence of many previous and future lives. Thus, a primary concept of refuting these relations is to prove the possibility of

[42]Verse 48b: de-blo bzhin-du 'dzin-'gyur phyir/
Verse 64a: me-dang zangs-ma'i zhu-nyid bzhin/   (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 389 and 399)

[43]Verse 74b: lus-kyi phul-byung 'grib med-par/ Verse 80a: de-phyir sems-la brten-pa yin/ (Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008, p. 405 and 408; Dhondup, Gyaltsab, & Dharmakīrti, 2008)

attaining a compassionate mind if one accustoms its homogenous causes for many lives.

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Identifying Persons: A Dialectic in the *Ātmavādapratiṣedha*

Anil Kumar Tewari*

ABSTRACT

What appears uncontroversial in practice turns out to be one of the most vexing theoretical issues in philosophy. For instance, there are adaptable modes developed to identify a person in a given context and recognize him/her at different times, but when it comes to devising a completely reliable criterion to ascertain the continued existence of a person, none of the pre-philosophical heuristics comes to the rescue. This problem in modern Anglo-American metaphysics is called the problem of personal identity: what makes a person P^1 at his/her life-stage t^1 identical to a person P^2 at the life-stage t^2? If there were unchallenged shreds of evidence for the existence of an unchanging substance like the self or *ātman*, its sameness across the life stages of a person would have ascertained the identity of the person over time. But Buddhism, for instance, says that there is no perceptual or inferential ground to accept the existence of any unchanging substance like the self or *ātman*. Instead, commonly available and reliable empirical evidence reveals the changing nature of things in reality. Due to its commitment to the metaphysics of impermanence, Buddhism naturally faces the how-question related to continuity in the life of a person. The classical discussion focuses on the issue of the unity of experience, the possibility of memory, and finally, the belief in rebirth. It is assumed that the principle advanced to account for these phenomena can be employed to account for the problem of personal identity. To narrow down the scope of inquiry, the present paper considers only the dialectic available in the ninth chapter titled *Pudgalapratiṣedhaprakaraṇa* or *Ātmavādapratiṣedha* of the *Abhidharmakoṣa-Bhāṣya* authored by the Yogācāra Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu (circa 4th/5th century CE). The text primarily targets the Vātsīputrīyas (Pudgalavādins), followers of one of the prominent sects of the Hīnayāna Buddhism, for their belief in the existence of a person (*pudgala*) apart from the psycho-physical aggregates. They however concur with Vasubandhu in believing that the identification of a person is necessarily through the aggregates. Besides these in-house interlocutors, he also considers the possible objections from the non-Buddhist systems. The present article reformulates some of the major arguments advanced by Vasubandhu and seeks to explore the implications of the dialectic on the problem of personal identity. It is suggested that the Buddhist understanding of a person as a 'convenient designator' provides significant insight into the contemporary debate on the continued existence of a person.

Keywords: Person, Personal Identity, Buddhism, Impermanence, Continued Existence, Psycho-physical Aggregates, Convenient Designator

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INTRODUCTION

When the problem of personal identity (continuous existence of a person over time) is raised in Buddhism, an obvious apprehension arises in our mind: 'Where is this problem in Buddhism that talks about the continuation of a person even life after life?' The Jātaka Kathās are known for the stories describing many previous lives of Buddha. Is it not the case that each life depicted in the stories is lived by Buddha, the same person? This observation applies to every system of Indian philosophy that accepts the cycle of birth and death: the same person is born time and again unless the cycle is broken by way of realizing the true nature of reality. The present article does not intend to probe the belief in the phenomenon of rebirth in general, nor does it seek to presume the actuality of rebirth. My limited objective in this article is to consider the Buddhist account of the possibility of rebirth and see how the explanation provides a theoretically legitimate ground for the belief in the continued existence of a person. The how-question related to the continuity in the existence of a person across lives can be raised about one life as well with more theoretical relevance.

The issue which is called the problem of personal identity in the modern Anglo-American philosophy relates to the continued existence of a person in one life only. The problem of personal identity is to explain how we can identify a person as the same person over time at different life stages. What is it that retains the identity of persons through changes in their perceptions, thoughts, actions, feelings, and, of course, their bodies over time? This is a theoretical problem which has a direct bearing on our practical concerns. Not only soteriological practices but our day-to-day behaviour and social practices such as the continuation of a marriage, property inheritance, and issuing passports and identity cards are also based on certain metaphysical beliefs regarding the constitution and continuation of a person's life. These practices, though pragmatically promising, need theoretical support since more often than not the question of their legitimacy is raised. It is this necessity which makes the discussion on personal identity philosophically stimulating. It is more inviting within the Buddhist metaphysical framework of incessant change.

The problem of personal identity is twofold: (1) what constitutes the identity of a person? and (2) how is a person identified? Whereas the first one is essentially an ontological question, the second one falls largely under the domain of epistemology. But both these folds are intended for a single inquiry: what makes a person P^1 at his/her life-stage t^1 identical to a person P^2 at the life-stage t^2? If there were conclusive evidence for the existence of unchanging substances like the self or *ātman*, its sameness would have ascertained the identity of a person over time beyond doubt. Buddhism, due to its doctrine of impermanence, does not subscribe to the existence of any unchanging substance like self or *ātman*. Hence, the question of personal identity becomes significant for the system. The ensuing discussion is however confined to some of the dialectics available in the last chapter

titled *Pudgalapratiṣedhaprakaraṇa* or *Ātmavādapratiṣedha* of the *Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya* of Vasubandhu.

THE TEXT: The *Abhidharmakośa* is a Sanskrit text authored by the 4th/5th century CE Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu. The text consists of the basic tenets of the Sarvāstivāda Buddhist tradition as pūrva-pakṣa. The master himself wrote a commentary on the text titled the *Abhidharmakośa-Bhāṣya*. In this commentary, an additional ninth chapter is added and the chapter is titled *Pudgalapratiṣedhaprakaraṇa* or *Ātmavādapratiṣedha* which means 'refutation of the person' or 'refutation of the doctrine of the self'. In this chapter, Vasubandhu seeks to establish his theory of person in a dialectical way by refuting the theory of person proposed by the Vātsīputrīyas (one of the five Schools of the Pudgalavādins[1] in the Sarvāstivāda tradition), one of the sects in the early Buddhist tradition. It is believed that Vasubandhu was initially a Sarvāstivādin who later became a Yogācāra Buddhist proponent under the influence of his brother Asaṅga.[2] Here he not only examines the Vātsīputrīyas' concept of person (*pudgala*) but also questions the Vaiśeṣika (and other) realist belief in the ontologically independent status of the self or *ātman* which is said to be the unchanging immaterial essence of a person. What is therefore in order is a discussion on the concept of person.

PERSON (Pudgala)

There are two diametrically opposite views, namely, Eternalism (*Śāśvatavāda*) and Annihilationism (*Ucchedavāda*) that determine the semantic boundary of the concept of person. According to the eternalists, what a person essentially is, does not depend on the continuation of psychological and physical features, but on something *sui generis*, which is said to be the owner of these psycho-physical properties. This 'owner', the self or *ātman*, is

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[1]The Pudgalavādins were the Buddhists ceded from the Sarvāstivāda Buddhist tradition in the 3rd century BCE (Before Common Era) and continued till 11th century CE in the Indian sub-continent. The Vātsīputrīyas first departed from the Sarvāstivāda and later four more Schools, the Dharmottarīya, the Bhadrayānīya, the Sammitīya, and the Saṇṇāgarika developed in the tradition. The most common issue for this schism pertains to the belief in the reality of *pudgala* (usually translated as 'person') and these five Schools are named Pudgalavādins after their belief that a person cannot be reduced to mere aggregates (the five *skandhas*, namely *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṁjñā*, *saṁskāra,* and *vijñāna* or *cetanā*). The followers of these Schools believed that, though unidentifiable apart from the five aggregates, the person is not individually or collectively merely aggregates. Such a belief led the other Buddhists to call them heterodox or non-Buddhists since their belief was seen as contrary to the basic Buddhist doctrine of the unreality of the self (*anattā*). One can, with benefit, see (Priestley, 2022), and the Introduction to Translation (Duerlinger, 2003, pp. 1-70) for a brief survey of the Pudgalavāda tradition in India.

[2]Having drawn a cue from the Austrian Indologist Erich Frauwallner (1898–1974), Amar Singh argues that there were two Vasubandhus: Sautrāntika Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu II) and Yogācāra Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu I). He recognizes Vasubandhu I as the brother of Asaṅga (Singh, 1984, pp. 23-25). Ramshankar Tripathi also observes a significant difference between the 4th century CE Vasubandhu and the 5th century CE Vasubandhu, but he seems to accept only one Vasubandhu in conformity to most of the modern scholars (Tripathi, 2008, pp. 109-111). Without going into the details of the controversy, the present discussion assumes only one Vasubandhu who composed the texts of both the traditions prevalent in this name.

held to be irreducible to anything else. In this non-reductionist framework, being a person is something over and above having mental and physical characteristics. If we consider the Western tradition of philosophy, Descartes, Locke, Leibniz et al are the prominent figures who can be put under the eternalist category. Among the Indian philosophical systems, particularly those accepting the plurality of the selves or *ātman*, are the espousers of the eternalist view, for instance, the Jainas, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga, and the Mīmāṃsakas etc. According to these eternalists, it is the self-same immaterial substance which retains the identity of a person over time despite radical psycho-physical changes in the personality.

On the other hand, for the annihilationist, there are no unitary persons at all apart from various aggregations, and therefore the question of personal identity is a non-question. In contrast to the eternalist belief in the unchanging existential being, annihilationists propose the theory of non-being. This means that a person continues to exist so long as the bodily aggregates are in order, a personality is dissolved with the deconstruction of the aggregation of bodily elements, and nothing remains that can be said to be the bearer of the impressions generated through various experiences and activities. In other words, once dead, nothing in a creature remains to take rebirth to bear the alleged fruits of karma. Thus, there is no scope for rebirth or after-life as such in this theory. Materialists like the Cārvākas can be taken as examples of such beliefs. The questions directed to the annihilationist regarding rebirth, however, pertain to the relationship across lives, the lives which are attributed to putatively a single person. But, as said earlier, whatever can be asked about the identity of a person across lives is also pertinent to the unity and identity of a person across different stages of a single life.

The Buddhist Concept of A Person

As such, a scrutiny of the term 'person' as used in the Buddhist canons is necessary to understand the concept of person in Buddhism. There are two terms frequently used in the Pāli canons: '*purisa*' and '*puggala*' (Sanskrit *puruṣa* and *pudgala*), of which the term 'person' appears to be the nearest rendering. These terms are used in a way compatible with the Buddhist doctrine of no-self (*anattā*) that there is no evidence of immaterial substance like self or *ātman*. The terms '*attā*' and '*jīva*' (Sanskrit *ātman* or *jīva*) are also used with more or less the same denotative purpose. Nevertheless, when they are used without any prefix or suffix, they ostensibly refer to an eternal immaterial entity accepted by the non-Buddhists. The Buddhists use these terms primarily in two ways: first, to describe a particular character, i.e., a person at a certain level of spiritual attainment, and second, to refer to the purported idea of a permanent subject or self to deny it. An Abhidhamma text *Puggalapaññati* is so

titled because its subject matter of discussion is various kinds of personalities.[3] There is, however, a diversity in the usage of the afore-mentioned terms in the common parlance of the Buddhist parables. But the terms '*purisa*' and '*puggala*' are close to our ordinary way of using the term 'person'. These terms are, in many cases, used interchangeably to denote (1) an organism, (2) a mental thing, (3) a unitary thing, (4) a subject of experience, (5) an agent or laity, and (6) a person who has attained a certain level of spiritual development. If we are to recapitulate these usages, we could say that the terms sometimes refer to psychical factors and sometimes to psychophysical organisms. For Buddhists, a living human body with all its material contingencies and psychical characteristics is the person.[4] In their soteriological and metaphysical explanation of meditative practices, the Buddhists describe a person as the aggregates of five transient factors (*pañcaskandha*). They hold that whenever we use the terms '*puruṣa*', '*pudgala*' or '*atta*', we mean one or more factors of these aggregates. Since, for them, the concept of person is understood in terms of the five aggregates, it is necessary to mention briefly what these aggregates are so that it becomes clear what the possible criteria for identifying a person are.

The Five Aggregates

The Buddhists tend to speak of the five aggregates as the locus of suffering and also the means to liberation. We can reasonably talk about suffering, and freedom from suffering, in relation to the psychophysical organisms (human beings) which are constituted by the five aggregates. The five aggregates are: *rūpa* or material or physical factors, which consists of the body, sense organs and their objects, *vedanā* or feelings which emerge due to the sense-object contact, *saṁjñā* or conceptualization, *saṁskāras* or dispositions prompted mainly by feeling and *vijñāna* or consciousness which is an indispensable factor in the production of unitary experience. There are four kinds of *rūpa*, namely, earth, water, fire, and air. Our body, its sense organs, and the external material things grasped by those sense organs are a blend of the four basic elements. It is not explicit in the Buddhist canons whether things beyond our cognitive ken should also be called *rūpa*.

'Feeling' is a straightforward rendering of the term '*vedanā*'. There are three states of

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[3]According to the Buddhist hierarchical order, all people can broadly be categorized into two groups: (1) *puthujjana*, the laymen who are entirely engrossed in the worldly affairs due to ignorance (*avidyā*), such persons can also be called *anariyapuggala* (Sanskrit *anārya*); (2) *ariyapuggala*, the person who is free from the defilements and has a pure mind, this category involves four kinds of personalities: (i) *sotāpanna*, the person who has entered in the path of salvation (in this context the Buddhist path); (ii) *sakadāgāmī*, the person who requires merely one more birth for liberation; (iii) *anāgāmī*, the person who is in his/her last birth of the worldly life; and (iv) *arhata*, the worthy or able one for liberation. And, above all, there is the Bodhisattva, the fully enlightened person, who refuses the final liberation for the welfare of others (Abhidhammapiṭake Puggalapaññtipāli, 2000, pp. 28-29).

[4]The human being is said to be composed of six basic components (*ṣaḍ-dhātu*), namely, earth, water, fire, air, space (*ākāśa*), and consciousness in the *Pitāputra Samāgama Sūtra* (Murti, 1960, p. 189).

feeling, namely, pleasant (*sukha*), unpleasant (*dukkha*), and indifferent (*adukkhamasukha*), and they are of two kinds: mental (*cetasika*) and physical (*kāyika*). *Saṁjñā* is defined as our cognitive function in the process of conceptualization. 'Idea' seems to be the nearest English equivalent of this term. The function of a conceptual element is to introduce a definite, determinate idea about the object of experience for identification, recognition, and practice. *Saṁskāra* is virtually an assortment of active volitional forces that determine the characteristics of our consciousness and form the proclivity of behavioural patterns. *Vijñāna* is nothing but awareness or consciousness of things; it includes both, the notion of self-awareness and the discriminating ability.

Vedanā, *vijñāna,* and *saṁjñā* are seemingly viewed as different aspects of our awareness of anything. First of all, we sense an object (*vedeti*), and then discriminate it from the other objects (*vijānati*) and, finally, we conceptualize or label it (*saṁjñānāti*) for identification and retrieval purposes. These states are in continual flux; each state is causally linked with its preceding state and thus forms a stream of internal states. This interlinked stream (*santāna*) provides the basis for identifying a person as the same person in time. Moreover, the aggregates are common to all sentient beings. These aggregates are in perpetual flux and mutually supportive without any substantial mental-physical gap. In the *Milinda Pañha*, in response to King Milinda's question 'what is material and what is mental?,' the Buddhist interlocutor Nāgasena replies: 'Whatever is gross is material and whatever is subtle is mental. Like the yolk of an egg and its shell, they (mind and body) arise together and thus they have been related through time immemorial' (Pesal, 2022, p. 47). The conversation suggests the relative understanding of material and mental.

Two other methods are adopted to analyse personality in Pāli canons; consequently, the two designations are used for persons: *saviññānakāya* (body-with-consciousness) and *nāma-rūpa* (mental-material). These designations are intended to denote a living body, which is credited with greater significance because of its role in the practice of meditation. However, based on the psychical factors, the Buddhist canons classify persons into various categories and thereby rank them in a hierarchy of certain spiritual levels. The celebrated work *Puggalapaññatti*, the fourth book in the *Abhidhammapiṭaka*, describes 390 types of personalities depending on the psychical states of persons. To initiate meditation, the first step for a practitioner is to recognize his or her present spiritual status wherefrom he or she has to take off.

Person and the Five Aggregates

After the general discussion on the concept of person, it is now obvious that, in Buddhism, a person is understood in terms of the five aggregates. There are three modes of the conception of a person depending on the three situations in an individual's life: the person with the presently appropriated aggregates, the person in the stage of transition from

one life to another, and the person attaining liberation after the cessation of aggregates. The Buddha himself talks about persons in these modes in his conversation. It would nonetheless seem presumptuous to think that these three situations would enable us to formulate a unitary conception of a person. The ordinary conception depends on the perception of psycho-physical continuity in a person. The conception regarding the nature of a person in transition from one life to another seems metaphysically more demanding. And the conception of a person attaining *nirvāṇa* seems simply elusive to any ordinary understanding.

Moreover, if a person is something that can only be defined in terms of the aggregates, it is pertinent to ask if the person as a unitary, self-identical being *really* exists. The Buddhists are aware of this problem and therefore they engage in a debate, in-house as well as with external opponents, on this issue. The *Ātmavādapratiṣedha* involves one of the representative debates where Vasubandhu formulates and questions the Vātsīputrīyas's (Pudgalavādins) belief in the actual existence of a person apart from the aggregates. He says that there is no perceptual or inferential evidence to accept the independent existence of a person. For, if it were a separate entity (*dravya-sat*) in reality, it would be known through direct perception either as the object (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of five sensory consciousnesses or as the object of mental consciousness. Similarly, if it were a subtle object, it would be known through inference, the way we know the existence of sense faculties based on the effect (cognition) produced by them (Vasubandhu, 2012, p. 2524).

There are two competing viewpoints in the text: one, that a person *really* exists; and the other, that a person only *conventionally* exists. The Vātsīputrīyas believe that persons really exist and their existence is conditioned by the elements of their personal lives. For them, the essence of personality remains the same while the traits of personality change. If the activity of a person cannot be denied, then the existence of the person also cannot be denied. For, the occurrence of any activity presupposes the existence of an agent. (If there is a perception, there is a perceiver; if there is a thought, there is a thinker; and so on.) But this agent is not a unified substantive entity; rather it is an uninterrupted continuity of (existing) discrete conscious states. They further argue that a person is neither identical with nor different from the aggregates: if it was identical with the aggregates, then Buddha's teaching that no eternal self is found in the aggregates would be violated; if it was separate from the aggregates, then it would be impossible to recognize it.

Vasubandhu argues that if a person (*pudgala*) is a distinct reality, it must be identifiable with the help of its differential character (*bhāvāntara*). If it is merely a collection of various factors (*samudāya*), like milk, which is identified on the basis of its constituents such as colour, it would then be merely an appellation. But, the Vātsīputrīyas maintain that the existence of a person is neither clearly and distinctly separable in existence from, nor (exhaustively) reducible in existence to the aggregates (Vasubandhu, 2012, p. 2525). The

only thing one can say about a person is that 'it is perceived and conceived in reliance upon the five aggregates which pertain to oneself and are appropriated in the present' (*ādhyātmikān upāttān varttamānān skandhān upādāya pudgalaṁ prajñapyate*). It means that the existential knowledge of a person, and its conceptualization, are dependent on what is perceptible as a person. The uniqueness of the aggregates forming the identity of a person is conspicuously expressed by the adjectives, *ādhyātmikān* and *upāttān*. *Ādhyātmika* means 'that which pertains to oneself'; *upāttān*, which means 'appropriated', shows that the present aggregation is not a fortuitous one, instead each of the factors is believed to be caused by a suitable sequence. For instance, the present physical constitution of a person is sequentially cohesively related to the preceding passed-out physical factors, thereby a spatio-temporal continuity is supposedly maintained. Similarly, the mental factors are also causally connected with their preceding states and thus what is called psychological continuity is also maintained. Both, Vasubandhu and the Vātsīputrīyas underscore the relevance of the continued existence of the psychophysical aggregates for the identification of a person. The latter however say that the existence of a person is not to be taken as hooked on to the aggregates. Instead, for them, a person is neither the same as the aggregates nor other than them. This expression shows the indeterminacy of the relationship between a person and the aggregates and it leads the Vātsīputrīyas to conclude that the nature of a person is inexpressible.

Retorting to the Vātsīputrīyas viewpoint, Vasubandhu says that a thing that is said to be inexpressible is either identical with or different from the aggregates. If it is identical with the aggregates, its existence must be reductively understood. He says that since a person is practically known only through the aggregates, therefore it has only nominal existence (*prajñapti-sat*). But the Vātsīputrīyas are not content with the nominal existence of the person (*pudgala*). Vasubandhu, therefore, inquires that if a person is different from the aggregates, it must exist in the absence of the aggregates, and its knowledge should be possible independently of the aggregates (*dravya-sat*). This way he intends to say that there is no difference between the Vātsīputrīyas' view and that of the essentialists in regard to a person. However, the above implications are disagreeable to the Vātsīputrīyas. For, they admit neither the identity of a person with the aggregates nor the difference between a person and the aggregates. That is why their notion of a person is often discredited as logical or psychological fiction (Mookerjee, 1975, p. 186).

From the foregoing discussion, Vasubandhu's dissent can be seen on two counts. First, he disagrees that persons have real and not just nominal or conventional existence, and adds that the way a person is conceived to be the unitary locus of feeling, thought etc., is incorrect. Persons do exist, he believes, but their existence is merely conventionally real. He further believes that persons are not different from their aggregates, since only aggregates are known through direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*)—the

only two ways of knowing granted in the Buddhist epistemology. 'Person' is a 'convenient designator' that we apply to a stream of psychophysical elements. There is no person as such; only impersonal states and activities that give rise to an illusory sense of agency and personality exist.

Granted that the view upheld by the Vātsīputrīyas is understandably vague, it nevertheless deserves a closer look for reconsideration. For them, a person is not something utterly different from the aggregates, any more than fire is something utterly different from the fuel in which it arises. We proclaim someone to be a person only when the five aggregates are present, but then a person is not just a concatenation of the constituent elements of the aggregates. Rather, it is something more than that, and its nature is beyond the reach of our communicative capability. It appears that the Vātsīputrīyas are of the view that the aggregates are not the essential properties of a person. Then what can judiciously be said about the essential nature of a person? The Vātsīputrīyas do not intend, on pain of conceding to essentialism, to claim that persons possess their own nature (*svabhāva*) and can be recognized as a separate entity. But they do intend to grant the existence of a lasting element which they call *pudgala*. Their position is comparable to Locke's agnostic affirmation of the existence of substance as something that indeed is real, but something 'I-know-not-what' it really is.

But, the above label of agnosticism on the Vātsīputrīyas would be a misnomer, for they would not say that we do not or cannot know the true nature of a person. Unless one knows the true nature of oneself, one cannot be free from misery—failing the very purpose of the Buddhist soteriology. Moreover, the Vātsīputrīyas say that a person is known to exist by the six consciousnesses (Vasubandhu, 2012, p. 2535).

When our eyes directly perceive the form (*rūpa*, i.e., the colour of the constitutive elements of the body), we cognize the presence of person though the whole of person is not sensually available, thus the person is cognized indirectly (*prativibhāvayati*) in reliance upon the form and in our expression, we claim that the person is known by means of visual consciousness. If one is to make sense of the relationship between the person and the form (colour-shape etc.), one cannot say that person is the same as or different from the form. The same can be said about other modalities of knowing the person. To this situation, the Vātsīputrīyas would call 'the indeterminacy of relationship' between the person and the aggregates.

One may conjecture that the Vātsīputrīyas were looking for a more intelligible account of a human personality which continues life after life till it gets extinguished with the realization of the true nature of reality including its own. And for this purpose, they might have speculated a temporary *svabhāva* of a person. Here it may be born in our mind that even though the *svabhāva* of an individual is continuously associated (so long as the individual is

alive) with the individual, it cannot be eternal (forever), if the individual of which it is the own-nature is itself subject to change. For instance, the nature of consciousness of a human person is of some kind, depending on that one may say that the person has an own-nature of that kind. However, since the character of consciousness is subject to change every moment, it is plausible to say that each subsequent life-stage of a person has its own-nature which perishes with the takeover of the next person-stage. Due to a minimal difference, the two subsequent person-stages are phenomenally indistinguishable. But, after a while, the change becomes noticeable and thereby expressible. The Vātsīputrīyas' inexplicability thesis could be a pronouncement of the fact that a changing personality lacks any static feature on account of which a person can be defined once and for all. But, then in what significant sense their concept of person differs from that of Vasubandhu's?

Vasubandhu's account of person can appropriately be called a reductionist view since not only he categorically refutes the Vātsīputrīyas' view of person but also argues for the reduction of persons to their aggregates. Ultimately there are no persons, contends Vasubandhu, because they do not possess essential natures of their own (*svabhāva*) on the basis of which they can be distinctively known. The essential nature of an entity is something which is always present in the entity and is not the effect of causes and conditions beyond itself. Since persons do not possess anything that is not causally conditioned, they cannot be assumed to be entities having independent existence apart from the five aggregates. Indeed, the fact of dependence of the concept of self or person on the five aggregates is acknowledged by one and all Buddhists. Hence, the reductionist reading appears to be irresistible.

After the refutation of the Vātsīputrīyas' view, Vasubandhu, in a brief manner targets the Mādhyamika Buddhist Nāgārjuna's account of person (Vasubandhu, 2012, p. 2556). Since the latter declares the emptiness (*svabhāvaśūnytā*) of every factor (*dharma*), even the existence of the aggregates cannot be ascertained in his theory, let alone the observation of the person dependent on them. Nāgārjuna's view is considered annihilationist view and thus Vasubandhu seeks to place his own view, true to the teachings of the Buddha, as the middle path between the eternalists and the annihilationist account of the person.

Criteria for Identifying Persons and Personal Identity

If we try to classify the talk of person in the whole Buddhist tradition, we may consider the three cases: a person apprehended with respect to its location (*āśraya-prajñapta-pudgala*), a person apprehended with respect to transition (*saṃkrama-prajñapt-pudgala*), moving from one life to the other, and a person perceived in relation to cessation—*nirvāṇa* (*nirodha-prajñapta-pudgala*) (Priestley L. C., 1999). It is however difficult to see if one can form a non-heterogeneous conception of person out of these three cases. But so far as the identification of a phenomenal existence of person is concerned, there is a common

indication towards the five aggregates. An insight can be drawn from the instances of the recollection of previous births described in the *Brahmajāla-Sutta* where Buddha recollects his past life: 'Then I had such a name (*nāma*), belonged to such a clan (*gotta*), had such an appearance (*vaṇṇa*), such was my food (*āhāra*), such were my experiences of pleasure and pain (*sukhadukkhapaṭisaṁvedanā*), such my span of life (*āyu*). Passing away thence, I re-arose there. There too I had such a name, belonged to such a clan, had such an appearance; such was my food, such my experience of pleasure and pain, such my span of life' (Brahmajāla Sutta, 2010). The usage of the first-person pronoun shows that the recollection is of the same person who has undergone the previous existences. Interestingly, the *Sutta* involves the analysis of 62 wrong views which lead one to form a perverted conception of reality. It is said that the recollection of the above kind leads one to think that all the lives belonged to the same person and therefore the person must be essentially an unchanging substance (*sassatavāda*=eternalism). But as a matter of fact, nothing remains unchanged. What is therefore the Buddhist account of the claim that the person at the life-stage of 40 is the same person who was born 40 years ago?

The Buddhists believe that the (phenomenal) person is a psycho-physical organism. Therefore, the criteria available to us for person-identification are a person's body and his or her psychological characteristics. Moreover, the Buddhists do not consider a person in bits and pieces, but take it as a whole. It implies that the aggregation of all the five factors in one unit is necessary as well as sufficient condition for naming something person. Thus, bodily and psychological features together should be considered to constitute sufficient criteria for identifying a person. It is conspicuous that, in Buddhism, there seems to be no sharp demarcation between these two features. A person is a whole organism with an outer physical appearance and an inner psychological constitution.

While both bodily and psychological features are in continual change in the life of a person, the nature of this change is by no means arbitrary. Rather, every perceptible or imperceptible change in every sphere follows 'the Causal Principle' (Kalupahana, 1975, p. 120): (1) the physical (inorganic) world (*utu-niyāma*), (2) the physical (organic) world (*bīja-niyāma*), (3) the sphere of thought or mental life (*citta-niyāma*), (4) the social and moral sphere (*kamma-niyāma*), and (5) the higher spiritual life (*dhamma-niyama*). These, according to Buddhism, are the existence and persistence conditions for every phenomenon in the world. Any natural change takes place under these laws.

The *utu* (Sanskrit, *ṛtu*) law is the fixed process that determines the ordered succession of the seasonal changes, which in turn seem to be regulating the natural life of organisms. For instance, trees, creepers, grasses etc. bring forth flowers and bear fruits according to seasonal changes. Thus, for a Buddhist, the seasonal changes are not caused by some celestial or divine power; rather they are naturally fixed processes. However, the basal generating and growing power of the plant kingdom is inherent in the seeds (*bīja*). Seeds

sprout, grow, and ripe according to their potency and climatic conditions. These two laws, namely, *utu* and *bīja*, therefore are the basic determining factors of observable physiological changes. The *citta-niyama* pertains to the functioning of the mind, the process of cognition, and mental responses to stimuli. According to the karmic laws or moral order, meritorious acts yield favourable results while evil acts culminate in misery. What determines an act as meritorious or evil is volition (*cetanā*) which instigates our deeds, speech, and thoughts. Volition is the act of willing through which one deliberates and decides before adopting a course of action; hence, it is the main cause that colours all the rest. And, therefore, the merit of an act is decided on the basis of the underlying volition. The *dhamma-niyama* is that which determines the relationship and interdependence of every phenomenon. It is also called *pratītyasmutpāda* which is formulated as: When that exists, this comes to be. From the arising of that, this arises. When that does not exist, this does not come to be. When that ceases, then this ceases to be.

Now, coming back to the issue of our discussion, when we say that a one-year-old child and a subsequent forty-year-old man are one and the same person, it implies that they are in the same lineage of different life-stages with orderly psychical changes and physiological replenishment. And these changes are conditioned by the laws above mentioned. One stage of a person's life is causally connected with its preceding as well as succeeding stages. The Vātsīputrīyas would find it rather convenient to explain since they emphasize the existence of *pudgala* as a unifying principle of the factors of personality. Vasubandhu, on the other hand, would say that person is a mere appellation which is used for the sake of referential convenience. Both, the Vātsīputrīyas and Vasubandhu, claim that there is an underlying principle which provides the ultimate basis for any frame of reference. In the case of the continuity of personal life, *pudgala* is the basis for the former and the underlying consciousness is the basis for the latter. The Mādhyamika thinkers attach only practical significance to any conventional conceptualization.

I would like to conclude with a brief discussion on the apparent primacy of psychological criterion. As remarked earlier, the Buddhists do not seem to make a strict separation between mental and physical. There are however examples where we see that some kind of primacy is attached to the psychological criterion. For instance, in a story (Ganeri, 2004, p. 74) from the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (attributed to the 2nd c. AD *śunyavāda* propounder Nāgārjuna), two demons dispute over the ownership of a corpse at a place. Both ask a person, who happens to be there before the demons arrive, to speak the truth. Fearing his death in either way, he resorts to telling the truth which goes against the wish of a demon. The lost demon angrily tears off his hand. The winning demon takes the hand of the corpse and fits it to the person. Gradually all the parts of the person's body are substituted by the limbs of the corpse. The demons leave after devouring parts of his original body. The unfortunate person perplexedly wonders if he has a body at all. He also expresses concern

over his survival and well-being.

The moral of this story appears favouring the primacy of psychological continuity. Although the original body is absent, the person is supposedly able to recall the experiences of the devoured body. But, suppose an acquaintance of the dead person meets this person who is recreated out of the limbs of the dead, without knowing that that person is no more. He would be easily mistaken by the appearance of the body. He may wonder if the person has met with drastic dispositional changes, but he would hardly believe that the person is no more. Even though the story depicts the primacy of psychological criterion, it hardly resolves the complicacy in identification (Tewari, 2007, pp. 113-114). The story also appears to be smacking of dualism: the (subtle) five aggregates and the gross body. The Vātsīputrīyas would conveniently say that the person survives bodily discontinuity since they believe in the temporary existence of persons not reducible to the five aggregates. For the other Buddhists, the problem seems rather perplexing since they identify persons with the five aggregates. It is indisputable that the relation of psychological continuity is what ultimately matters for all our intents and purposes. Our initial encounter is always with the physical appearance of a person, and we instantly interact with the physical person on the presumption of sameness of the person on the basis of our previous experiences. But we correct ourselves if we notice any abnormal change in the behavior of a person due to psychological discontinuity, even though the person is biologically continuous with the person prior to psychological abnormality. It would however be interesting to explore the responses of the Buddhist thinkers in relation to the contemporary though-experiments in the discussion on personal identity.

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Majjhima-magga and *Nibbānic Consciousness*: *A Historical Sketch of the Buddha's Wandering for Enlightenment*

Anand Singh*

Asceticism and meditation were supposed to be developed with the beginning of the civilization in the Indian subcontinent. With the rise of population and organized urban life in the period of the Harappa Civilization, the intricacies of life and the afterlife also entangled the minds of human beings. Many of them desired to know the mysteries of life and death and they advanced their mind to develop various types of meditational practices to reach a particular stage of psychological state or higher end of knowledge. They invented different methods of ascetic practices covering a wide range of body postures, practices, and methods. Such practices led to various types of *Yogic* postures and ways of concentrating with their specific terminology. There are earnest efforts by different ascetic movements to choose and develop a path of consciousness that can exonerate them from the grooves of the melancholic web of ignorance and rebirth. The core value of this religious fermentation was to learn and understand the transient nature of *saṁsāra* which was the source of sorrow and impermanence. These ascetics realized the emptiness of all objects and evolved a mechanism to explore the mystery of this supreme void. Different metaphysical assumptions were developed by them viz., the Buddha emphasized upon *anatta*, impermanence, and suffering emerged from the conception and the Jains endured *Syādvāda* and *Anekāṅtavāda*. These teachings accentuate the ways and means to achieve liberation from the servitude of ignorance and the realization of supreme bliss.[1] The genesis of intellectual thirst and its scheme of values was conceived in such a way that ultimately reflects in their conscious tradition and that end might be realized through meditation, austerities, and psychic upliftment. The excavations of the Harappan sites manifest that the proper education management evolved from schooling to the children, learning physical sciences, craft, mediation, etc., to attain perfection in metaphysical and spiritual learning. John Marshall emphasizes the supremacy of the Harappan Civilization in many fields and accepts its superiority over prehistoric Egypt Mesopotamia or other cultures in Western Asia. In West Asia, the Kings and priests spent lavishly on the construction of magnificent temples for the gods and the palaces and tombs of kings, but their subjects lived in a state of scarcity with minimum infrastructure to survive. In the Harappan Civilization, the best structure is dedicated to all strata of the society. These people had their peculiar aspects

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[1]Anand Singh, 'Mindfulness in Pali Nikāyas: Origin and Incubation', Vidyasagar University Journal of History, Vol.VI, 2017-2018, pp.9-19

of spiritual and religious ideas indigenously developed and exhibited in their style of architecture and Art.[2] Harappan archaeological evidence shows the presence of edifices showing collegiate buildings and residences of priests. A large open space and courtyard referred to as a college lies to the east of the Great Bath. The Collegiate Building as a single architectural unit, was situated across Main Street to the west and must have been of extraordinary importance. It measures approximately 70.3 meters long and 23.9 meters wide. On his right, a wide doorway opens to a large court with open-air space and in front of it, exists a structure of row of living rooms with an audience chamber. It might be built for the head of the institution. On the left side, the two doorways led to a smaller court having several rooms, three verandas, and two staircases that leads to the roof and upper floor. It may be the residence of the higher hierarchy of priests or a college for them.[3] The southern portion of the remains of Mohenjodaro has a huge structure named as the assembly hall. It has a double row of square columns and lines of bricks paved on the floor. In Buddhist *vihāras* or Brāhmanical *āṣramas*, monks or students often sit in arranged order on the floor and these rows of bricks may also have been used to define the place where people should be seated.[4] The Harappan people ushered in fundamentals of educational infrastructure, means, and ways of knowledge with the holistic aspirations to live happily and to investigate and command divine and supernatural powers.

The Harappans are considered to be originators of some of the ideological and spiritual ideas i.e., metempsychosis, episteme endurance, ascetic and meditative traditions, etc. It was not only the physical postures and austerities shown in their sculptures but visibility of cognitive thoughts and consciousness are also well represented. Some of the impressions found on the seals and sculptures show the existence of some kind of meditative practice. It sets a standard design of visualization, a sagacious outlook, and a perspective in which the material and the ethical, the corporeal and mystical, and the perpetual and perishable constituents of life were undoubtedly regulated and firmly segregated.

Tapas as an ascetic practice of body mortification, penance, and austerities could be directly related to the Harappan spiritual tradition. The limited representation of it on the Harappan seals and sculptures suggests that it was contemplative, always voluntary, and self-imposed asceticism. The ideas that became the main constituent of *tapas* in later traditions i.e., seclusion or isolation, silence, fasting, and *brahmacarya* or celibacy might have been prevalent in the Harappan Civilization. Ramaprasad Chanda was the first scholar

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[2]John Marshall, *Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilization, Being an Official Account of Archaeological Excavations at Mohenjodaro Carried out by the Government of India Between the Years 1922 - 27*, Delhi: Indological Book House, 1931, vol.1, pp. v-viii.

[3]E.J.H Mackay, *Early Indus Civilizations*, London: Luzac and Co., 1948, p. 41; G. L. Possehl, *The Indus Civilization: A Contemporary Perspective*, New Delhi: Vistar Publication, 2003, pp.192-93.

[4]J.M. Kenoyer, *Ancient Cities of the Indus Valley Civilization*, New York: Oxford University Press and American Institute of Pakistan Studies, 1998, p. 62.

who proposed that Yoga was first conceived and developed in the Harappan Civilization. The cross-legged deity represented on seal no. 420 from Mohenjodaro has half-closed eyes, neither fully open nor completely closed. He is looking towards the tip of his nose which is an indication of meditative posture. He says that for common people, it is a distant possibility to keep their eyes fixed for a long unless concentrated on some object. The tip of the nose is the nearest point for meditative concentration. Therefore, in most of the literary references related to Yoga, it is recommended that the eyes of the Yogi engaged in meditation should be fixed on the tip of the nose. The stone head of the priest from Mohenjodaro had some resemblance to a Yogi because his eye posture is like an ascetic. Even this tradition was continued in later Harappan cultures of the Chalcolithic period and it was later adopted by both Sramanic and non-sramanic religions. Their references could be found as the *Yatis* of the *Ṛgveda*, the *Vrātyas* of the *Atharvaveda*, and the characteristics of meditation like nasal gazing are often discussed in the texts of later traditions including Brahmanism, Jainism, and Buddhism. The *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Ādipurāṇa* describe a Yogi as someone who sits cross-legged and contemplates at the tip of his nose.[5] Mercia Eliade endorses his view while examining Yoga posture in the depiction of the Mohenjodaro seal. He says that it was not only physical posturing but mental discipline and meditation could also be alluded to by the Harappan people.[6] He accepts that the Keśī of the *Ṛgveda* resembles the ascetic who earned supernatural powers through his asceticism. His higher state of consciousness/*siddhis* could be developed by engaging in *dhyāna* and *samādhi*.[7] Eliade compares the Yoga of Patanjali with the mystical powers of Keśī. The ecstasy realized by Keśī was not a Shamanistic exhilaration but may be the type of absorption developed by the Jains and Buddhists. Ramprasad Chanda's idea of the Yogi of Mohenjodaro inspired Jhon Marshal to hypothesize the Yogi as Paśupati. His view was accepted for many decades but later challenged on many grounds. The sitting posture of the Yogi was also examined and found that he was not sitting in the *padamāsana* but in a different *āsana* posture. John Marshall propounded the proto-Śiva hypothesis that the Yogi represented on Seal no.420 looked divine because he wore a headdress; he looked mythical because he had three faces; sitting in the Yogic posture and Śiva of later phase used to sit in the same posture; The three horn-like headdress can be representative of *triṣula* (trident); Śiva was representative of animals as this Yogi was; and the seal may be ithyphallic.[8] McEvilley contests Śiva's hypothesis of Marshall and argues that Hindu iconography does not represent Śiva in the

[5]Ramaprasad Chanda, 'Survival of the Prehistoric Civilization of the Indus Valley' *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, no.41, Calcutta: ASI, 1929, p.25 (The *Ādipurāṇa* (XXI.62) and the *Bhagvad Gītā* (XI.13) mentions various qualities of meditative posturing; John Marshal identifies this seal as proto Siva, Marshal, *Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilization*, vol.1, 1931, pp.52-54).

[6]Mercia Eliade, *Yoga, Immortality and Freedom*, New York: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Foundation, Vol. 56, 1956, p.355.

[7]Ibid., p.402

[8]Marshall, *Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Civilization*, vol. I,p.54; III. pl. XCVIII.

horned headdress. The bull is associated with both Śiva and the Buddha. The Buddha is fondly called the bull among the Śākyas. The tripartite headdress resembles the Buddhist *triṣula* depicted at Sāncī. Buddhism and Śaivism both symbolize the deer throne. Even the animals represented on Mohenjodaro seal are very much part of the Jain and Buddhist iconography. He further contemplates that Marshall's Śiva argument was based on only one seal but many other seals tell different stories. Four such representations from Mohenjodaro and two from Harappa differ from each other in many dimensions i.e. horns missing in many illustrations, one flanked by serpents, the beasts as the attendants in only one seal, etc., but the posture of *āsana* is common in all representations.[9] Doris Srinivasan says the animals represented on Seal No. 420 were wild. The Paśupati/Rudra of *Ṛgveda* and the *Atharvaveda* do not guard the interest of the wild beasts. The *Atharvaveda* emphasizes that Rudra protects the domestic animals for the propitiation of agriculture and sacrifice. The identification of the Yogi seal with proto-Śiva is not subscribed because of the above observations but also because of other characteristics like facial features, headdress, etc.[10] Stella Kramrisch says that the bovine represents the power and can be manifested by the horn/headdress and the Yogic power is well manifested by his posture.[11]The Yogi seems to be the divinity related to the fertility cult that protects the interests of humans, animals, and plants. He was an anthropomorphic representation maintaining the cosmos of the nature-man-spirit complex in the true sense.

In the later Vedic age, several such traditions and practices are known. Benimadhab Barua argues that Ājīvikas were the first who imbibed the contemplative traditions developed in the Harappan Civilization which has abundant rituals magic, sexuality, and physical austerities. Makkhaliputta Gośāla was a conventional follower of the old tradition. Both Mahāvīra and the Buddha were the reformers of the old ascetic tradition who recommended celibacy and non-ritualistic contemplation.[12] The *Munis* in the *Ṛgveda* were representative of the ascetic class who were opposed to sacrificial rituals and most of them did not follow the sacred rituals developed for Indra.[13] The *Keśin Sūkta* of the *Ṛgveda* gives vital evidence about the method of consciousness, practices, and their output. The hero of this hymn was not a Vedic Āryan but a long-haired Harappan ascetic called *Muni*. He was represented as the possessor of immense mystical power because of his deep meditative skills. The

[9]Thomas McEvilley, 'An Archaeology of Yoga' *Anthropology and Aesthetics*, 1981, no.1, pp.46-47.

[10]Doris Srinivasan, 'Unhinging Siva from the Indus Civilization' *The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 1984, no.1, p.82

[11]Stella Kramrisch, *The Presence of Siva*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981, p.14

[12]Benimadhab Barua, 'The Ajivikas, A Short History of Their Religion and Philosophy' *Journal of the Department of Letters,* vol.2, 1920, p.21 (The *Dīgha Nikāya* mentions who practices extreme austerities like sitting in posture 'squatters on heel' plucking their hair. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III.37-56)

[13]*Ṛgveda*, II.12.5

Ṛgveda[14] says:

- ❍ The long-haired one carries within himself fire and poison and both heaven and earth.

- ❍ To look at him is like seeing heavenly brightness in its fullness. He is said to be light itself.

- ❍ The sages, girdled with the wind, are clad in dust of yellow hue.

- ❍ They follow the path of the wind when the gods have penetrated them.

Siddhārtha as a wanderer met with several ascetics who mastered different kinds of ascetic traditions and practices. During the age of the Buddha, many such practices have been practiced by Śramaṇic traditions. In the *Brahmajāla Sutta*, the Buddha summarised all existing traditions during his time. While delivering dialogue on wanderers (*paribbājakakathā*) to Suppiya and his disciple Brahmadatta, he elucidated on the different kinds of views existing among the Indic ascetic traditions. Some of the important views were categorized under the wider umbrella of *pubbantakappika* (speculation about the past); *sassatavāda* (eternalism); *ekaccasassatavāda* (partial eternalism); *antānantavāda* (finite and infinity of the world); *amarāvikkhepavāda* (endless equivocation); *adhiccasamuppannavāda* (fortuitous organization); *aparantakappika* (speculation about future); *saññivāda* (percipient immortality); *asaññṣivāda* (non-percipient immortality); *nevasaññā-nasňñivāda* (neither percipient nor percipient); *ucchedavāda* (annihilationism); *diṭṭhidhammānibbānavāda* (doctrine of *nibbāna* have and now); *paritassitavipphandits* (agitation and vacillation); *phassapaccayavara* (conditioned by contact).[15] The *Sutta* provided a fair idea that the Buddha examined different types of thoughts existing during his time but he did not accept the core values of any of such beliefs and chose the path of *majjhima-magga*. The *Samaññaphala Sutta* informs when on request of royal physician Jīvaka, King Ajātaśatru went to meet the Buddha, he told him about his meeting with six great teachers of his time viz., Puraṇa Kassapa, Makkhaliputta Gośāla, Ajita Keśakamblī, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sañjay Belaṭṭhaputta, and Nigaṇṭha Nātaputta.[16] It also shows the existence of diverse views and thoughts in the age of the Buddha.

The origin of the practice of meditation and its fructification in Buddhism is quite debatable. It is a quite contentious issue in Buddhism to know how the Buddha developed the meditational practices that led to the realization of the *Nibbāna*. Was it his invention or did he take inspiration from existing thoughts and develop it with his innovations? The historical examination of the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta* and other *suttas* give fair ideas about

[14]Ibid., X.136

[15]*Dīgha Nikāya*, I.70

[16]Maurice Walshe, *The Long Discourses of the Buddha, A Translation of the Dīgha Nikāya*, Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2012, pp.91-92

meditation practices that the Buddha might have evolved with his own ingenious as well as interactions with his forerunners and contemporaries. The *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* deliberates his quest for *Nibbāna* and meetings with the ascetics of different traditions. He narrated his wanderings to a group of monks at Rammaka's place near Jetavana. The Buddha told them about the cause that led him to renounce home, meeting with two great ascetics, attainment of bodhi, his preaching on request of the Devas, meeting with Ājīvika monk Upaka, and finally, his first sermon to the *pañcavaggiyas* at Sārnāth, etc.[17] However, the Buddha rediscovered and institutionalized meditation as a core Buddhist practice with his certain inventions. In his six years of wanderings from *mahābhiniṣkramana* to *nibbāna*, the Buddha interacted with several ascetics and imbibed many of their ideas. Ālāra Kalāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta met Siddhārtha at Vaiśālī and Uruvelā respectively. It is believed that the teachings of the 'sphere of nothingness (Ākiñcaññayatana)' and 'neither consciousness nor unconsciousness (*nevasaññānasaññāyatana*)' are imparted by them respectively.[18] Louis de La Vallé Poussin examined the origin and evolution of Buddhist meditation practices and argued that the Buddha met with Ālāra Kalāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. Both canonical and non-canonical sources inform that several features of Buddhism were borrowed from non-Buddhist traditions which were already existing in the Ganga valley at the time of the Buddha. Such cultural interactions and religious exchanges were not new in the Indian tradition.[19] André Bareau says that the Buddha did not interact with these two teachers. The *Mahiśāśaka Vinaya* did not inform the conversations between these two teachers and Siddhārtha. The Buddha's intent to teach them does not show that he had an early encounter with them.[20] Johannes Bronkhorst endorses Bareau's argument that the *Mahiśāśaka Vinaya* informs that the Buddha decided to teach Ālāra Kalāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta just after attainment of *Nibbāna* but does not inform that both the ascetics were his teachers. Originally this idea was not part of Buddhist tradition but incorporated later when the Buddha thought to teach them his newly discovered doctrine.[21] A. Foucher also raised doubts about many facets of the biographical sketch of the Buddha and says that incidents like Siddhārtha's meeting with Ālāra Kalāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta have been juxtaposed in many canonical and non-canonical literature. So, it is difficult to ascertain

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[17] Jonathan S. Walters, 'Four Approaches to the "Sermon of the Noble Quest" (Ariyapariyesana Sutta)', *History of Religions*, 1999, Vol.38, No.3, p. p.250

[18] Alexander Wynne, *The Origin of Buddhist Meditation*, London: Routledge, 2007, p.8

[19] Louis de La Vallé Poussin, *The Way to Nirvana: Six Lectures on Ancient Buddhism from Origin to the Saka Era*, Louvaine: Universite Catholquede Louvain, 1917, p.163

[20] André Bareau, *Recherches sur la biographic du Buddha dens les Sutrapitaka et les Vinayapitaka anciens I: se la quéte de leveila la conversion de Sariputra et de Maudgalayana*, Paris: E'cole trancaise d' Extreme-orient, 1963, pp.20-21, 263

[21] Johannes Bronkhorst, *The Two Traditions of Meditations in Ancient India*, New Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, 1993, pp.86-87

the truth.[22] But such arguments are based on the *Mahiśāśaka Vinaya* and other texts of later origin. The Pāli *Vinaya* and *Suttas* endorse the view that Siddhārtha met both the ascetics and learnt many meditation techniques.

The study of Pāli *Suttas* corroborates the idea that the Buddha interacted with Ālāra Kalāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta before the attainment of *Nibbāna*. The *Ariyapariyesana Sutta* says that Siddhārtha received teaching of the 'sphere of nothingness' and mastered it. Kalāma acknowledged his scholarship and regarded him as a great scholar.[23] The erudition of Ālāra Kalāma as a great thinker has also been acknowledged in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*.[24] It informs about Pukkusa, a follower of Ālāra Kalāma and citizen of the Malla *janapada* became a disciple of the Buddha. He praised that Ālāra practiced great meditation as once he was meditating in a courtyard and he neither saw nor heard the noise of five hundred bullock carts passing by him though he was awake and conscious. It may be assumed that the Buddha may have adopted some of his practices of mindfulness and discarded the rest of his ideas. Malalasekera says that the Ālara's teaching of the *Akiñcaññāyatana* was later developed by the Buddha as the first three stages of *jhāna* to attain enlightenment.[25] After renouncing Ālāra, Siddhārtha moved towards Vaiśalī and met another teacher Uddaka Rāmaputta who taught him the doctrine of 'neither consciousness nor unconsciousness' Uddaka learned his doctrine from his father Rāma. The Buddha recognized his teaching but was not fully satisfied so left him to discover the real truth.[26] The *Pāsādika Sutta* informs that the Buddha informs Cuṇḍa about knowledge attained by Rāmaputta which was like the blade of the sharpened razor but not comparable to its edge.[27] The Buddha had high regard for Rāmaputta and considered teaching him after getting his enlightenment but he was no more.[28] Ālāra was an ascetic who developed his teachings but Uddaka received teaching in succession from his father.[29] There is no confusion in Pāli literature about the meeting of Siddhārtha with the two teachers and their meditational acumen. How their teachings influenced the Buddha became a debate but both had some impact on the Buddha and it is somehow accepted that Uddaka's preaching of 'neither consciousness nor unconsciousness' corresponds to the fourth *jhāna* mentioned in the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta*. Thomas examines that canonical literature does not explain knowledge shared by Ālāra and Rāmaputta to Siddhārtha. Only the *Aṭṭhakathās* give some connection to the

[22]A. Foucher, *The Life of the Buddha according to the Ancient Texts and Monuments of India*, trans. Simone Brangier Boas, Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1963, p.96

[23]*Majjhima Nikāya*, I.163-65

[24]*Dīgha Nikāya*, II .130, *Viśuddhimagga*, V.330

[25]G P Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names*, Delhi: Motilal Banarasidas, Vol.1, 2007, pp.296-97.

[26]*Majjhima Nikāya*, I 165ff

[27]*Dīgha Nikāya*, III 126-27.

[28]*Vinaya Pitaka*, I 7

[29]Peter Skilling, 'Uddaka Rāmaputta and Rāma' *Pali Buddhist Review*, vol.VI (2), 1981-82, pp.99-104

Saṅkhya philosophy. Aśvaghoṣa mentions some indistinct relation between the teachings of these two teachers to *Saṅkhya* because only these teachings may be relevant to Buddhism. This is the reason that tenets of early *Saṅkhya* have been mentioned in the *Aṭṭhakathās* and core metaphysical assumptions are left because the Buddha did not find it suitable.[30] After leaving these two teachers, Siddhārtha proceeded towards Uruvelā where the other five ascetics, later known as *pañcavaggiyas* (Kondañña, Bhaddiya, Vappa, Mahānāma, and Assaji) joined him. All of them engaged themselves in severe austerities but their strenuous efforts paid nothing. Siddhārtha decided to leave because self-mortification annoyed the other five who later deserted him and moved to the *migadāya* at Sārnāth.[31] Siddhārtha decided to leave the self-mortification and intentionally chose the path of *majjhima-magga* to be the Buddha.

The Buddha accepts that the origin and antiquity of meditational practice in India are pre-Buddhist. The *Nagara Sutta* of the *Saṁyutta Nikāya* says that the Buddha rediscovered an ancient path just as an awakening person in a forest saw a road that led to an ancient city founded by the men of early ages.[32] It has been accepted that the four *Satipaṭṭhānas* did not exist during the age of Siddhārtha but were rediscovered by the newly Awakened One. Brāhma Sahampati applauded the efforts of the Buddha to rediscover it.[33] It further mentions that *samma sati* was the rediscovery of the ancient path.[34] It is possible that the Buddha's idea was influenced by the non-Vedic Yogic traditions that existed in India since the Harappa Civilization. The Buddha seems to have added some features to give it a new shape. L M Joshi argues that it is difficult to accept that the historic *Munis, Yatis,* and Śramaṇas of Buddhism, Jainism, the *Saṅkhya,* and Yoga or the older *Upaniṣadas* appeared suddenly in the sixth or fifth century BCE. The theory of 'revolt' or 'reaction' and 'reform' within the Vedic Brahamanism is hypothetical. The *Upaniṣadas* themselves informed that non-Vedic, Non-Brahamanical, and non-Āryan stimuli were at work. The archaeological discoveries of Mohenjodaro and Harappa prove that there were ascetics or *Yatis* and *Yogis* in India in the second millennium before Christ.[35] The great *Munis* and enlightened persons of early periods *(pubbakehisammāsamabuddhehi)* may be recognized as the Buddhas of pre-historic ages. The awakened *Munis* and *Yatis* of pre-Upaniṣadic and non-Vedic Śramaṇic traditions are acknowledged as the *Tathāgatas*. It may be argued that all the Buddhas and the

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[30]Edwards J. Thomas, *The Land of the Buddha as Legend and History*, Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2003, pp.229-30.

[31] Anand Singh, *Buddhism at Sārnāth*, New Delhi: Primus Publishers, 2014, pp.2-4

[32]*Saṁyutta Nikāya*, XII. 65

[33]Ibid., V. 167, 178

[34]Ibid., II. 105 (The *Aṅguttara Nikāya* also mentions similar instance that *samma sati* was rediscovered by the Buddha, *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II, 29)

[35]L M Joshi, *Brahamanism, Buddhism and Hinduism: An Essay on the Origins and Interactions*, Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1970, pp.26-28

Pacekkabuddhas accepted in Buddhist tradition may be historical and some mythological features might be added later on. The six Buddhas: Vipassī, Sikhi, Vessabhu, Kakusandha, Konagamana, and Kassapa mentioned in the *Dīgha Nikāya* and the *Saṁyutta Nikāya* were precursors of the Buddha. They are considered to be Śramaṇic teachers whose historicity has been shrouded in mythological legends.[36] The Buddha learned and adopted many of their ideas. The Buddha though learned and well-versed in different traditions and finally evolved his mechanism of *jhāna*. The *Pañcālacaṅda Sutta*[37] mentions that the Buddha was the discoverer of the technique of *jhāna* for attaining *nibbāna*.

 '*Sāmbādhe vata okāsam, avindi bhūri, medhaso yo jhānam, bujjhi buddho patilīna, nissabho munīti*'

 'Truly in the confining place, he found an opening sage of vast wisdom, the Buddha who discovered *jhāna*, the chief bull, withdrawn, the sage.'

Numerous other examples could be cited as examples showing that *jhānas* are the Buddha's own experiments or insights. The interaction with other ascetics could also be instrumental in such kinds of experiments. He experienced the first stage of *jhāna* in his childhood. Once he was participating in the plough festival of the Śākyas and his father Śuddodhana was performing the ceremony. He was sitting under a Jambu tree and experienced his first state of *jhāna* i.e., meditative absorption through concentration which was an unprecedented spiritual experience for him. Then *Saccaka Sutta* informs that Siddhārtha also practices breathless meditation that helps him to control his breath.[38] His enlightenment was so emphatic that he considered himself a universal conqueror. The *Mahāvagga*[39] informs that the Buddha told Upaka-

'*Sabbābhibhū sabbavidū ham asmi sabbesu dhammesu anupalito sabbañjaho taṇhakkhaye vimutto, sayaṁ abhiññāya kam uddesiyyam. na me ācariyo atthi, sadiso me no vijjati, sadevakasmiṁ lokasmiṁ n atthi me paṭipuggalo. ahaṁ hi arahā loke, ahaṁ sattha anuttaro, eko mhi sammṁsambuddho, sītibhūto smi nibbuto. dhammacakkaṁ pavattetuṁ gucchāmi kāsinam puraṁ, andhabhūtasami loksmiṁ āhaṅhi amatadudrabhin ti.*'

 'All-conquering, I have attained all wisdom; undefiled concerning all things; I have given up everything, and liberated through the destruction of craving. Having gained knowledge, whom should I call the teacher? There is no teacher for me; no one is equal to me; in the world of men and devas, no being is like me. I am worthy one in the world; I am the unsurpassed teacher; I am one the absolute Sambuddha, cool and passionless, and have obtained *nibbāna*.'

[36]Ibid.,p.28

[37]*Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I. 48

[38]*Majjhima Nikāya*, V. 246

[39]*Mahāvagga*, I.7

The *Udumbārika Sīhanāda Sutta*[40] says that the Buddha developed self-discipline (*damathāya*), calmness (*samathāya*), salvation (*taranāya*), peace (*parinibbāna*), and liberation (*nibbāna*) not only for himself but for all human beings. The *Saṁyutta Nikāya*[41] says *Nibbāna* as a noble abode (*ariya-vihāra*) or *tathāgata-vihāra*. After taking a bath in the river Nirañjanā, Siddhārtha partook in *Madhu-payas* offered by Sujātā. He proceeded to Bodhagayā and seated himself under the Bodhi tree to contemplate and attain *Nibbāna* on the full moon day of the Vaisākha month of the Indian lunar calendar. During the different watches of the ensuing night, he got enlightenment about recollection of his previous births, then the knowledge of death and birth of beings and extinction of desire that causes successive rebirths. Then, he finally realized *Paticasamuppāda* and examined the cycle of direct and reverse order of twelve links (*Nidāna*).[42] The canonical, as well as post-canonical literature, mention that Māra caused many hindrances to disturb Siddhārtha's meditation and tricked up many alluring and fearful apparitions. He demonstrated swarms of petrifying demons, throwing spears, firing arrows, or hurling boulders at him. With his meditative powers, Siddhārtha removed the web of ignorance to become the Buddha. Perplexing with the reality that Siddhārtha could not be frightened, Māra threw a web of sensual assault on him by sending countless beautiful women with his three beautiful daughters Tṛṣṇā, Rati, and Rāga (thirst, desire, and delight) to seduce Gautama, but to no avail. Siddhārtha triumphed over all the odds and the demon fled. Māra's story differs in different literature and is explained differently i.e. happening before or after the Buddha's *Nibbāna*. It may be truth or later interpolation but certainly, a deliberate occurrence presented by the Buddha before the monks to remind them that the path of enlightenment is strenuous and tedious where one has to grapple with many odds.

The Buddha during his wandering learnt five subtle knowledge i.e., kinds of supernormal power (*iddhividhāñāṇa*); divine ear (listening) (*dibbasotadhātu*); understanding the mind or cognizing others' thoughts (*cetopariyañāṇa/paracittavijānana*); the recollection of past lives (*pubbe nivāsānussatiñāṇa*); and divine eye, or knowledge of passing away and rebirth (*dibbacakkhu/cutupāpātañāṇa*). The Pali texts categorize them as five *abhiññā*s or the intrinsic mental faculties evolved through systematic means of meditation. These five are considered mundane (*lokiya*) and could be developed by the Buddhists as well the non-Buddhist but considered inferior if possessed by a non-Buddhist as such person is still impended with the *āsava*s or defilements viz., *kāmāsava* (sensory pleasure), *bhavāsava* (continued existence), and *avijjāsava* (ignorance). Sometimes *diṭṭhiāsava* (perspective) is added. These are considered supermundane (*lokuttara*) when earned through the path as recommended by the Buddha as it facilitates the *paññā* that leads to *Nibbāna*. For it the methodological means are inherent in vipassanā *bhāvanā*, the

[40]*Dīgha Nikāya*, II.122-23

[41]*Saṁyutta Nikāya*, V.326

[42]E. Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism,* Louvain-Paris: Peeters Press, 1976, pp.16-17.

effective means of eradicating the *āsava*s, and the, *samatha bhāvanā* which produces the *jhāna* states of meditative absorption and the *abhiññā*s.[43] *Āsavakkhayañāṇa* reflects the destruction of the *āsava*s or influential impurities. The four *āsava*s or *doṣa*s are the main causes of attachment to *saṁsāra*, and with the elimination of these defilements comes *arahaṅthood*.[44] *Iddhividhāñāṇa* signifies supernormal power which leads to soteriological accomplishment. It is a phase when a monk has achieved all nine meditative engagements of the form and formless sphere and intends to visualize impermanence through his meditative insight. The instantaneous outcome of systematic meditation is eradicating the five hindrances or the *nīvaraṇa*s- sensual desire (*kāmacchanda*); ill-will (*byāpāda*); sloth and torpor (*thīnamiddha*); anxiety and restlessness (*uddhacca kukkucca*); and doubt (*vicikicchā*), which always encourage unreflective engrossment in the realm of desire. After that, absorption (*appanā*) in the four *jhāna* states possibly leads to the supernormal powers and the other *abhiññā*s. [45] When the mind is concentrated, pure, cleansed, free from defilements, steady, and unperturbed, it leaps towards the attainment of *arahantahood*. *Dibbasotadhātu* is a state of the fourth *jhāna* where a monk cultivates the power of divine listening. It is considered as pure and sublime. With the help of this, a person can listen to sounds of countless frequencies belonging to the divine as well as humans and non-humans. It is an incredible expansion of auditory discernment in both deepness and distance, even without the help of the sense organ.[46] *Cetopariyañāṇa/paracittavijānana* is the ability to read others' minds in their different states.[47] Buddhist literature mentions various types of telepathic frequencies like learning the mind of others (*citta*) and their states (*cetasika*), the primary thoughts (*vitakka*), and the chain of thoughts (*vicārita*) of other beings.[48] The *Aṅguttara-Nikāya* informs four ways of knowing another's mind viz., perceiving external gestures; receiving information from others; hearing the ambiance of thoughts of another what one contemplates; comprehending the mind of another and observing how the mental dispositions are fixed to derive which subsequent thoughts will ascend at the next level.[49] Buddhism recommends different means to examine the claim that a person has earned the ability to read the other's mind or not to avoid any kind of falsification or mistaken claims (*cetasā ceto paricca parivittakam aññāya*).[50] *Pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa* shows knowledge of previous births. The *Jātaka* is an important source where the Buddha speaks about his

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[43]Bradley S. Clough, 'The higher knowledge in the Pāli Nikāyas and Vinaya', *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies,* Vol.33, No.1–2, 2010, pp.410-411

[44]*Majjhima Nikāya*, I.55

[45]*Aṅguttara Nikāya*, V.193,

[46]Ibid., I.79

[47]Ibid., I. 79-80

[48]Ibid., I. 213

[49]Ibid., V.170–171

[50]Ibid., 161–164

previous births. He used *abhiññā* to recall his earlier existence in different destinies. The main theme of the story is *atītavatthu* or the past birth which is narrated on the pretext of the present.[51] *Dibbacakkhu/cutūpapātañāṇa* deals with the knowledge of the death and rebirth of living beings in different destinies. In the *Mahāsīhānāda Sutta*, the Buddha declares that one with a divine eye comprehends each of the five destinies.[52] The inferior or superior status of birth is decided by their deeds. Ones will obtain the fruits of *kamma* due to one's right view. After death and dismantling of their bodies, they will reborn as a person in a celestial world.[53] The means of *arahantahood* is developed as a series of meditational stages by the Buddha and it begins with a simple way to concentrate that moves through different moral and mental means progressively.

The Buddha provides methodology to learn the *Dhamma* through three important means: *pariyatti* i.e. accomplishment of the *Dhamma* and *Vinaya* with the help of the canons and elders,[54] *paṭipatti* i.e. the practice of *Dhamma,* as opposed to mere theoretical knowledge,[55] *paṭivedha* i.e., experiential learning to extinguish defilement and releasing the mind from all sufferings. It signifies the realization of the truth of the *Dhamma*.[56] The Pāli canons were the sources of monastic education and training, which included texts remembered for instructional purposes as well as for performative actions. These textual and experiential learnings guide a monk to learn and embrace the three *vijjās*, an ideal step to the path of monkhood. *The three vijjās* denote the three *abhiññā*s – divine eye, recollection of past lives, and knowledge of the exhaustion of the impure influences. These are also known as the clear visions (*parisuddhañāṇa dassana*) which were experienced by Buddha under the Bodhi tree. The *Verañja Sutta* of the *Aṅguttara-Nikāya*[57] and the *Bhayabherava* and *Mahāsaccaka Sutta*s of the *Majjhima-Nikāya* mention that the Buddha visualized them on his night of awakening by attaining the four *jhāna*s. In the first watch of the night, he experienced many thousands of his previous births, in each case recalling his name, clan, food, pleasure, suffering, and death. It preludes to overcoming ignorance and a cloud of darkness and as a consequence the advent of clear vision. In the second watch, with the support of the pure divine eye, Buddha envisioned the movement of destinies according to their deeds. In the third watch, he absorbed his mind to wipe out of all kinds of defilements

[51] Anand Singh, 'Contextualizing Jātaka Narratives: Symmetry and Consonance in Literary and Visual Traditions' in *Rethinking Buddhism: Text Context Contestation*, ed. Anand Singh, New Delhi: Primus Publishers, 2023, p.66

[52] *Majjhima Nikāya,* I.68

[53] *Dīgha Nikāya*, I.82.

[54] *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, V,205.

[55] *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I.69, V.126.

[56] Ibid., I.22, 44

[57] Ibid., VIII.11

(*āsava*s) and attain the consciousness of the four noble truths.[58] These three pieces of knowledge have been seen as essential to the path to liberation. The *Tevijja- Vacchagotta Sutta* says that the Buddha is not Omniscient (*Sabbaññū*) but one who possesses the three knowledge. He goes on to say that he recollects former lives in all modes and details, and comprehends that beings are inferior, superior, good-looking, unpleasant, kind, and unkind according to their *kamma*. He engrosses in the liberation of mind and insight realized by the higher knowledge of the destruction of the *āsava*s.[59] The *Mahā Assapura Sutta* says that a *bhikkhu* who acquires the three *vijjā*s in the fourth *jhāna* is called a *samaṇa* and a *brāhmaṇa*, an attainer of knowledge, well-versed in sacred learning, a noble person, and an *Arahaṅta*.[60] Both means and methodology were first experienced and evolved by the Buddha and then he imparted it to the monks to learn, meditate, and become *Arahaṅta*. The *arahaṅthood* for the *pañcavaggiyas* at Sārnāth suggests that the learning process, mental faculties, reception of the teachings, and engagement in meditation for every monk were not the same. It depends upon the individual capacity of the monk to learn the process of enlightenment and practice it to get the desired result. The *Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta*[61] informs that Kauṇḍinya became the Sotapatti as soon as he listened to the teachings from the Buddha. After five days of listening to the *Anattalakkhana Sutta*[62], he became *Arahaṅta*. But Assaji and Mahānāma were the last to understand the teachings, and the Buddha had to deliver more elucidations to them when the rest three *bhikkhus* went out on alms round. His first sermon gives a fair idea of how a monk can achieve the highest kind of knowledge. The way is slow, steady, and without any extreme kind of physical austerities. The goal that was put before a *bhikkhu* was to be a wanderer to seek salvation. The *bhikkhu* can go through stages of *Sotapañña, Sakadāgāmī, Anāgāmī* and *Arahaṅta*. An *Arahanta* is a person who has eliminated all the unwholesome roots and after that, he will not take any rebirth in any world. The fetters that attracted him to be in the *saṁsāra* will be extinct forever. It is a stage of final consciousness or *Nibbāna* and after attainment of it, the five aggregates will continue to function with the help of physical vitality. But once the *Arahaṅta* dies and with the disintegration of his physical body, the five aggregates will cease to function and it will end all traces of existence in the phenomenal world and thus total release from the misery of *saṁsāra*. The Buddha himself was an *Arahaṅta* as he was free from all defilements and living without any kind of hatred, delusion, ignorance, greed, and craving.[63] Ānanda states four ways to attain *Nibbāna* i.e. one develops insight headed by tranquillity (*samatha-pubbaṅgamaṁ vipassanāṁ*), one develops serenity preceded by

[58]*Majjhiṁa Nikāya*, I. 22; 248–249

[59]Ibid., I.71

[60]Ibid., I.278

[61]*Saṁyutta Nikāya*, V 420

[62]*Saṁyutta Nikāya*, III 66

[63]*Vinaya Pitaka*, I 8, II 254; *Dīgha Nikāya*, III 10

insight (*vipassanā-pubbaṇgamaṁ samathaṁ*), one inculcate serenity and insight in the gradual way (*samatha-vipassanāṁ yuganaddhaṁ*), and the fourth way is to assimilate the mind with the Dhamma in a way to shed all fetters and inculcate serenity *(dhamma-uddhacca-viggahitaṁ mānasaṁ hoti)*.[64] The Buddhist ideals are very clear about the *arahaṅathhod*. The Buddha visualized, experienced, and interpreted new doctrines while the other *Arahaṅtas* had to follow the teachings of the Buddha and propagate them in all four directions. Siddhārtha was a prince who strived to be the Buddha, the Awakened One to become a torchbearer for this mortal world.

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64   *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, IV 170

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Three Unpublished Jhiuri Type Buddhas from Rangamati, Chattogram, Bangladesh

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Abstract

The discovery of two meditative metal Buddhas in the Rangamati district of Chattogram add knowledge on the Jhiuri School of Art of early-medieval Bengal, reflecting the region's Buddhist heritage. These Buddhas depict Akshobya in an earth-touching gesture, symbolizing firmness in meditation. The article explores the artistic style and idiom of the images as well as their connection to the Jhiuri school. They reveal common features with the Jhiuri hoard discovered in 1927, suggesting a shared artistic tradition. Furthermore, the article discusses the historical context of Buddhist activities in Chattogram and surrounding areas, tracing back to the 7th century CE. Through comparative analysis with dated images from Tetrawan and Bodhgaya, the article proposes a dating for the Rangamati Buddhas no later than the 7th century CE, aligning with the region's early artistic developments.

Keywords: *Akshobhaya, earth-touching gesture, Buddhism, art style, Chattogram, Jhiuri, Bengal, Harikela.*

Several years ago, three metal Buddhist images were unearthed in the Rangamati district of Chattogram division, Bangladesh. One of these sculptures has suffered significant damage, fragmented into several pieces (fig. 1), while the others remain remarkably intact. Standing approximately a foot tall atop pedestals, these sculptures show deities seated on plain cushioned seats, affixed to elongated pedestals. *Bhusparsha-mudra* of the figures identified them as transcendent Buddha Akshobya. The figures sit in *padmasana* on a plain cushion-seat, resting left hand on the lap while s right hand make the earth-touching gesture. This gesture recalls a pivotal moment during Buddha's meditation when he faced attempts by maras to disrupt his focus. However, Buddha remained steadfast, touching the earth to reaffirm his commitment to meditation. The cushion-seat features intricate floral decorations, while the *bhumisparsha-mudra* symbolizes the Buddha's enlightenment under the pipal tree, signifying his triumph over temptation and malevolent forces, notably represented by the demon king Mara.

In the figure 2, Akshobhaya adopts a frontal erect stance with cropped hair and a hemispherical *usnisa*. His monastic robe drapes diagonally across his chest, one end gracefully folded over his left shoulder. The left arm is covered up to the wrist, contrasting with the bare right arm. The lower garment's pleated end elegantly cascades over the

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cushion, a stylistic choice prevalent in various regions such as Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Tibet, Java, and Siam. The elongated earlobes signify the deity's spiritual stature, while three lines on the neck symbolize beauty, following the tradition outlined in sutras. According to sutras, three lines represent the three trainings of conduct, concentration, and wisdom, whereas tantric texts advocate for two lines, symbolizing the paths of sutra and tantra.

Figure 3, though slightly smaller than Figure 2, exhibits similar features. The deity shows same *bhumisparsha-mudra*. Like figure 2, his monastic robe drapes diagonally across the chest, but there's no indication of one end being folded over the left shoulder. The hem of the robe is stitched, displaying three lines compared to the single stitch seen in figure 2.

Regarding the artistic style of these images, it's noteworthy to mention the discovery of the Jhiuri hoard. In 1927, 61 Buddhist metal images were found in Jhiuri[1], near Anwara Police Station in Chattogram (ASIAR 1927-28: 184). Most of these images are now housed in the Indian Museum, Kolkata, while some have been acquired by private collectors and institutions such as the S.K. Saraswati, Buddhist temple and museums like the Los Angeles County Museum. All these images, belonging to the 'Jhiuri School', were primarily discovered from Jhiuri, with additional finds from Raujan, Patia, and Mireshsarai in Chattogram (formerly known as Chittagong). The majority of the altar pieces depict Akshobya in the *bhumisparsha-mudra*, with other images portraying Amitabha, Vairocana, and Bodhisattvas like Avalokiteshvara, Manjushri, and Vasudhara.

The newly discovered images also align with the artistic features of the Jhiuri School. They share common characteristics such as a strictly frontal erect stance, plain cushion-seats, diaphanous monastic robes with thickened edges, closely cropped hair with a hemispherical *usnisa*, etc. The monastic robe drapes diagonally over the chest, with one end depicted as folded over the left shoulder. The left arm is covered up to the wrist, while the right arm remains bare, and the pleated end of the lower garment gracefully rests on the cushion.

The emergence of the School of Art at Jhiuri was not a sudden event. Buddhistic activities had been thriving in Chattogram from ancient times. Since early-medieval period Chattogram and neighboring areas were known as Harikela. The region served as a vibrant center for Mahayana Buddhism. According to Lama Taranatha, there existed a monastery called Pinda-vihara in Chatighabo, Bhamgala. Sarat Chandra Das (1898: 20-28) notes that the renowned tantric Buddhist guru Tila-yogi was born in Chatigaon i.e. Chattogram in the middle of the 10th century CE. Naratopa, the hierarch of Magadha, visited Chatigrama and received vows from Tila-yogi. Following the destruction of Buddhist monasteries in Magadha by invaders, many Buddhists migrated to eastern Bengal and Arakan, where Buddhism continued to flourish in Chattogram, Chattogram Hill Tracts, and Arakan. The Buddhist queen of Chagala-raja (king of Chattogram), a powerful ruler of

Chatigaon, encouraged the king to restore some of the ruined monasteries of Magadha and the Mahabodhi temple at Bodh-Gaya. Pandita Vana-ratna and others from Chatigaon also visited Tibet. Additionally, accounts from Buddhist pilgrims like I-tsing reveal that a monk named Wu-hing spent a year in O-li-ki-lo (Harikela) before heading to Mahabodhi (Bodh-Gaya). Another Chinese monk, Tan-Kwong, arrived in India via the southern sea-route and stayed in A-li-ki-lo (Harikela), receiving much favor from the king during his visit. The antiquity of Chattogram is further evidenced by the discovery of copperplates belonging to Devatideva, Kantideva, and Attakaradeva of early-medieval period (Chowdhury and Chakravarti 2018: 660-670).

Considering the art style, the dating of the Rangamati images should not extend beyond the 7th century CE, despite D.C. Sircar (1977: 111-12) and Debala Mitra (1982: 3) suggesting a 9th-10th century CE date for the Jhiuri images. However, I hold a different view on the dating of Jhiuri images. In support of this perspective, I can reference an image (fig. 4) from Tetrawan, Patna, and two additional images (figs. 5, 6)

Fig. 1: Buddha, Rangamati, Chattogram, Bangladesh
Fig. 2: Akshobya, Rangamati, Chattogram, Bangladesh
**Fig. 3:** Akshobya, Rangamati, Chattogram

Fig. 4: Buddha, Tetrawan, Patna | **Fig. 5:** Buddha, Bodhgaya, Gaya
Fig. 6: Buddha, Bodhgaya, Gaya.

Fig. 7: Akshobya, Jhiuri, Indian Museum Kolkata
Fig. 8: Akshobya, Jhiuri, Indian Museum Kolkata

from Bodhgaya, Gaya, all of which are seated on simple unadorned oval cushions similar to those used in the Rangamati and Jhiuri images (figs. 7, 8). The Tetrawan Buddha is dated to the late 7th century CE, while the other two Gaya Buddhas are dated between the 7th and 8th centuries CE by Frederick M. Asher (1980: 44). The Jhiuri images, along with

the aforementioned Rangamati images, share stylistic and executional similarities with the Tetrawan and Bodhgaya images.

However, it's important to consider that the earliest dated metal works in Eastern India were found in Deulbadi, Cumilla, Bangladesh. It is the Sarvani image with gold plating by Queen Prabhavati, the second wife of King Deva Khadga of the Khadga dynasty. The Khadga kings ruled Samatata, present-day Cumilla-Noakhali region of Bangladesh, in the 7th century CE. Hence, the image should be dated earlier than the time of gilding. As artistic activities began in the heart of Samatata in the 7th century CE, it is reasonable to apply this dating to Chattogram, ancient Harikela as well, a place not much farther from Cumilla. And Harikela was sometimes under the domain of Samatata.

Conclusion:

The discovery of three metal Buddhist images in Rangamati district sheds light on the Jhiuri School of Art and Chattogram's Buddhist heritage. These sculptures, depicting Akshobya, suggest a shared artistic tradition with the Jhiuri hoard, dating back to the 7th century CE. The findings highlight Chattogram's significance in early-medieval Bengal's Buddhist art and culture.

Notes and References

Locally known as Jhiuri and I kept it unaltered, the spelling Jhewari is using since the first report of the treasure trove was published in *ASIAR* (1927-28).

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BOOK REVIEW

C S Upasak, *Dictionary of Early Buddhist Monastic Terms,* Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, Nalanda, 2010 (Second Edition).

Reviewer: Sanghasen Singh*

It is indeed an honor to be asked to write a Review of Professor C.S. Upasak's *Dictionary of Early Buddhist Monastic Terms.* Professor Upasak is hailed as one of the topmost, scholars of Pali and Buddhist Studies of contemporary India. Hence, a few lines towards that end. At the outset I express my sense of almost appreciation on his compilation of Buddhist monastic terms and in defining them with precision and clarity. Professor Upasak is generally known for his writings on topics related with Ancient Indian History, and Paleographical and Epigraphical Sciences, but at the same time, one finds him authoring treatises on Pali literature and Buddhist Studies as well. The *Dictionary of Early Buddhist Monastic Terms,* which has been republished as second edition, is in itself a matter of great joy and satisfaction. I, therefore, heartily offer him my sādhuvāda (loud and clear-throated acclaim), though he is no more to favorably respond it.

Another point that impels me to express my sense of appreciation, time and again, is the fact that Professor Upasak thought of writing treatise on one of the means of understanding and comprehending literary and ecclesiastical passage and at the same time providing a helping hand to linguistically deficient folk, and content wise less-equipped scholars and students, instead of producing himself an independent and/or academic piece of work in the field of Buddhist learning and love. In fact, preparing a dictionary entails a sustained and strenuous hard work, the nature of work and commitment being highly technical and time-absorbing. Professor Upasak did it perhaps joyfully and succeeded in producing a brilliant work.

Professor Upasak named his work on Vinayic literature a dictionary, though one may might be inclined to name it a lexicon on a glossary as well. Since Professor Upasak was very particular in choice of words, terms and phrase, he did the fittest one as per the requirement. Seeing the nature of work, one is restrained to say that it contains not only the meaning of the terms, but also their detailed definition, and expositions. In this sense and content, it may not be far-fetched to call it a dictionary of monastic terms with their detailed expositions, that is to say, a dictionary of monastic terminological expositions, or a *bhāṣā-kośa* (Sk. *bhāṣya-kośa*) to use Pali term. Here, it may be pointed out, by way of parenthesis, that English has several words to express the idea of a dictionary including

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theories and its meanings and expositions as partly mentioned earlier, but Pali (and for that matter Sanskrit as well) has only the word and that happens to be Kośa generally written with palatal sibilant.

The basic meaning of the word `Kośa' lies in the ideas of collection or store of any usable material. Them the word `Kośa' (with cerebral sibilant) stands for even a treasure of coins and other valuables. This deficiency of language lies in the fact that the meaning of a dictionary in Pali can only be given, if the word 'Sadda' (Sk. Śabda) is added to the word and the compounded to make it 'sadda-kośa' or more expressly 'saddattha-kośa' (Sk. Śabdārtha-kośa). The word 'sadda-kośa' (Sk. Śabda-kośa) has acquired so wide currently and acceptance that the word 'attha' is dropped invisibly. Thus, it automatically becomes, a majjhima-pada- lopī samāsa (i.e. a middle-word-dropping compound).

While evaluating the task accomplished by Professor Upasak, one is struck with the fact of having lesser relevance monastic terms as far as study of Pali workds is concerned. It may be true to some extent but it is not so all the time. The occurrence of monastic terms even in Sutta and Abhidhamma treatises, is a very common feature. Secondly, apart from the Buddhist recluses, even the Buddhist laity has to grapple with many common monastic terms and has to handle them accordingly. So much so that even the recluses of heretic origins had also to face such problems and had to be prepared to deal with such terms.

While compiling the monastic terms Professor Upasak had perhaps knowingly skipped over many words, which were of little significance. In this context, while all the ten points (dasavatthūni) find place in the dictionary under discussion, the Devadatta's five point seems to have been side-lined. It appears, at certain occasions, the learned author's disdainful attitude towards some terms, due to perhaps obvious reasons, might have been instrumental in their skipping.

It appears, the author was in a haste to complete the task within the stipulated time schedule, set forth by the author himself. This fact, it seems, led to cutting short the expositions of certain terms. Had there been sufficient time at his disposal, he would have explained the word compounded together in certain terms by way of dissolving, then word by word and supplying their exact derivatives as well. For instance, the first term cited in the dictionary under discussion happens to be 'aṃsabaddhaka' which stands for a string tied to one of the shoulders of the monk in order to hang the bowl (patta) with. Here, it would have been easier for a reader to understand and comprehend, had the term would have been explained in terms of 'Aṃsa' (shoulder)+ 'baddhaka' (string). Further, the word 'Baddhaka' in terms of the verbal root 'bandh+kta suffix+kan', meaning thereby a string. A number of such words invites the attention of scholar in this regard.

Each term, defined and discussed here, has its own history and social relevance. That have been partly brought out by Professor Upasak in his pioneering work. For

instance, '*sapadāna-cārikā'* may be cited in the respect. The learned author rightly defines it as `uninterrupted begging'. In fact, this simple and precise definition carries with it a host of hidden and suggestive meanings. The word *sapadāna* and *cārikā* are compounded here. The word '*sapadāna'* though a compound in itself stands for *sa(sva) + padāna* (Sk. *Sva +padānaṃ*) i.e. with one's own fact. Thus, the whole compound means 'a walk with one's own feet'. With the passage of time, the term acquired an extended meaning in the sense that it came to be used for begging uninterruptedly from house to house. In this '*sapadāna'* exercise the monk is not supposed to skip over any house in between even if he is refused alms, at the door of a house or houses. The term '*sapadāna cārikā'* has a loaded meaning too. It means that the monk should not discriminate households on the basis of economic and social disparities. He should not apt out frequent households of rich and wealthy households in anticipation of tasty and meritorious alms food. Thus, the term '*sapadāna cārikā'* shows the social and economic disparities as found and practiced in the society during those days. As *sapadāna cārikā* is not easy to practice and therefore, it was termed as one of the *'dhūtaṅgas'*(austerities).

There is another dimension of the usage of the term '*sapadāna'*. It is evident in the thirty third (33rd) *Sekhiya Dhamma* of the *Bhikkhu Pātimokkha*. It reads as follows – '*Sapadānaṃ piṇḍapātaṃ bhuṃjissāmī ti sikkhā karaṇīyā ti'*. Here '*sapadāna'* practice refers to taking alms food from the begging bowl in a row uninterruptedly. He should not be guided by taste and resort to the method of pick and choose in respect of the items as placed in this own bowl.

Professor Upasak's *Dictionary of Monastic Terms*, serves as the guide book for the present-day scholars. The task is heavy for them, if they wish to follow the footsteps of Professor Upasak.

 The work is indeed. a pioneering one as indicated above, the need for a fresh edition speaks volumes about its utility and worth. I therefore, close my words with a heartly sādhuvāda to all those who are instrumental for its New Edition.

Editors Note: This is the last book's review which was done by
Prof. Sanghasen Singh, who passed away on 27.03.2024 (evening).

OBITUARY

Prof. Sanghasen Singh (O3.07.1933-27.03.2024)

Prof. Sanghasen Singh was born on 3rd July 1933 at Shambhuchak, District Allahabad (U.P.). He passed B.A., M.A. in Sanskrit from Allahabad University, Allahabad. After that he did M.A. in Pali from Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, Nalanda in 1957. He joined as Lecturer in Sanskrit and Pali in the Department of Buddhist Studies in 1959 and served the department as Reader and Professor. He retired from his service in 1998. He was invited to deliver the lectures on Buddhism and Buddhist Studies at the University of Tokyo, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore.

He wrote *Pupphāñjali*, which is the collection of essays and verses in Pali. He edited the Dhammapada with Hindi and Sanskrit renderings, published by Delhi University, Delhi. He compiled and edited Pali –Paiya –Pakaso, a collection of Pali and Prakrit passages. He edited *Mahābuddhavatthu* Vol. I of Bharat Singh Upadhayaya with 108-page Introduction in Sanskrit. It has been published by Delhi Sanskrit Academy, Delhi.

Prof. Sanghasen Singh was very much impressed by the revolutionary ideas of Rahuljee. He edited the text *Sphutārthā Śrīghanācāra-saṅgrahaṭīkā*, which is based upon the photographic enlargements of the manuscripts of the text, discovered in the Ngor monastery of Tibet by Rahuljee. It was also published from K.P. Jayaswal Research Institutes, Patna in 1974. In the editorial on 'Buddhist Studies in India' of the *Journal of Buddhist Studies*, Prof. Sanghasen Singh writes-"But Rahul Sankrityayan stood apart, a seminal mind, a polymath of towering genius, vigorously active in many fields".[1] He has also dedicated his book "*Dhammapada: A Study*" to Rahuljee who taught him to revolt against the superstitions of the society.[2]

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[1]*Buddhist Studies*, Published for the Deptt. of Buddhist Studies, Delhi University, Delhi, 1975, p. no.VI.

[2]See *Dhammapada:A Study*, Vol.I (Ed.) Sanghasen Singh, Delhi University, Delhi, 1977.

Regarding origin and development of Abhidhamma, Prof. Sanghasen Singh is of the opinion that the scholastics among the monks who formed a very powerful group in the order under the leadership of the Brahmin converts to Buddhism had acquired prominent position by the dint of their proximity to the Buddha. After passing away of the Buddha the same group became more powerful. They made the exegetical study of the teachings of the Buddha and formulated the Abhiddhammic terms and their consequent details. Moggaliputtatissa Thera composed the text *Kathāvatthu* and circulated as a text of the *Tipiṭaka*. It seems that a very large number of Abhidhammic pandits had contributed their best in building early Abhidhammic literature. It is also significant that Sāriputta's name is associated with the origin of *Abhidhamma*. In fact, early Brahmin converts did play a vital role in this respect. The story of the association of Mahāmāya, the mother of Siddharth with the origin of *Abhidhamma* seems an afterthought[3].

Prof. Sanghasen Singh was also engaged to revise and edit the text *Abhidharmakośa* with *Nālandikā Ṭīkā* of Rahul Sankrityayan, published by Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan. (Deemed University), New Delhi. It was a great pleasure that after eighty-two years of the publication of this Nālandikā Ṭīkā from Kashi Vidyapeetha, Varanasi, a revised edition has been done by Prof. Sanghasen Singh and has been published by Rashtriya Sanskrit Sansthan (Deemed University, New Delhi in 2010 since the previous edition by the Kashi Vidyapeetha had been out of print. It was a historical event and has been possible with the noble assistance of Prof. Radha Vallabha Tripathy of that Deemed University. In the colophon of the new edition of the Nālandīkā Ṭīkā of Rahul jee, Prof. Sanghasen Singh writes that "this new edition has been prepared for arresting the decline, for promotion of Abhidharma scholarship, and the smooth entry of the freshers into the field". He had got a Photostat copy of text from Parshvanath Vidyapeetha, Varanasi with a great effort. He applied for the reprint of this text to the Registrar, Kashi Vidyapeetha, Varanasi and succeeded for the permission of the publication of this text with the assistance of Prof. Manager Pandey, Prof. Awadh Ram, Vice-Chancellor, Kashi Vidyapeetha, Prof. Parmanand Singh, Head, Deptt. of History, Kashi Vidyapeetha, Sri Indupati Jha, Registrar, Kashi Vidyapeetha, Dr. Anil Kumar Pandey, Secretary, Rahul Sankrityayana Pratishthana, New Delhi and writer of this obituary (Prof. Bimalendra Kumar). He also got the help of Prof. Ramashrya Sharma in the selection of the lesson (*Patha)*; Dr. Ravindra Panth, Director, Prof. Rajesh Ranjan, Head, Deptt. of Pali and Dr. K. K. Pandey, Librarian, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, Nalanda in getting the photo-prints of the Table of *Citta, Cetasika* etc. at the end of the previous mentioned text.

Prof. Sanghasen Singh was a veteran Life Member of the Maha Bodhi Society of India, Kolkata (West Bengal) and was a member of the Advisory committee of the Maha Bodhi Journal and the Dharmadoot Journal published by the Maha Bodhi Society of India,

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[3]Mahesh Tiwari, (Ed.) *Bodhi Raśmi*, First International Conference on Buddhism, New Delhi, 1984, p.110.

Kolkata and Sarnath centres respectively. He was very much concerned with the promotion of the Pali language and literature and the establishment of the Anagarika Dharmapala International Institute of Pali and Buddhism and for that he had donated an amount of Rupees Two lakhs to Maha Bodhi Society of India. He was one of the admirers of Anagarika Dharmapala for whom he had composed the following verses in Pali language to reinforce his own ideas[4]. It was published in the Maha Bodhi Journal, 2020. He was also awarded Anagarika Dharmapala Samman for the promotion of Pali and Buddhism in India at the First International Conference on Pali and Buddhism, organized by Maha Bodhi Society of India, Sarnath, Varanasi and on the occasion of 150th Birth Anniversary of Anagarika

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[4]*Dhammapālo Anāgaro*

1.Dhammapālo anāgāro simhalesu janim gato,
simhala-gāravaṭṭhānam smhala-kulaputtako.

2. Bhārataṁ vsīkarī raṭṭham nivasi yavajīvanaṁ,
Saddhammam bhāratam dve'pi sevāya parivaḍḍhayi.

3. Sāsanaṁ ca dalhīkātuṁ Mahābodhi sosāiṭīṁ,
Ṭhāpesi ca pavaḍḍhesi saddhamma-paṭisevayā.

4. Dese ca paradesesu tasmā sabbattha pujjati,
Dhammapālo anāgaro dhammamitto sadāhito.

5. Sāsana-sevāyā tenuṭṭhāpitaṁ dhamma-bhārataṁ,
Bharata-sevayā tena bhārata-mutti sādhitya.

6. Vissa-dhammāna saṁsāya sikāgo-nagare pare,
sambuddha-dhamma-byājenuḍḍāpitaṁ Bhārata-ddhajaṁ

7. Saddhamo Sākyasṁhāna mettādikaruṇā-ghano,
Uccassareṇa ugghuṭṭo jane jane pade pade.

8. Mutti mokkho ca nibbānaṁ nāmaṁ yadapi rocakaṁ,
Arahati jano laddhuṁ deva-bhāvaṁ apākari.

9. Bodhicitta-vikāsāya sabbe muttā na baddhakā,
Dvāraṁ sambodhiyā loke sabbesaṁ vivataṁ sadā,
Tasmā buddhena ugghuṭṭaṁ uṭṭhāhi tvaṁ pamādato.

10. Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā tamhetuṁ bhagavā vadi,
Tesaṁ ca sannirodho evaṁvādī mahāmuni.

11. Tumhehi kiccamātappaṁ akkhātāro tathāgatā,
Vināyaken yaṁ vuttaṁ taṁ vaco ajarāmaraṁ.

12. Sadhammo evamkkhāto Devamittena saṁsadi,
Sadhammassappakāsena bhāratam bhā-rataṁ gataṁ.
Iti Setala Sanghasenassa bandho.

Dharmapala in 2014.

Prof. Sanghasen Singh was one of those Buddhologists and historians whose name and fame shine world over. His contribution to Buddhological Sciences and Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit is perhaps second to none. In the field of Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, his work on *Sphutārthā S'rīghanācāra-sangrahaīkā*, serve as guidebooks to the researchers as well as seasoned.

There are many contributions of Prof. Sanghasen Singh in the development of Buddhist Studies in India and had been a source of inspiration for other researchers and students of Buddhist Studies. He devoted his whole life to the cause of the weaker and socially marginalized and earned the displeasure of those who did not see eye to eye with him. His frankness and straightforwardness have sometimes taken to be his harshness and even rudeness. But those who knew him, are of the opinion that he helped even those who differed with him bitterly. I admire his simplicity, putting his thoughts with reasoning and logic. I pay my tribute and great salutation to my respected Gurudev Prof. Sanghasen Singh and wish for getting a state of peace.

Prof. Bimalendra Kumar

ICCR Chair of Buddhist Studies
Lumbini Buddhist University
Lumbini, Nepal.

NEWS AND NOTES

Felicitation Ceremony Honouring Chairman & Members of National Minorities Commission :

Odisha Centre held felicitation ceremony honouring Shri Iqbal Singh Lalpura, Chairman, Ms. Rinchen Lhamo and Shri Dhyan Kumar Jinappa Gunde, Members of National Minorities Commission on 6th December, 2023, at Bhubaneswar. It was a great occasion to honour the dignitaries of National Minorities Commission. Shri Lalpura availed his presence to felicitate the veteran Member and dignified scholar, Dr. Bimalendu Mohanty, for his contributions to Buddhist literature.

17th Anniversary Celebration of Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi Vihara at Buddhagaya Centre :

Buddhagaya Centre of Maha Bodhi Society of India held 17th Anniversary Celebration of Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi Vihara from 1st to 3rd February, 2024. The Celebration started by bring out a procession from Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi Vihara to Maha Bodhi Maha Vihara (Main Temple) on 31st January, 2024. Exposition of the Sacred Relics of Sakyamuni Buddha and His Chief Disciples - Arahants Sariputta and Maha Moggallana took place from 1st to 3rd February, 2024, for public veneration. Other events include drama on Buddhist theme, Dhammachakka Sutta chanting, Sobha Yatra starting from Kalachakra Maidan to Maha Bodhi Society of India via 80 ft. statue of the Buddha.

85th Foundation Day Celebration of New Delhi Centre :

New Delhi Centre celebrated 85th Foundation Day of the Centre throughout the day on 18th March, 2024. The programme included placing garlands on the statue of Bodhisattva Anagarika Dharmapala. Buddha puja and Sutta chanting and discourse on recollection of the historical background of the Centre.

Ven. M. Dhammalankara Thero, Bhikkhu-in-Charge, New Delhi Centre, welcomed the dignitaries and invitees at the evening programme. Dr. (Prof.) Manish Kumar, Vice-President and Shri Subroto Barua, Governing Body Member of the Society delivered speeches on the occasion. Representatives of Vietnam Embassy, Acharya Yeshi, Shri Rajesh Lamba, Ms. Vaisakhe Sailani, Shri Amarendra Kumar Singh, Governing Body Member of the Society and Sri Lankan students from Delhi University atte4nded the programme amongst others.

Audience with Hon'ble President of India at Rashtrapati Bhawan :

Shri Narendra Kumar Mishra, Vice-President, MBSI and President of Odisha Centre of MBSI along with his wife had the privilege of meeting the Hon'ble President of India, Mrs. Droupadi Murmu at Rashtrapali Bhawan on 26th April, 2024. It was very cordial meeting with the Hon'ble President of India and Mr. & Mrs. Mishra, when they took the opportunity of cordially inviting the Hon'ble President to inaugurate the Buddha Stupa which was in

final stage of construction at the Odisha Centre.

Mrs. Mishra was the teacher of Hon'ble Madam President and Superintendent of S.T. Women's Hostel where Her Excellency resided during her studenthood.

Webinar on Birth Anniversary of Babasaheb Dr. B. R. Ambedkar :

Maha Bodhi Society of India celebrated 134th Birth Anniversary of Babasaheb Dr. B. R. Ambedkar on 14th April, 2024, through remembering his great contributions to the country as well as in the propagation of Buddhist thoughts as he perceived. The Society held a Webinar on 20th April, 2024, at 6 P.M. (IST) on the theme - "Contributions of Dr. B., R. Ambedkar for deprived communities and in propagation of Buddhism in India".

The Webinar was presided over by Dr. Mahendra Singh, President, MBSI, and Key-Note Address was delivered by Prof. Pradeep Gokhale, Retired Professor of Pune University. Ms. Namrata Chadha, Executive Committee Member of the Society and engaged in social activities, was the other Hon'ble Speaker of the Webinar. The President of the Society also highlighted on the close association of Dr. Ambedkar with the Society including his embracing to Buddhism with his followers enmasse at Nagpur on 14th October, 1956, where Dr. Devapriya Valisinghe, the then General Secretary and Most Venerable G. Prajnananda Thero, Vice-President & Trustee of the Society were present.

Book Release :

A book release function was held at the Temple Hall of Odisha Centre of Maha Bodhi Society o India on 14th January, 2024. The book on life history of Guru Padmasambhava, who was known as the Second Buddha in the entire Himalayan region, was authored by Shri Prabir Patnaik, renowned researcher and Life Member of the Society.

Dr. Umakanta Mishra, Editor of popular Odia daily newspaper - "Sakala" was the Chief Guest of the function and the Chief Speaker was Dr. Asit Mohanty, Editor of "Pourasha" a popular cultural magazine and the Editor of "Kalinga", house-journal of Odisha Centre. Dr. Karunakar Pradhan, Chief of Sikhya Vikash Sansthan, Shri Narendra Kumar Mishra, Vice-President, MBSI & President of the Centre, Shri M. K. Panda, Publisher of the book were present in the function amongst others. Dr. S. K. Mohapatra, Trustee, MBSI & Secretary of the Centre conducted the whole function.

Obituary:

Dayke Maha Upasika Nalini Kumbhare, Founder Member of Dragon Palace Temple, Kramptee, Nagpur, passed away on 3rd December, 2023, at the age of 86 years. She was a Life Member of the Society and was the beloved mother of Ms. Sulekha Tai Kumbhare, Hon'ble State Minister, Govt. of Maharashtra.

Late Tai Kumbhareji was a devoted Buddhist and attended ceremonies organised by Buddhist Societies in sacred Buddhist places during the last few decades and extended her continuous support for such activities.

Dr. Jagdish Gandhi, renowned educationist and Founder, City Montessori School at Lucknow passed away on 22nd January, 2024. He was conferred the distinction of Honorary Life Membership of Maha Bodhi Society of India for his outstanding contribution in the field of education, which came out in Guinness Book of World Records in 1999 and being the author books and articles on spiritual education as well as being the organiser of conference of World's Chief Justices since 2000 at Lucknow forming 'World Parliament' under Article 51 of Constitution of India and recipient of UNESCO Prize for Peace Education.

Most Ven'ble Dhammissa Nayaka Maha Thero, Acting Maha Nayaka Maha Thero of Udarata Amarapura Maha Nayaka, Sri Lanka, passed away on 13th March, 2024, at the age of 64 years at Japan. He was a well-wisher of the Society and made valuable co-ordination in restoration of Mulagandha Kuti Vihara wall paintings by the Japanese Artists on the life of the Buddha.

Ven'ble Lama Lobzang, Former Vice-President of Maha Bodhi Society of India, passed away on 16th March, 2024, at the age of 93 years at New Delhi. Late Ven'ble Lamaji born in 1931 at Leh, Ladakh, was taken to Sarnath Centre of the Society in his childhood by late Devapriya Valisinghe, the then General Secretary of the Society and his Monastic Education was arranged thereat. He later went to Sri Lanka for higher Ordination as a Monk.

Late Ven'ble Lamaji devoted nearly six decades of his life for propagation of Buddhist Teachings and held various positions in Government organisations as well as NGOs. He was the Founder of International Buddhist Confederation at New Delhi which was later went under the Central Government and he developed Ashoka Mission at New Delhi which is a popular Buddhist Community Centre for helping the needy people. Apart from being the Member of National Commission for Scheduled Tribe, he represented the Buddhist in the Minority Commission of the Government.

Condolence prayers were held at New Delhi, Sarnath and Buddhagaya Centres of the Society. President, and General Secretary of the Society convened Condolence Prayer meetings of the Society on 17th March, 2024. Shri Subroto Barua, Executive Committee Member of the Society attended the last Rites Ceremony of the late Ven'ble Monk.

Prof. Sanghasen Singh, a veteran Life Member of the Society, passed away on 27th March, 2024, at the age of 91 years at New Delhi. Late Prof. Singhji, a renowned academician of international fame, was the Head of the Department of Buddhist Studies, Delhi University and made notable contribution for propagation of Buddhist Teachings in

the country and abroad. He authored a number of books in Pali and edited Dharmapada with Hindi and Sanskrit readings. A recipient of President of India's Certificate of Honour for outstanding in Pali and Buddhist Studies, late Prof. Singh was the honourable speaker in the Webinars organised by the Society.

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